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ABSTRACT
Nuclear %«eapons, long considered the bête noire of 
human existence are examined quantitatively and 
qualitatively in this dissertation to ascertain if the 
heinous effects they threaten ultimately serve to promote 
deterrence between pêtirs of states. The findings suggest 
that nuclear weapons do have a significant intact on 
conflict when present on both sides of a dyadic dispute. In 
such symmetrical nuclear pairs conflict levels are 
quantitatively shown to be reduced, suggesting that the 
conflict inhibiting qualities of these weapons long espoused 
by nuclear optimists are legitimate. Further evidence is 
presented in the form of a qualitative analysis of conflict 
between India and Pakistan over the region of Jammu and 
Kashmir. In this individual dyad the introduction of 
nuclear weapons again appears to have manifested lower 
levels of conflict between these heated adversaries. The 
in^lication of this research is that the steady spread of 
nuclear weapons may serve to dampen conflict throughout the 
international system.
vxi
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CHAPTER ORB: IMTRODUCTIOH: THE THREAT AMD PROMISE
OP MUCLEAR WEAPOMS
"The reputation of power is power." 
— Thomas Hobbes
Nuclear weapons promote interstate peace. The 
statement seems counter-intuitive initially, as the reader 
grapples with the seemingly divergent concepts of nuclear 
weaponry and peace. Yet since their creation in 1945 
nuclear weapons have not been the bane of human existence 
many feared they would become. Indeed such weapons have not 
been used in conflict since the end of World War II and a 
number of scholars have theorized that the destructive 
potential displayed by these weapons has ensured peace 
between the great powers ever since (Gallois 1961; Sandoval 
1976; Waltz 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982;
Hearsheimer 1990; Weltman 1995). Others are not as 
sanguine, suggesting that the spread of nuclear weapons is 
something to be actively and vigorously curtailed 
(Morgenstern 1959; Ikle 1960; Doty 1960; Nye 1981; Bailey 
1991; Spector 1990, 1995; Kraig 1999). Still others have 
called for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons (Gilpin 
1962; Schell 1982, 1984; Ellsberg 1992). This dissertation 
tests the claims of the first group of scholars, sometimes 
referred to as nuclear optimists, to ascertain if the 
presence of nuclear weapons has led to any reduction in 
conflict between pairs of states.
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The basic notion put forward by the nuclear optimists 
that overWielming military strength pacifies enemies is not 
a new concept. The ancient military strategist Sun Tzu 
(1963, 67) argued for the necessity of evasion when one's 
opponent had overwhelming force saying that when this was 
the case: "avoid him." Indeed nuclear pairs of states
clearly appear to have avoided one another in terms of armed 
conflict, as there has never been a case of interstate 
warfare between two nuclear powers. But why? In order to 
understand why it is helpful to review how states operate 
within the international system.
The fundamental dynamics of international politics 
regularly act to restrict the extent to which a state can 
reach its aims at the expense of other states. Nuclear 
weapons have amplified many of these characteristics. As 
observers starting with Thucydides have pointed out, in a 
world of autonomous states, each will act to check the most 
objectionable efforts of others. As a result, most attempts 
to nicLke excessive gains have been self-defeating. This is 
the basic lesson of the balance of power (Waltz 1979). A 
state that seeks domination may gain a series of successes, 
but doing so will lead others to see the state as such a 
menace that they must temporarily scuttle their disputes to 
defeat it, lest they later be dominated by it. This results 
in a coalition of weaker forces banding together to put down 
the dominant hegemon. By seeking dominance rather than
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
accepting lesser gains, Napoleon and Hitler forfeited the 
positions they had previously secured. These ignoble 
attempts to dominate Europe might have triumphed if the 
aspiring hegemon had adopted somewhat different tactics. ^ 
Even on a scale less grand, states that consistently 
augment their power and continually intrude on the interests 
of others are likely to encounter expanded opposition. 
Although states sometimes bandwagon and strive to align 
themselves with rising powers, more often they balance 
against such threats (Halt 1985). Of course not every 
action meets with a rapid and similar counteraction. For 
example, taking advantage of their rather isolated 
geographic locales, both the United States and Russia 
annexed their hinterlands in the nineteenth century with 
minimal opposition from other states. But such free 
expamsion is not the norm within the international system. 
The fact that the world consists of independent states that 
seek goals that conflict with those of each other means that 
states may find it difficult to gain most of what they want. 
Additionally, according to Realist scholars, to succeed too 
well is to invite others to increase their efforts to 
combat, contain, and control the state. Realist thinkers 
such as Hans Morgenthau (1979) acknowledged these dynamics
1. For instance, if Hitler had not decided to declare 
war on Russia and the united States before he had complete 
control of Western Europe his attempt to dominate Europe 
might have proven more effectual (Schroeder 1987).
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when they advocated restraint, the use of quiet diplomacy, 
and the sacrifice of peripheral interests when necessary in 
order to display respect for the vital interests of others 
and reduce conflict with them.
Security might seem like a basic mission, but even the 
effort to ensure that others will not be able to threaten 
the state may be self-defeating. International politics is 
characterized by the security dilemma. Realists suggest 
that absolute security for one state tends to lead to 
absolute insecurity for others. Therefore, efforts aimed at 
freeing the state from foreign dangers generally influence 
other states to take counteractions that are likely to 
reduce the other state's security to a level lower than it 
was before it launched its initial effort. In some cases, 
the result can be a spiral of misperceptions, antagonism, 
and war. When statesmen grasp these dynamics, they do not 
try to maximize their power to make them safe, but instead 
they seek to maximize their security (Waltz 1979; Luttwak 
1987).
Nuclear weapons have served bo magnify these 
international difficulties facing states, and thus succeed 
in limiting the options available to nuclear-capable states 
paired in conflict with one another. The danger of 
escalation, coupled with the clear impossibility of winning 
a nuclear conflagration, means that leaders realize that 
serious challenges to a nuclear adversary's vital interests
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
could end in Armageddon. Therefore, conflict stalemate is 
naturally promoted between nucleêur powers because in such 
pairings victory is unrealizable.
Thus, in theory at least, nucleair powers cire deterred 
from escalating conflicts with one another because of the 
potentially dire consequences such an escalation could 
produce. This dissertation tests that hypothesis through a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative means.
The dissertation consists of six chapters. Following 
this introduction the second chapter discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings of the nuclear peace. As will be 
discussed in detail in the second chapter, Kenneth Waltz 
(1981), among others (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 1982; 
Hears heimer 1990) has argued that "the measured spread of 
nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feeured. " Waltz 
believes that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons will 
promote peace and reinforce international stability because 
nuclear weapons induce caution between adversaries who 
possess them. In short, "more may be better." The second 
chapter will explore the theoretical arguments behind this 
intrepid assertion.
The third chapter is the quantitative section of the 
dissertation. It tests the hypothesis that nuclear weapons 
have had a pacifying effect on conflict between pairs of 
states through employment of two multiple regression models. 
The dependent variable of conflict escalation
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(operationalized in terms of level of conflict and number of 
fatalities) is tested against the presence of nuclear 
weapons (both symmetrically and asymmetrically) in the dyad 
and six other independent factors theoretically surmised to 
have had a significant impact on conflict: military parity,
level of democratization, regime stability, trade, 
geographic proximity amd allicuice membership.
The next two chapters provide the qualitative backbone 
of the dissertation. The fourth chapter is a case study of 
the evolving relationship between India and Pakistan. The 
decades old animus between these two states has led some to 
suggest that now that both sides have openly and 
successfully tested nuclear weapons, ^ the Indian 
subcontinent is a tinderbox waiting to explode (Erlanger 
1998). For instance, following the nuclear weapons tests by 
India and Pakistan in 1998 President Clinton declared, "I 
cannot believe that we are about to start the twenty-first 
century by having the Indian Subcontinent repeat the worst 
mistakes of the twentieth century" (Hirsh and Barry 1998, 
23). This notion deserves scrutiny as the events of the 
Cold War suggest that the presence of nuclear weapons may 
have prevented conflict between nuclear rivals. Indeed a 
number of analysts argue that the introduction of nuclear
2. India conducted its tests on 11 May 1998 producing 
one or more blasts totaling cd)out 25 kilotons. Pakistan 
responded with tests of its own on 28 May 1998 producing one 
or more blasts totaling about 12 kilotons (Hirsh and Barry 
1998, 24).
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weapons to the Indian subcontinent will lead to conflict 
pacification. "There is no way that there is going to be 
another war here," according to Colonel Narendra Singh Mehta 
of the Indian Armed Forces. "There may be some local 
exchanges of fire, the sort of thing that's been happening 
here for yeeirs, but nuclear weapons have made full-scale war 
unthinkable" (Bums 1998, 3). Many scholars and defense 
analysts support this view of South Asia (Subrahmanyam 1986; 
Harrison and Kemp 1993; Perkovich 1993; Sundarji 1993; Beg 
1994; Arguilla 1997; Arif 1995; Lavoy 1995).
Thus the impact of nuclear weapons on Indo-Pakistani 
conflict will be reviewed. Through an examination of the 
historical record this chapter serves to trace Indo- 
Pakistani relations over the past fifty years, beginning 
with their 1947 war over control of Jammu and Kashmir, up to 
the present nuclear stalemate between the two. It focuses 
on the four major conflicts between India and Pakistan over 
the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. This 
dissertation will display that the Indo-Pakistani dyad was 
pacified by the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1974.
The Indo-Pakistani relationship is particularly 
important because it provides a qualitative window through 
which one Ccui observe the impact of all three types of 
dyadic relations between states. Over the past fifty years 
the Indo-Pakistani dyad has moved from a non-nuclear one 
(1947-1974 when India ascended to its present status as a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nuclesLT capable state) ; to an asymmetrical dyad (1974-1986) ; 
to a symmetrical dyad (though Pakistan became an official 
member of the nuclear club with its overt testing of such 
weapons in May of 1998, it has been considered a de facto 
member since 1986 (Spector 1990)).
Armed with the results from the previous two chapters. 
Chapter Five examines current US policy with respect to 
nuclear proliferation and then discusses vdiat alterations 
may need to be made in it as we move into the twenty-first 
century. Chapter Five attempts to apply the theories and 
findings presented in the preceding chapters to real world 
situations, investigating the potential impact of nuclear 
weapons on two dyads of recent concern by US security 
planners: the Korean dyad and the Greco-Turk dyad. This
chapter will examine whether or not the presence, or even 
the threat of the presence of nuclear weapons has, or could 
have a pacifying effect on relations in these dyads. US 
policy recommendations with respect to these dyads are 
presented. The major question for this chapter is whether 
the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons will be a 
hindrance or a help to maintaining stability throughout the 
world and what the implications are for US foreign policy in 
the future.
Chapter Six provides a brief summary of the conclusions 
of the dissertation. Additionally, it elucidates the 
potential impact of technological advancements in weaponry
8
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in the next millennium to ascertain v^at role nuclear 
weapons will play, if any, in the arsenals of the future. 
Both the qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in 
the preceding chapters are drawn upon to frame a cogent 
answer to this question.
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CHAPTER TWO: CRISIS RED RUCLBAR HBAPGERX
"Since I do not foresee that atomic energy 
is to be a great boon for a long time, I 
have to say that for the present it is a 
menace. Perhaps it is well that it should 
be. It may intimidate the human race into 
bringing order into its international affairs, 
which, without the pressure of fear, it would 
not do."
— Albert Einstein
The abrupt end to the forty-five year long Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union caught 
everyone off guard. Scholars of international relations 
failed to forecast such a placid and sudden end to communist 
control of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as occurred 
between 1989-1991. In fact, most had asserted theories that 
stated only a major war between the two great powers would 
ultimately leave one the victor and the other the 
vanquished. Yet this did not occur. Why? Why did scholars 
of international relations fail to predict such a peaceful 
cessation of tensions? Historian John Lewis Gaddis (1992- 
93) has berated students of the discipline of international 
relations for their fctilure to do so, claiming that theories 
of international relations are lacking in both their 
descriptive and predictive power.
This dissertation endeavors to reassert traditional 
international relations theory by qualitatively and 
quantitatively examining the intact of the one major element 
which made the Cold War international system unique: the
10
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presence of nuclear weapons. The impact of nuclear weapons 
on interstate relations will be examined to ascertain if 
weapons have a pacifying effect on nuclear interstate 
interactions. The dissertation's central question is single 
but critical to our understanding: Does the presence of
nuclear weapons retard conflict escalation between pairs of 
states ?
Nuclear Optimism
The possible pacifying effect of nuclear weapons^ on 
interstate relations has been heralded most strongly by 
neorealist Kenneth Naltz. Waltz has put forward the view 
that the spread of nuclear weapons is not necessarily a 
threat to world security. Waltz (1981), among others 
(Gallois 1961; Sandoval 1976; Bueno de Mesquita and Riker 
1982; Mearsheimer 1990; Weltman 1995), argues that "the 
measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed 
than feared." Waltz theorizes that the gradual spread of 
nuclear weapons will promote peace and reinforce 
international stability because nuclear weapons induce 
caution between nuclear adversaries. In short, "more may be 
better."
3. A nuclear weapon is an apparatus whose explosive 
energy is a derivative of fission, fusion, or a combination 
the two nuclear processes. Nuclear fission is the splitting 
of the nucleus of an atom into two or more parts. Nuclear 
fusion joins light isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium 
and tritium, which lilaezrates energy and neutrons (Cochran et 
al., 1984).
11
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Though Waltz may be the loudest voice of nuclear 
proliferation optimism, support for the potential pacifying 
effect the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the 
international system might induce has existed almost as long 
as the weapons have. Jacob Viner (1946) was the first to 
openly argue for the potential peace nuclear weapons might 
bring. Viner (1946) theorized that the spread of nuclear 
weaponry throughout the world would make conflict less 
likely between states because of the high price of military 
victory. Arthur Less Burns (1957) elaborated on Viner' s 
theory, arguing that in the absence of a sudden 
technological breakthrough, the spread of nuclear weapons 
could stabilize international relations. Morton Kaplan 
(1957, 52) concurred with Viner and Burns, stating that as 
long as a "surprise Icnockout blow was technically 
impossible" nuclear weapons dispersed among a large number 
of states would ensure a more peaceful world.
The 1960s brought additional advocacy for proliferation 
optimism. F.H. Bins ley (1963, 354-55 ) wrote that nuclear 
weapons "constitute for the first time a true deterrent, one 
that will never be relied upon so long as it exists —  and 
this is likely to be forever. " French General Peter Gallois 
(Dulles and Crane 1964, 215) added his support, arguing that 
"If every nuclear power held weapons truly invulnerable to 
the blows of the other, the resort to force by the one to 
the detriment of the other would be impossible. " At the
12
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same t^iine, Richard Rosecrance (1963) suggested that worries 
about the strategic consequences of nuclear proliferation 
were exaggerated. Rosecrance (1963, 188) argued: "The nth 
country ' problem may not turn out to be a problem. " 
Rosecrance (1969, 103) added six years later: "If the
threat of minor war makes the two greatest states redouble 
their efforts in tandem to prevent major war, it is even 
conceivcible that nuclear dispersion could have a net 
beneficial impact."
The 1970s brought Robert Sandoval's (1976) porcupine 
theory of nuclear proliferation. According to this theory, 
states even with modest nuclear capabilities would "walk 
like a porcupine through the forests of international 
affairs: no threat to [their] neighbors, too prickly for
predators to swallow" (Sandoval 1976, 19). It was only 
after all of this that Kenneth Waltz (1981) added his 
theories to those of the nuclear optimists, suggesting that 
the mere presence of nuclear weapons leads to extreme 
caution, thereby decreasing the likelihood of conflict as 
more states acquire them.
Following Waltz, additional scholars have weighed in as 
nuclear proliferation optimists. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
and William Riker (1982) contend that nuclear proliferation 
serves the interests of peace. Martin van Creveld (1993) 
asserts that "nuclear weapons prevent the regional states 
that have them from fighting each another." John Weltman
13
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(1995, 219) theorizes that "the spread of nuclear 
weapons... to new powers will tend over time to induce 
caution and moderate conflict." In fact, nuclear 
proliferation optimists mostly agree that the presence of 
nuclear weapons generates caution in military and political 
decision-makers irrespective of the geographic location, 
system of governance, or the political culture of the 
countries in question (Freedman 1988).
Indeed all weapons, as Robert Jervis (1989) has argued, 
change the status of states in ways that make them more or 
less secure. For example, as Waltz (1995) notes, "If 
weapons cure not well suited for conquest, neighbors have 
more peace of mind." Likewise, nuclear weapons arguably 
produce their own effects by providing a strong deterrent 
against aggression (Binsley 1963; Lavoy 1995; Weltman 1995). 
Nuclear weapons' deterrent value rests on their ability to 
punish (Gray 1979, 1990; Waltz 1990). Nuclear weapons 
provide a state with the ability to damage or destroy things 
the aggressor holds dear to such an extent that gains the 
aggressor had hoped to achieve are outweighed (Waltz 1990; 
Gray 1998). It is believed that this strong punitive 
aspect of nuclear weapons is what makes them such a powerful 
deterrent against state aggression (Sandoval 1976; Gray 
1979, 1990, 1998; Waltz 1990; Van Creveld 1993; Lavoy 1995).
14
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Paz Atomica
Thus, during the Cold War, the overwhelming destructive 
capabilities of the nuclear weapons arsenals of the United 
States and the Soviet Union provided each of these two 
superpowers with a strong deterrent against militeiry 
conflict between themselves. Would a like peace have 
existed in an international system void of such weapons? 
Probably not, according to a number of scholars (Gaddis 
1990; Mearsheimer 1990; Waltz 1990; Lavoy 1995; Weltman 
1995; Gray 1998; Payne 1998a, 1998b). The uncertainties of 
a world made up merely of states with access to conventional 
weapons are increased because conventional warfare, unlike a 
nuclear conflagration, can be perceived as winnable. For 
this reason, the likelihood of warfare between states 
increases "because the uncertainties of their outcomes 
(wars) make it easier for the leaders of states to entertain 
illusions of victory at supportéible cost" (Waltz 1990, 58).
The US-Soviet relationship is particularly important 
because it represents the longest symmetrical nuclear 
relationship in the history of the world. It is 
additionally unique because, despite the roughly equal 
military standing between the two states during the Cold War 
period, the United States and the Soviet Union never 
directly engaged in warfare. The lack of interstate warfare 
during the Cold War has been attributed to the presence of 
nucleêu: weapons (Jervis 1989; Gaddis 1990; Mearsheimer 1990;
15
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Waltz 1990, 1993; Glaser 1998; Harkavy 1998; Payne 1998a, 
1998b). Indeed the nuclear era seems to be peerless In 
modern history because of this absence of great power 
conflict. Stephen Cambone and Patrick Garrity (1994-95, 77) 
note: "The past five decades have marked a unique period in
human history (at least since the establishment of the 
modem state system in 1648), in which war between the 
dominant powers has not occurred and in which one of those 
powers actually conceded and dissolved itself peacefully."
In eras when military victory was possible, a state 
could challenge its adversary in the expectation that if the 
latter did not retreat, the state could resort to war 
(Jervis 1989; Lavoy 1998). During the Cold War and 
continuing through to today, the knowledge that war would be 
suicide coupled with the bargaining advantage possessed by 
the side defending the status quo means that would-be 
expansionists should be loath to instigate confrontations.
In addition, because in the past the balance of power could 
be upset if a significant actor shifted from one camp to the 
other (Rosenau 1969; Waltz 1993), the security interests of 
both the united States and the Soviet Union were often 
deeply involved with those of their allies (Jervis 1989).
The series of pre-world War I confrontations provide 
evidence of this. The main reason why Britain supported 
France in the Moroccan crises was the fear that if it did 
not, France might desert the Entente and leave England
16
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dangerously Isolated (Jervis 1989). The same dynamics were 
at work in July 1914. France had to support Russia and 
Britain had to support France and Russia because a failure 
to do so might break up the Entente and leave them exposed 
to German dominance. Similarly, Germany could not afford to 
see Austria-Hungary leave the alliance or, more probably, 
disintegrate (Betts 1987).
In the nuclear era, by contrast, security is provided 
by second-strike capability; defections by allies are 
therefore less damaging. Thus, neither France's withdrawal 
from the military arrangements of NATO nor China's 
realignment precipitated a superpower crisis. Therefore, 
during the Cold Wau: years, the superpo%rers did not permit 
their allies to drag them into excessively dangerous 
situations (Betts 1987).*
However, conflict at some level still took place 
between the Soviets and the United States once the advent of 
mutual second-strike capability occurred (Brecher and 
wilkenfeld 1989; Brecher 1993), but the crises between the 
two superpowers generally were considered less serious 
according to some scholars (Betts 1987; Jervis 1989; McCall 
1992).5 According to Robert Jervis (1989) most of the
4. However, Richard Betts (1987) argues that even 
during the 1950s American war planners acted as though the 
Soviet Union did have second strike capability.
5. McCall (1992), for instance, provides case 
histories for what he argues are the most serious US-Soviet 
Cold War crises: Iranian crisis of March 1946; Berlin
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tensions were generated by third actors and were driven more 
by the superpowers ' desire to project a general image of 
high resolve than by any specific stake.
It has been suggested that because of the extreme 
destructive potential of nuclear weapons the superpowers 
during the Cold War were forced to recognize the necessity 
of accommodation and cooperation. Both the United States 
and the Soviet union were compelled to engage in what David 
Tarr (1991) has called adversarial cooperation, Tarr (1991, 
10) argues that for the two superpowers "the motive for 
accommodating the other arose not so much from the 
congruence of values and interests, but in recognition that 
the alternatives to cooperation could be too costly or 
dangerous to pursue. " The boat of nuclear risk in which 
both the United States and Soviet Union sat was kept steady, 
therefore, by an adversarial cooperation. Both superpowers, 
as Thomas Schelling (1960) first suggested, shared a strong 
aversion to tipping over the boat. Thus, the United States 
and Soviet Union seemed to "learn" as the years of the Cold
blockade and air lift (1948-1949); Berlin Wall crisis 
(August 1961); Cuban Missile Crisis (October 1962); and the 
Middle East Wcur and alert (October 1973). McCall (1992^ 28) 
argues that these incidents "constitute the most serious 
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet 
union that involved the risk of military conflict in the 
post-world War II era." Of these crises, only the 1973 
Middle East War occurred at a time of rough nuclear pari.ty 
between the United States and Soviet Union. Even the Cuban 
Missile Crisis took place, according to Robert Jervis (1989, 
36) "when the Soviets had weak nuclear forces" and was "in 
part motivated by the urgent Soviet need to gain something 
like parity."
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War progressed that because neither side could determine its 
own security unilaterally, cooperation was needed (Nye 1987, 
371-402).
Thus the first implication of the nuclear age is that 
military victory is perceived as not possible between 
nuclear states. From this it follows that if leaders are 
rational, wars among nuclear powers should not occur.
Indeed, since 1945 they have not. This is especially 
significant in the case of the United States and the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War because the absence of fighting 
between the two main international rivals is rare. Indeed, 
it seems to be unprecedented. Paul Schroeder (1985) writes, 
"Since the second century A.D. under the Pax Romana, the 
Western world has known no long periods of general peace.
The modern record was 38 years, 9 months, and five days... 
from the aftermath of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo to the 
effective beginning of the Crimean War.. .That record was 
broken...on May 15, 1984." Joseph Nye"s (1987) counting 
rule is somewhat less stringent, but still yields merely a 
previous record of forty-three years of peace (between the 
Franco-Prussian Wêir and World War I), a record that 
continues to be surpassed as the years continue to mount 
since the end of World War II.
This is not to say that nuclear weapons are the only 
possible cause of peace, they just seem to be the strongest. 
Nevertheless, other hypotheses for the long peace enjoyed
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since the end of World War II have been put forward as well. 
First, it has been suggested that bipolarity may have 
brought peace by providing an easy and unambiguous 
identification of potential enemies and by diminishing the 
ability of allies to drag the leading powers into conflict 
(Gaddis 1990). When there are only two major powers in the 
system, each knows that only the other one can threaten its 
standing. Yet a bipolar world in which military victory is 
possible can be unstable, as the examples of Athens and 
Sparta and Rome and Carthage indicate. What separated the 
Cold War bipolarity from these earlier instances is the 
presence of nuclear weaponry.
Second, the processes of political and economic 
modernization might have brought peace even without nuclear 
weapons (Gaddis 1990). Trade provides many of the economic 
benefits that previously came with conquest, as Japan's 
success indicates. Territory, the prime spoil of war, has 
become at least somewhat devalued. Indeed nuclear weapons 
may have led to the refocusing of the possible spoils of war 
away from territory. Such devices make the acquisition of 
territory irrelevant as use of nuclear weapons makes the 
irradiated territorial gains uninhaibitable.
Finally, the most basic explanation of the Soviet- 
American peace is singly that neither side had a strong 
motive to change the status quo (Gaddis 1990). While both 
would have preferred a some^ rtiat different world, they
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already had reached the pinnacle of superpower status. Thus
it did not take a great deal of restraint to keep the peace.
There may be something to be said for this last
argument. But even though neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union was strongly driven to eliminate the other,
they did have important conflicts of interest and clashing
security requirements. Furthermore, the basic insight of
systems theory is that we cannot equate results with
intentions: for wars to occur it is not required that the
actors seek such an outcome (Waltz 1955). Previous wars
have broken out even though the major states were not
pressing to overturn the status quo; without nuclear weapons
these processes could be replicated. John Gaddis's (1990,
56) analysis is persuasive:
Wars, in the past, have started over far lesser 
provocations than have been present since 1945.
World War I itself began as the result of a 
single political assassination. The Crimean War 
grew out of a quarrel between France and Russia 
over the custody of holy places in Palestine.
Spain and England went to war in 1739, or so we 
are told, over the cutting off of a single 
sailor's ear. One need only to compare these 
trivialities, with all their bloody effects, to 
such postwar episodes as the Iranian crisis of 
1946, the Czechoslovak coup and the Berlin 
blockage in 1948, the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea in 1950, the fall of Dienbienphu in 
1954, the Quemoy-Matsu incidents of 1954-55 and 
1958, the Hungarian uprising cuid the Suez crisis 
of 1956, the Berlin confrontations of 1958-59 and 
1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the mining 
of Haiphong harbor and the bombing of Hanoi in 
1972, the DefCon 3 nuclear alert during the 1973 
Middle East weir, the invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, and the Korean airliner incident of 1983.
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The absence of interstate warfare or any significant 
conflict between the great powers following these myriad 
events would seem to reinforce the proposed pacifying 
effects of nuclear weapons (at least among the nuclear 
powers ). In the case of the two superpowers, nuclear 
weapons seemed to foster a stalemate, where neither the 
United States, nor the Soviet Union was ever willing to 
challenge directly the other, in order to become the sole 
power in the world. Instead the status quo was maintained 
because the risks of a nuclear conflagration were singly too 
exorbitant. In other words, both of the superpowers 
preferred to deter rather than to compel one another.^ 
Whereas deterrence supports the status quo by merely 
requiring an adversary to continue to refrain from forbidden 
acts, compellence obligates an adversary to alter its 
behavior, either through the discontinuance of an activity 
or by initiating a behavior which otherwise would not be 
undertaken.^
6. George, et al. (1971) present empirical arguments 
concerning the conditions under which the superpowers 
attempted to conqpel one another during the first half of the 
Cold War.
7. Schelling (1960a) suggests that deterrence is 
usually easier to achieve than con^llence as an adversary's 
behavior is attempting to be maintained and not changed. 
Thus, it is a much less overtly threatening posture and 
therefore, more suited to activities between nuclear rivals.
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Crises and Nuclear Weapons
The general effect of nuclear weapons on crises has 
been to widen the gap between the value of the interests in 
conflict and the potential costs of the war. The separation 
between potential costs and potential outcomes was not as 
wide, or at least not as clear to prospective combatants, in 
the years prior to the nuclear age. The destructive power 
nuclear weapons pose is clear. Overall, the perceived 
intact of nuclear weapons on crisis situations basically has 
been twofold: first, it is generally assumed that nuclear
weapons lead states to behave in a more prudent and 
constrained fashion, and second it has been argued that 
nuclear weaponry provides a tacit raising of the 
"provocation threshold", thereby lengthening the crisis 
escalation "ladder” adversaries must climb before arriving 
at interstate warfare (Kahn 1960).
Referring to the first of these two results of the 
nuclear age, it seems reasonable to suggest that states in 
general have worked quite hard to keep risks low during 
crises since 1945. Physical constraints, for exan^le, are 
constructed laggardly in order to receive feedback as to the 
opponent's probable response before completion. A notable 
case of such a gradual commitment was the East German step- 
by-step closure of the border between east and west Berlin 
in 1961. Loopholes are also manufactured by opposing sides 
to create a possible retreat as during the Cuban missile
23
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crisis \^en Kennedy implicitly solicited Kruschev to be the 
savior for world peace, or when Kruschev proposed a US 
pledge not to invade Cuba would lead to the withdrawal of 
the Soviet missiles (Blight and Welch 1995).
Snyder and Diesing (1977, 452) suggest that crisis 
decision-making has evolved as well because of the creation 
of nuclear weapons. They compare the crisis decision making 
of July 1914 with that of the Cuban missile crisis arguing 
that in 1914 "the crisis activity was almost entirely 
diplomatic activity, carried on by diplomats who viewed 
military forces only as instruments to be used in weu:. They 
had plans only for war; they had no complex crisis 
'contingency plans' such as are commonplace today." 
Additionally, civilian leaders largely were uninformed 
regarding the plans their military had devised. Snyder and 
Diesing (1977, 452) note that while the Russicui and the 
German civilian leadership understood that mobilization 
meant war, "they did not really believe this with enough 
certainty to integrate it into their diplomacy because they 
were not aware in detail of the logical and logistical 
compulsions that made it true. Their ignorance was one of 
the primary immediate causes of World War I. "
This is in sharp contrast to the mixed military and 
diplomatic activities of the Cuban missile crisis. Both 
President Kennedy and Defense Secretary McNeumara exercised a 
great deal of control over military planning and activity.
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Ultimately y as Graham Allison (1969) documents in his 
thorough investigation of the crisis, they were able to 
subordinate military activity to their "political aims and 
tactics. " Additionally, much more than in 1914, the United 
States and Soviet Union "spoke" to one another not only 
through words, but through deliberate calculated actions.
The second broad inçact of the nuclear age, the raising 
of the threshold of provocation, has served to increase tiie 
number of moves availêüsle to states in order to retard the 
precipitation of war. Since 1945, however, an arena of 
"force short of war" has evolved wherein states may employ a 
range of "physical maneuvers" to demonstrate resolve (Kahn. 
1960; George and Simons 1994).
This second factor may seem to be in conflict with tbe 
first development of the nuclear age, that of increased 
caution in crises. If states are particularly cautious 
because of the nuclear threat, it might be expected that 
they would be more wary about engaging in maneuvers that 
could bring them closer to war. This creates a notable 
nuclear paradox with such weaponry not only inducing caution 
within a state, but simultaneously suggesting that a 
rational opponent will behave cautiously as well, "and 
therefore will tolerate a considerable amount of pressure 
and provocation before resorting to acts that seriously risk 
nuclear war" (Snyder emd Diesing 1977, 453).
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Opaque Proliférant#
Yet hovr can states successfully deter adversaries with
nuclear weapons when they outwardly deny their possession of
them? Opaque proliférants succeed In their efforts to deter
by what McGeorge Bundy has called "existential deterrence. " ^
While Bundy first used this phrase In writing about
superpower relations during the Cold War, his description of
It clearly applies to opaque nuclear powers as well. Bundy
(1984, 8-9), among others (Brodle 1973, Jervis 1984) argued
that conflict between the superpowers would be riddled with
"terrible and unavoidable uncertainties" which have "great
meaning for the theory of deterrence" :
They create what I will call existential deterrence.
My aim In using this fancy adjective Is to distinguish 
this kind of deterrence from the kind that Is based on 
strategic theories or declaratory policies or even 
International commitments. As long as we assume that 
each side has very large numbers of thermonuclear 
weapons which could be used against the opponent, even 
after the strongest pre-en^tlve attack, existential 
deterrence Is strong. It rests on uncertainty about 
what could happen, not what has been asserted.
For Bundy (1983, 4), existential deterrence was "strong In
every major crisis between the superpowers since massive
retaliation ' became possible for both of them In the 1950s"
8. Though Bundy created the phrase, Trachtenberg 
(1985, 139) may provide the most succinct definition for It: 
"The mere existence of nuclear forces means that, whatever 
we say or do, there Is a certain Irreducible risk that an 
armed conflict might escalate Into a nuclear war. The fear 
of escalation Is thus factored Into political calculations : 
faced with this risk, states are more cautious and more 
prudent than they would otherwise be."
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and was "particularly powerful during the Cuban missile 
crisis."
Deterrence of any sort is dependent upon the 
adversary's perception of its opponent's capabilities and 
resolve to employ them.* Yet the dilemma this poses for 
opaque proliférants is whether they can deter aggression 
without the overt demonstration of nuclear prowess in which 
the declared nuclear powers have engaged. For Hagerty 
(1995/96, 90) the answer is yes : "like all nuclear weapon
states, opaque proliférants signal resolve to one another 
through a process of strategic bargaining, which runs along 
a communication spectrum from formal negotiations to the 
transmission of intentions via deeds rather than words. " 
Schelling (1960, 53) claims that signêü.ing falling into the 
latter category is called tacit bargaining, "in which 
communication is incomplete or impossible. " Opaque 
proliférants slip into this latter category of communication 
because of their desire for secrecy (Joeck 1990). Formal
9. There is some disagreement among theorists 
regarding the relative weight that should be given to 
weapons in calculations of deterrence. For instance, Bundy 
(1984, 9) writes that the uncertainties which make 
existential deterrence so powerful have the further 
consequence that what either government says it might do, or 
even believes it might do, in the event of open conflict 
cannot be relied on either by friends or by opponents as a 
certain predictor of what it would actually do." In 
contrast, Rhodes (1989, 85) curgues "the mere existence of an 
ability to inflict or withhold tremendous pain is logically 
not sufficient to result in coercive power. ..For nuclear 
deterrence to operate, the opponent must also believe that 
the coercer is committed to a strategy that has some 
unacceptable probability of resulting in nuclear war if 
deterrence fails. "
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negotiations tend to require for discuss ion, "exchanges of 
detailed information that opaque prolifercuits are loath to 
provide" (Hagerty 1995/96, 90). Instead opaque proliférants 
communicate their resolve through a variety of tacit 
behaviors such as passing messages through intermediaries or 
through state-controlled or state-influenced media.
Schelling (1976, 85) describes this signaling as "passive 
deterrence," achieved by "just letting it be known, perhaps 
through an innocent leak of information, that a 
government.. .singly had nuclear weapons, letting every 
potential addressee of this 'deterrent threat' reach his own 
conclusions about what kind of misbehavior, if any, might 
provoke nuclear activity." So there is not an absence of 
communication between one or more opaque nuclear 
proliférants. Rather there is a less formal, less direct 
communicative engagement. Hagerty (1995/96, 90) argues that 
this creates a unique language for understanding between 
such proliférants: "Over the yeeirs, this discourse
establishes certain deterrent understandings that may not be 
as clear as those between the transparent nuclear powers, 
but which are conqpelling all the same. As these 
understandings develop, it becomes exceedingly unlikely that 
decision-makers in opaque nuclear states will fail to 
understand the possibilities that confront them. "
While such deterrent intentions must be communicated 
clearly in some fashion, just as important is the credible
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demonstration of capabilities. This would seem to be an 
impractical task for opaque proliférants, as how can they 
maintain their ambiguous status without making "visible" 
their capabilities ( if any ). Largely this dilemma has been 
solved by the nonproliferation community. Pressure is 
applied by the international community to "pressure 
recalcitrant proliférants into nuclear chastity... by 
publicizing their nuclear transgressions" (Hagerty 1995/96, 
91). For instance, in the case of proliferation in South 
Asia, US policymakers openly have suggested in recent years 
that both India and Pakistan could build and deliver nuclear 
weapons rapidly in the event of a crisis.Such 
pronouncements, however driven by eui interest to pressure 
proliférants into reversing course, serve instead, according 
to Hagerty (1995/96, 91), to "stanç their nuclear programs 
with a seal of credibility that they would otherwise lack. " 
Though the likelihood of a pre-emptive nuclear strike 
between new nuclear states is considered a possibility by 
some security analysts (Roberts 1993? Blair 1994), the logic 
of nuclear deterrence suggests that such an occurrence is 
very unlikely (Hagerty 1995/96). Preemption is viable.
10. As examples see CIA Director Robert Gates' remarks 
to the Nixon Library Conference, Washington D.C., March 12, 
1992; the testimony of former CIA Director R. James Woolsey 
before the House Armed Services Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, 
International Organizations, and Human Rights, July 28,
1993; amd Davis (1994) who served as Under-Secretary of 
State for International Security Affairs in the Clinton 
administration.
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according to Waltz (Sagan and Waltz 1990, 15-16), "only if 
the would-be attacker knows that the intended victim's 
warheads are few in number, knows their exact number and 
locations, and knows that they will not be moved or fired 
before they are struck. To know all of these things, and to 
know that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult." 
John J. Weltman (1981/82, 190) concurs with Waltz, noting 
that nuclear weapons create uncertainty for an adversary 
because they are easy to hide and move: "Failure to
eliminate even a single deliverable weapon would thus be to 
risk catastrophe and short distances mean that no 
sophistication in means of delivery is required for a 
successful countervalue response."
Indeed when real world events are considered the 
arguments of nonproliferation seem to pale in comparison to 
the logic of nuclear deterrence. For some security analysts 
(Schneider 1994; Hagerty 1995/96) the Gulf War poses the 
potential obstacles any state would need to surmount in 
order to achieve a successful first strike. For instance,
UN inspectors discovered more than twenty Iraqi nuclear 
installations following the war, vdiile allied bombing target 
lists were able to identify only two (Hagerty 1995/96).
Also, more than 1,000 hours of allied air strikes left much 
of the Iraqi nucleeu: infrastructure untouched (Schneider 
1994). Further, according to a study released by the US 
House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, evidence
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cannot confirm that coalition forces destroyed even a single 
SCUD missile (Gordon 1993). Such a failure Illustrates the 
ease of deception In concealing nuclear delivery systems and 
why opaque nuclear states may deter conflict as well as 
overt nuclear capable states.
Games of Chicken
The way that actors perceive the costs and benefits of 
a crisis will have am Intact on their behavior during the 
crisis. The structure of the situation will affect the 
Incentives to persist In, or seek a way out of, the 
confrontation. If the situation Is perceived as being 
extremely dangerous, as Is the case In games of Chicken, the 
actors Involved are likely to exercise more caution than 
they might If the crisis Is seen as relatively cost-free.
It Is also possible that a perception of danger will 
Increase the search for mutual accommodation.
With this In mind It Is now useful to examine the two 
types of dyadic crisis Interaction known as Chicken and the 
Prisoner's Dilemma. The main difference between the two Is 
that In a Prisoner's Dilemma mutual non-cooperation brings 
about the second worst outcome as seen by decision makers, 
while In Chicken mutual non-cooperation brings about the 
worst outcome. The differing outcomes of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma and Chicken are displayed In Figure One. In 
Prisoner's Dilemmas, the only way a side loses conqpletely Is 
If It cooperates and Its adversary does not (producing a 5,0
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or 0,5 outcome). This makes cooperation a tenuous goal. In 
games of Chicken, however, cooperation Is promoted because 
persistent non-cooperation will bring e&bout a loss for both 
sides (0,0). Because nothing Is gained by persistent non- 
cooperation, one or both sides often choose to swerve 
thereby ending the conflict completely. Conflicts between 
nuclear states are considered to be geunes of Chicken as non- 
cooperation would bring about the potential destruction of 
both competitors.
Cooperate
Defect
Prisoner's Dilemma
Cooperate Defect
3,3 0,5
5,0 1,1
Swerve
Straight
Figure One :
Chicken
Swerve
3,3
5,1
Prisoner's Dil
Straight
1,5
0,0
a and Chicken
In their review of International conflicts, Snyder and 
Diesing (1977) note that conflicts, when portrayed as games, 
can be characterized as being either symmetric or non- 
symmetrlc. Their finding of Interest Is that there was a 
sharp difference In behavior between parties In Prisoner's 
Dilemmas and parties In Chicken (and asymmetric games).
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Parties in Chicken and asymmetric games do not prefer the
outcomes that come with mutual firmness, and thus the party
that can show it will continue to stand firm will usually
prevail. In Prisoner's Dilemma situations, each party
prefers war (or the non-cooperative outcome) to accepting
the other's demand. This outcome is intuitively believable,
for as Snyder and Diesing (1977) suggest:
When this is realized [that both parties prefer war 
to concession in Prisoner's Dilemma], the parties 
know they must reduce their goals to something the 
other can accept, or the outcome is likely to be 
war. There occurs an internal reassessment of goals, 
plus probing the opponent, to determine what is 
essential and what can be sacrificed, and what the 
opponent is willing to give up. The communication 
of reduced goals to the opponent is the turning point, 
after which the parties make reciprocal concessions 
leading to compromise. In the Chicken cases..., one 
or both parties prefer to yield than risk war.
Therefore when one party establishes superiority of 
resolve it can force the other to give way completely, 
and usually does so.
Thus situations that are seen by the actors as Prisoner's
Dilemmas are more likely to endure because there is less
risk that they will bring about the worst outcome. While a
situation seen as Chicken will bring about great pressure to
either (1) convince the other party that the non-cooperative
mode will continue or (2) work to bring about the
cooperative outcome. As an example, the Cuban Missile
Crisis can be seen as a géune of Chicken, with Kennedy's non-
cooperative move being continued preparations for an
invasion while Kruschev's non-cooperative move was continued
installation «md preparation of the missiles (Bundy 1988).
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If both persisted in their actions, war was likely, and as a
result there were efforts to find a way out of the
confrontation (Blight 1990).
When actors find themselves in a Prisoner's Dilemma, 
they will attempt to avoid mutual defection and at the saune
time atteo^t to avoid being exploited. One way to do this
is to change the stakes of the contest by increasing the 
cost, or appeairing to increase the cost, to the other side 
of mutual confrontation. In a sense, one actor is trying to 
convince the other that mutual confrontation is the worst 
outcome rather tham mutuaü. confrontation (mutual defection) 
being the second the worst outcome. Thus, one would expect 
to see actions taken with the intent of convincing an 
opponent of just this, leading to a greater and more 
intensive search for alternative outcomes (other than mutual 
confrontation ) udien crises are seen as Chicken than when 
they are seen as Prisoner's Dilemmas. An expected corollaury 
to this would be "Crises seen as Chicken will bring about a 
greater search for alternative outcomes than those perceived 
as Prisoner ' s Dilemmas. " The reason for this follows from 
the earlier discussion. Mutual confrontation under Chicken 
brings about the worst outcome. Thus, parties will be more 
likely to persist in confrontational behavior in the 
structure of a Prisoner's Dilemma rather than Chicken.
Interstate nuclear dyads produce these games of 
Chicken. The presence of nuclear weapons serve to
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incorporate the element of deterrence and thereby aid in 
preventing conflict escalation. Thus, the conflict process 
between nuclear states is different from non-nuclear dyads 
as the participants in a nuclear dyad may be deterred not 
only from nuclear war, but also from escalation in general. 
Thomas Schelling (1966, 35) notes that common conceptions of 
deterrence "seem to depend on the clean-cut notion that war 
results —  or is expected to result —  only from deliberate 
yes-no decisions. But if war tends to result from a 
process, a dynamic process in which both sides get more and 
more deeply involved, more and more expectant, more and more 
concerned not to be a slow second in case war starts, it is 
not a 'credible first strike' that one threatens, but just 
plain war." In other words, states need not threaten an 
immediate full-scale nuclear attack on the other side in 
order to deter it. Instead, they can threaten to take 
actions that could lead to an undesired conflagration by a 
series of steps that cannot be entirely be foreseen. 
Empirical evidence bears out this argument: Alexander
George and Richard Smoke (1974) found that one important 
cause of deterrence failure was the challenger's belief that 
he could control risks. In games of Chicken, this is not 
the case. Therefore, the logic of nuclear dyads indicate 
that they should be less prone to conflict than other 
interstate couplings.
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Conflict Escalation and Wuclaar Weapons
While it is clear that the deterrent value of nuclear 
weapons on crises in general is impressive among all the 
nuclear powers (warfare has not occurred between two nuclear 
powers since the creation of such weapons of mass 
destruction), it is less evident what specific intact 
nuclear weapons may have had on conflict escalation. Might 
the impact of nuclear weapons be felt also in terms of their 
coercive capabilities? In other words, is it reasonable to 
conceptualize nuclear arms not only as deterrent weapons, 
but as defensive weapons as well? The answer might be yes 
if one differentiates use from utilization. While the 
actual use of nuclear weapons would be strictly for punitive 
effect, the utilization of the threat of use of nuclear 
weapons could be used as a defensive measure to repel or 
stop an enemy from taking further action.
Nuclear weaponry's strong punitive nature provides an 
easy understanding as to why nuclear devices are often 
classified under the deterrent heading. Deterrence's goal, 
after all, is to dissuade an enemy from initiating an action 
by threatening a highly credible punitive response. In other 
words, deterrence in most instances threatens punishment. 
However, US nuclear doctrine in the 1970s and 1980s expanded 
the definition of deterrence by arguing that US nuclear 
doctrine should be expanded to include deterrence by denial
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as well as deterrence by punishment.The aim of deterrence 
by denial is to hold at risk strategic assets (counterforce 
targets ), especially those assets "Wiose destruction would 
deny [the eneny] military success" (Payne 1998a).
Defense, on the other hand, is focused upon protection 
once an action has begun. A state's defensive capability is 
its ability to limit the costs an adversary can impose on it 
(Snyder 1961; Powell 1990). Defense seeks to stop or 
reverse an action, goals nuclear weapons have not typically 
been associated with.
But while nuclear weapons are best described as 
deterrent weapons (Waltz 1990), when conflict does arise 
between two states nuclear weapons might have some defensive 
value in terms of their coercive potential (Feldman 1995).
To be clear, the actual "use" of nuclear weapons would not 
be considered a defensive move, but rather a state's efforts 
to "utilize" nuclear weapons as a bargaining method during a 
conflict could be considered a defensive gesture. This 
latter employment could be defined as an example of coercive 
diplomacy, which is limited to defensive actions (George
1991).
Alexander George (1991, 5) clearly restricts coercive 
diplomacy to defensive use as he describes it as "efforts
11. The classic description of the distinction between 
deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment is 
presented by Glen Snyder (1961). See also Slocombe (1981), 
(Gray 1984) Sloss and Milot (1984), and Payne (1996).
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(made) to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action 
he is already embarked upon. "
While the threat of the use of nuclear weapons for 
coercive diplomacy has rarely occurred in overt instances 
(George (1994) describes the Potsdéun Declaration as one such 
instance), it seems reasonable to assert that nuclear 
weapons might have influenced state behavior in more subtle 
ways. The ominous threat such weapons provide might elicit 
more pacific reactions, or at least a more cautionary 
approach, between adversaries during a conflict as each 
seeks to prevent an escalation toward Armageddon.
Thus, it is important to examine what intact the 
presence, or lack thereof, of nuclear weapons might have in 
conflict situations in order to identify if the 
characteristics of such weapons not only may have served to 
prevent interstate warfare, but also to have dulled conflict 
in general among pairs of states. This study is notable in 
that the impact nucleeu: weapons have had on conflict 
escalation between interstate dyads (if they have had any) 
has not yet been explored quantitatively at all, and 
qualitatively outside of the US-Soviet dyad. This probably 
is the case for two major reasons: first, the relative
dearth of nuclear weapons states since the first use of the 
weapons in 1945; and second, their non-use following the end 
of World War IX. Since that time there have been only nine 
states identified as having nuclear weaponry (Spector 1990) :
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the United States (1945); the USSR (1950); the UK (1953); 
France (1960); China (1964); Israel (1970); India (1974); 
the Republic of South Africa (1980); and Pakistan (1986). 
Such a limited number of states has not provided scholars 
much data with which to work.
This study argues that the relative scarcity of data on 
dyadic relations between nuclear weapons states can be 
overcome by singly cLltering the dependent variable from the 
mere presence of interstate warfare between states to a 
scaled interstate dispute score which serves to measure and 
compare the level of conflict between states involved in 
dyadic confrontations. Thus, the intact of nuclear weapons 
can be directly measured to understand if such weapons truly 
have had a pacifying effect on interstate conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OP HUCLEAR WEAPOHS
OH COHPLICT E8CALATIOH
This chapter addresses through statistical analysis 
whether or not nuclear weapons have had an identifiable and 
significant impact on crisis escalation. It is hypothesized 
that the symmetrical presence of nuclear weapons in dyads 
will lessen conflict escalation. The methodology and the 
means by Wiich this chapter will scientifically address this 
inquiry now follow.
Methodology
The most solidly proven contribution of scholars ' of 
international politics to the social science world at-large 
has been the notion first asserted by Immanuel Kant (1970) 
that democracies do not fight one another. This so-called 
"democratic peace" phenomenon has time and again survived 
the strict rigors of quantitative analysis to ascend in the 
realm of international politics as the discipline's most 
identifiable law.
The democratic peace proposition, however, augurs 
caution when presenting its findings regarding democracies, 
by noting that while democracies refrain from warfare in 
dyadic relations with one another, when faced with a state 
of a differing type (i.e. autocracy, anocracy, etc.) 
democracies «ire just as likely as other types of states to 
engage in conflictuel behavior. Thus, democratic states are 
pacific only in their dealings with like states. In fact.
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four of the five most conflictual states during the 170 
years between 1912-1982 were democracies (Chan 1983). Only 
Russia/USSR was a non-democracy among France^ India, Israel, 
and the United Kingdom.
Might the same be the case with respect to nuclear 
weapons' states? In order to ascertain If there Is a 
significant difference In conflict escalation among 
differing types of states three categories of dyads have 
been created: symmetrical nuclear dyads (two nuclear
states), asymmetrical nuclear dyads (only one nuclear 
state), and symmetrical non-nuclear dyads (two non-nuclear 
states).
The conflict observations will be taken from the 
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Gochman and 
Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer and Singer 1997). Those 
disagreements between states considered to be Interstate 
disputes must contain at least one of the following three 
events : ” ( 1 ) an explicit threat to resort to military
force; (2) a mobilization, deployment, or other display of 
military force ; or (3) an actual resort to military force" 
(Senese 1997, 4). For these events to be Included, they 
"must be explicit, overt, non-accidental, and government 
sanctioned" (Gochmaui and Maoz 1984, 586).
The current MID data set Includes Interstate dispute 
data through 1992 (Jones, Bremer euid Singer 1997). The year 
1950 has been chosen as the beginning point for data
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analysis in this paper because this was the first full year 
in which more than one state in the international system had 
nuclear weapons. Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union had the atomic bomb in 1950, firmly rooting the two 
superpowers as Cold War adverscuries. Within this time 
period of 1950-1992, 1,042 conflict dyads are available for 
study.
Dependent Variable: Conflict Escalation
Escalation processes have been analyzed previously in 
concert with deterrence (Bueno de Hesquita and Riker 1982; 
Zagare 1992), arms races (Richardson 1960) and the 
bargaining process (Schelling 1960, 1966; Kahn 1965; Young 
1968; Smoke 1977). Schelling (1960, 1966) suggests that one 
of the effects of escalation is to persuade an opponent to 
back down by playing on the fear that continued and/or 
future escalation will lead to disastrous results. Thus, 
escalation is often conceptualized as a game of competitive 
risk taking, with actors attempting to demonstrate their 
superior ability to tolerate risk (Schelling 1960, 1966;
Kahn 1965, Maoz 1985, 1990; Geller 1990).
Disputes between states are rarely, if ever, static 
occurrences (Ray 1974). Such confrontations often evolve 
from one stage of conflict to another involving an 
augmentation in hostilities as the initial spark of the 
confrontation creates a larger conflagration. Thus, this 
dissertation employs two measures for its dependent
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variables. First it uses the highest level of conflict 
reached between pairs of states as a dependent variable. 
This score (see Table One), referred to as the level of 
hostility, is a scaled reference point allowing the
Table One: MID Dispute Level Codes
1 = Nonmilitary act
2 = Threat to use force
3 = Threat to blockade
4 = Threat to occupy
territory
5 = Threat to declare war
6 = Threat to use nukes
7 = Show of troops 11 = Nuclear Alert
8 = Show of ships 12 = Mobilization
9 = Show of planes 13 = Fortify border
10 = Alert 14 = Border Violation
15 = Blockade 18 = Clash
16 = Occupation of territory
17 = Seizure
19 = Raid
20 = Declaration of war
21 = Use of CB weapons
22 - Interstate warfare
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quantitative differentiation between levels of conflict.
HID dispute level types range from 1 (a nonmilitary act) to 
22 ( interstate warfare ).
The level of hostility in a dispute is an important 
marker for distinguishing it from other disputes. For 
example f it seems reasonable to assert that a threat to 
blockade an area is less hostile than an actual naval 
blockade, just as a mere threat to use force is less hostile 
than an actual raid into another state's sovereign 
territory. Thus, the higher a dispute escalates, the more 
dire its consequences can be.
As a second marker, dispute severity also was used as a 
dependent variable for conflict escalation. The severity of 
interstate disputes was measured by the number of battle 
fatalities registered by both states. An increase in the 
number of fatalities is considered to display conflict 
escalation because "an increase in severity is usually 
associated with an increase in the intensity of actions 
taken by combatants, in terms of militarized uses of force" 
(Senese 1997, 7). In other words, higher battle fatalities 
are considered to be characteristic of a more serious 
conflict. The MID data set employs seven levels of 
fatalities in its coding procedures: 0, 1 to 25, 26 to 100,
101 to 250, 251 to 500, 501 to 999, and >999 battle deaths.
12. HID does not provide the actual fatality numbers 
for disputes.
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Independent Variables
Eight Independent variables are examined In this 
chapter. The first two of these directly relate to the 
focus of the dissertation: presence of nuclear weapons. It
Is hypothesized that those dyads In vdilch both of the paired 
states have nuclear weapons will produce less conflictual 
outcomes than those dyads In which only one nuclear power Is 
present, or In which none Is present. This Is because In 
symmetrical nuclear dyads there Is greater destructive 
potential than In the other two types of dyads. Further, 
asymmetrical nuclear dyads are hypothesized to be less 
conflictual thcui non-nuclear dyads again because of the 
deterrent value of such weapons.
Two dummy variables have been created to measure the 
effect of nuclear weapons on conflict escalations. First, a 
symmetrical dyad variable has been created. In this 
variable dyads In which two nuclear states are present are 
coded as "1" and all other cases as "0". Second, an 
asymmetrical dyad varléü>le has been created. For this dummy 
variable those dyads In which only one nuclear state Is 
present are coded as "1" with all others coded as "0". A 
dummy varlcd>le need not be created for the Independent 
category of non-nuclear dyads because Its value Is 
determined by the first A - 1 dummies entered Into the 
regression equation. In other words, the independent
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category (also known as the reference category) is equal to 
the Y intercept.
The data set provides 1,042 conflict dyads between the 
years of 1950-1992. 56 of these conflicts involve a
symmetrical pairing of nuclear powers. 291 dyads are 
asymmetrical in nature. These dyads include one nuclear 
power and one non-nuclear state. The remaining 695 cases 
are dyads in which no state with nuclear weapons was 
present.
The third predictor variable to be used in this study 
is democracy. Numerous studies have been undertaken to 
explore the effect of democratic institutions on conflict 
resolution among states (Chan 1984; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; 
Bremer 1992, 1993a, 1993b; Dixon 1993; Russett 1990, 
1993,1995; Senese 1997). Strong agreement among scholars 
has arisen that democratic dyads produce more peaceful 
outcomes than other dyadic groupings. The coding of states 
as being democratic or not is based on scores taken from the 
Jaggers and Gurr's (1995) Polity III data set which has been 
en^loyed in recent studies on the effects of democracy on 
conflict (Reiter and Stam 1998; Ward and Gleditsch 1998). 
Polity III rates individual states ' level of democracy on an 
11-point (0-10) scale (Jagger and Gurr 1995). This is a 
continuous interval measure ranging from a score of "0" 
least democratic to a score of ”10” or most democratic.
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Fourth, a variable has been created to measure the 
impact of dyadic maturity on conflict escalation. This 
variable will attengt to capture the impact of stability on 
interstate relations. The assumption here is that more 
mature polities will recognize the potential costs of 
escalation as well as the ability to call on past experience 
to reduce the likelihood of conflict severity. Scholars 
have noted a tendency for states in transition, 
specifically, states whose regimes are in flux, to be more 
likely to engage in military ventures than those whose 
governments remain stable (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).
The logic of this argument states that those countries which 
are in a state of flux are more prone to military action 
because their leaders are seeking to rally their publics 
around a patriotic cause in order to save their faltering 
position. This rally around the flag effect (Miller 1995; 
Levy and Vakili 1992) is intended to provide the leader with 
the necessary internal support to stay in power.
Therefore, a variable of dvadic maturity (or stability) 
has been created by measuring polity persistence in years. 
This variable will be dichotomized, as has been common 
practice in previous studies (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997), as
13. While the findings of Mansfield and Snyder (1995) 
are generally supported, a study by Gleditsch and Ward 
(1997) does challenge them. However, this dissertation 
finds the work of Mansfield and Snyder (1995) to be more 
con^lling.
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mature/not mature based on a twenty year threshold. Again 
the data will be drawn from the Polity III data-set which 
extends from 1800-1994. If both the regimes in a dyad have 
persisted for at least twenty years the dyad will be 
considered mature; otherwise the dyad will be considered not 
mature.
As a fifth independent variable, proximity will be 
studied. The intact of geographical proximity has been 
shown in previous studies to be significeuit on the 
escalation of hostilities between states not only because of 
the animosity close interactions can produce, but also 
because of the monetary expense of such efforts (Bremer 
1992; Diehl 1985; Russett 1993; Vasquez 1993; Senese 1997). 
War fighting is a costly business after all, and therefore 
the monetary impact of moving troops and equipment often 
serves as a strong deterrent. Proximity serves to lessen 
these costs, thereby augmenting the chances for interstate 
bloodshed. As Senese (1997) argued, "States are less 
constrained for participation (in warfare) when the venue of 
combat is geographically proximate. "
In order to determine the effects of proximity on 
conflict escalation the Correlates of War (COW) contiguity 
data set has been used. Five divisions of state-to-state 
contiguity are delineated by the COW data: contiguous by
land, or separated by 12, 24, 150, or 400 miles or less of 
water (those over 400 miles are not considered contiguous).
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Geographically proximate rivals êure classified as those that 
are contiguous by land or separated by 150 miles or less of 
water. proximate dyads are coded as "1" and all others as
" 0 ” .
Sixth, the intact of alliances on Interstate relations 
will be examined. The inclusion of data on alliances is 
needed and appropriate because of Its possible relation to 
joint conflict. Alliance members generally have been shown 
to engage infrequently in conflict with one another (Mlhalka 
1976; Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Weede 1989; Kim 1991; Bremer
1992). In order to ascertain whether dyad pairs are 
alliance members the Correlates of War alliance data is used 
(Small and Singer 1982). Weede (1991) and Bremer (1992) 
both find that the major effect of alliance on conflict can 
be captured in an allied/not allied dichotomy. Therefore, 
allied dyads are coded as " 1 ” and all others as " 0 ".
Seventh, a variable measuring trade relations for each 
of the dyadic pairs of states has been created. Realist 
thinkers have curgued that the relative gains of one trading 
partner could ultimately threaten the survival, or at least 
the international standing, of the other (Gowa and Mcuisfield 
1993; Grieco 1988). Liberals, on the other hand, have
14. This delineation is used by Senese (1997, 11) who 
defends it by noting, "An earlier study (Bremer 1992) shows 
the major effect of proximity on conflict to be captured by 
a ' contiguous by land or sea ' versus ' not contiguous ' 
distinction. " In both these studies (Bremer 1992; Senese
1997) 150 miles was shown to be the proper cut-off point in 
accounting for proximal significance.
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suggested that the absolute gains accumulated by both 
trading partners may create security externalities, which 
would both increase trade and decrease conflict (Snidal 
1991).
There is no strong scholarly consensus, however, on the 
impact of trade on international conflict. Several studies 
of interstate conflict and trade have shown that conflict is 
negatively related to international trade ( Gas iorowski and 
Polachek 1982; Polachek 1980; Pollins 1989). Yet Russett 
(1967) and Barbieri (1996) produce quite different findings. 
Russett (1967, 198) found that trade partners were "twice as 
likely to fight" than those which were not. Barbieri (1996) 
concludes that trade interdependence increases the 
probability that dyads will experience militarized disputes. 
These mixed findings suggest any hypothesis with respect to 
the impact of trade on conflict levels between interstate is 
inqperiled. Thus, it is assumed that trade will have a 
significant impact on dyadic conflict, yet in what direction 
remains uncertain.
The majority of trade data are derived from the 
International Monetary Fund's Direction of Trade Statistics 
electronic taoe.^  ^ Data were reconfigured from national
15. Data are made available by Katherine Barbieri 
(1996b). Data were collected for all sovereign states 
within the interstate system, as defined by the Correlates 
of War (COW) Project, for the period 1870-1992. Barbieri 
(1996a, 31) notes concerning the data: "In many instances,
the electronic version of the IMF data tape reports trade 
flows as zero or missing, but these trade values are 
reported in their annual publications. Missing data were
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accounts to dyadic trade flows using the importing 
countries' reported trade figures. When these figures were 
absent, the exporter's reports were used. The values that 
each state reports to import from each partner were added to 
derive the dyadic total. Each state's total imports and 
export figures were combined to arrive at each nation's 
total trade.
Unlike the case of trade, one key variable affecting 
the decision to escalate has reached a status of general 
consensus among researchers. A number of studies have shown 
that an actor's relative military capabilities is the most 
vital variable affecting the decision to escalate (Garnham 
1976a, 1976b; Organski and Kugler 1980; Bueno de Mesquita 
1981; Leng and Gochman 1982; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Bremer 
1992; Geller 1993). Military capcd>ilities are in^ortant to 
consider because they determine the level of potential costs 
which can be doled out by either side (Small and Singer 
1982). Empirical evidence suggests that states of 
relatively equal military capability are more likely to go 
to war with each other than states with disparate 
capabilities (Bremer 1992).
So as a eighth marker, an independent variable 
measuring military capabilities has been created. This
investigated and supplemented with The International 
Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics (1956- 
1998) and The Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (1956-
1998)."
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capability score was obtained from the Correlates of War 
(COW) data set (Small «md Singer 1982). Military 
capabilities are measured by six indicators: military
expenditures, military personnel, iron/steel production, 
energy consumption, total population, and urban population. 
These indicators are combined in the COW data set to create 
an index reflecting a state's percentage of the total 
capabilities in the world for each year. From this index, a 
variable is created to serve as a reflection of the ratio of 
military capabilities of the two actors per dispute. The 
stronger state is represented in the numerator and the 
weaker state in the denominator. The ratio will vary from
1.0 (the actors' capabilities are equal) to any positive 
number less than 1.
These eight independent variables were regressed 
against the dependent variable measures of level of 
hostility cuid severity of hostility in order to ascertain 
the impact of each on conflict escalation.
Results
The two-tailed regression results show (Tables Two and 
Three) that nuclear dyads significantly reduce conflict 
escalation between states in terms of level of conflict but 
not in terms of fatalities. The Y intercept value of 13.961 
is the mean response if all the independent veuriables equal 
zero. If such was the case the model predicts an outcome of 
nearly 14 on the twenty-two point MID scale.
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Table Two: The Effect of Nuclear Weapona on 
Conflict Level
Varicd)le Estimate t-Score Significance
INTERCEPT 13.961 16.422 .01
Asymmetrical .605 1.502 .13
Nuke Symmetry -1.555 2.026 .04
Democracy -.502 .798 .43
Maturity -1.932 3.137 .01
Proximity .676 1.876 .06
Allied -1.871 2.009 .05
Trade .001 1.763 .08
Capabilities 2.765 2.392 .02
N = 840
r2 = .06
Table Three: The Effect of Nuclear Heapons on 
Conflict Fatalities
Variable
INTERCEPT
Asymmetrical
Nuke Symmetry
Democracy
Maturity
Proximity
Allied
Trade
Capabilities
N = 789 
r2 = .06
Ratimato 
.295 
.078 
-.024 
-.077 
-.182 
.449 
-.147 
—. 001 
.192
t-Score
1.643
.937
.156
.590
1.462
5.999
.775
.762
.782
Significance
.10
.34
.88
.56
.14
.01
.44
.45
.43
Beginning with the two predictor variables of concern 
to this dissertation, the nuclear symmetry varicible reduced 
the level of conflict between states by 1.55 and was 
significant at the .04 level. This indicates that a pairing 
of symmetrical nuclear dyads leads to a 1.55 reduction in 
the level of conflict on the twenty-two point MID scale. In
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the case of asymmetrical nuclear dyads an increase in 
conflict likelihood was found, though it was not 
significant.
This divergence in findings between symmetrical and 
asymmetrical dyads suggests that nucleeu: deterrence is 
nullified in asymmetrical situations. This is most likely 
the case because symmetrical nuclear relationships promote 
extraordinary caution between countries, with both states 
preferring to err on the side of caution and de-escalate the 
conflict rapidly. The heightened tension of mutual 
Armageddon experienced by nucleeur pairs does not exist (at 
least for the nuclear state) in an asymmetrical dyad as the 
non-nuclear state can only threaten with conventional 
forces. This, in turn, may reduce the deterrent value of 
the nuclear weapons altogether, as the non-nuclear side may 
feel that as long as it seeks only limited objectives, the 
nuclear state will not decide to employ its weapons of mass 
destruction for fear of international outrage.
The 1982 invasion êuid occupation of the Falkland 
Islands (referred to as the Malvinas Islands by the 
Argentineans) by Argentina provides a clear excui^ le of an 
asymmetrical nuclear dyad which escalated to the pinnacle of 
interstate warfare. A limited aims strategy promoted by
16. Other research has noted the 1973 Arab Israeli war 
as cui instance of asymmetrical escalation, though it clearly 
was not dyadic in nature. Despite Israel's "undeclared" 
status, it was generally understood that it had begun 
production of nuclear arms at its Dimona factory in the 
Negev desert in 1968. Thus, by 1973 it was assumed that
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Argentina ' s desire to recapture vrtiat it considered to be 
lost sovereign territory overrode any apprehensions the 
Argentinean junta in cheirge of the country might have had 
about a potential nuclear response to their militeury 
actions. The Argentinean leaders expected the British not 
to respond militarily to their action, and even if they did, 
they believed that they could still wage a limited war 
(Lebow 1985). It has been argued that the junta believed 
nuclear weapons would never be used in such a small regional 
theater because of the wrath which would befall Great 
Britain was it to do so (Lebow 1985).
An alternate explanation is that asymmetrical nuclear 
dyads permit bullying by the nuclear power. Nuclear 
capability allows the nuclear powers to react more strongly 
to conflict challenges by non-nuclear states. Thus when the 
United States decided to capture Manuel Noriega it invaded 
Panama to do so. Such a decision almost certainly would not 
have been made had Panama possessed nuclear weapons.
Most of the other independent variables were found to 
have a significant effect on conflict between states. The 
most powerful results were from the "Mature" variable (p = 
.01) which measured regime longevity. This variable 
indicates that the likelihood of conflict is decreased in 
dyads whose two states have had long eUid stable regimes.
Israel possessed twenty to twenty-five nuclear weapons (Paul 
1994).
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This was expected, as previous studies have shown that 
mature regimes tend to behave more prudently in conflict 
situations (Bremer 1992; Senese 1997).
Surprisingly, however, the presence of democratic 
institutions in dyads was not shown to produce significant 
effects (p = .425) on conflict escalation, though the sign 
is in the expected direction. While this finding is 
antithetical to Democratic peace research, it is important 
to recall that the dependent variable in this study is 
different. Democratic peace researchers are focused upon 
the presence of interstate war as a dependent varicible, 
while this dissertation has expanded this to include any 
sort of conflict between states. This dissertation's 
findings are similar to those of Paul Senese (1997) who 
found that democratic dyads, while unlikely to escalate all 
the way to war, were just as likely as other types of dyads 
to escalate to threat and displays of force. Senese (1997, 
1) finds: "Once a democratic pair has entered a militarized
dispute, it is about as likely (possibly a little more so) 
to escalate that dispute through further stages of 
antagonism short of war, as is a non-jointly democratic 
dyad."
Geographic proximity was shown to have significant 
effects (p - .06) on dyadic escalation. This reconfirms the 
earlier research mentioned previously which asserted that 
states bordering one another are more likely to escalate
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conflicts than those that do not. Thus, neighbors in 
conflict are more likely to esceü.ate than distal dyadic 
combinations.
This clearly has io^rtant significance for current 
conflictual regional dyads. Since proximity appears to 
promote conflict escalation, might nuclear weapons be 
effectual in offsetting discord between neighbors, 
especially when other pacifying influences such as alliance 
and regime maturity are not present? This question will be 
addressed in the next chapter by qualitatively exéunining the 
Indo-Pakistani dyad.
Alliance membership was shown to significantly (p =
.05) reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation between 
dyads. Again, this was to be expected, as the institutional 
constraints placed on alliance members were believed to 
reduce the likelihood of conflict escalation between them.
Military capêüsilities were shown to have a significant 
(p = .02) intact on conflict escalation as well. As the 
military capabilities of two states approach relative 
equality, the likelihood of escalation increases. This 
finding confirms earlier research, suggesting that evenly 
matched rivals are more likely to escalate than dyads 
containing two militarily divergent states. This is most 
likely the case in conventional instances because neither 
side is deterred. Relative conventional military equality 
precludes either party from clearly appreciating ahead of
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time which side would prevail. Thus, the conflict 
escalates. The symmetrical effects of nuclear dyads produce 
pacifying results, though, because in such instances 
escalation of the conflict would lead to both sides losing. 
This is the reason why deterrence is successful in 
symmetrical nuclear dyads and not in symmetrical 
conventional dyads.
Trade was shown to have a very minimal impact in terms 
of its marginal significance (p = .08), as well as its 
magnitude of effect, on conflict escalation. As the level 
of trade between two states increased, so too did the 
likelihood of conflict escalation. These results are 
somewhat counter-intuitive, but, again, some earlier 
research has produced similar findings.
Employment of the second dependent variable (conflict 
fatalities) largely did not produce significant results. In 
fact, the only variable displaying a significant effect on 
fatality levels was geographic proximity (p = .01). This 
suggests that geographically proximal states tend to produce 
higher numbers of fatalities during dyadic conflicts with 
one another than other types of state couplings. This makes 
sense as proximity provides more and easier opportunities 
for contact with one's adversary.
Despite the fact that the remaining v«u:iables were not 
significant, their b values all were in the same direction 
as was in the case vdien conflict level was the dependent
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variable, with the exception of trade. This movement from a 
positive to a negative b-value of the trade variable 
Indicates that while trade may lead to marginally higher 
levels of conflict escalation between Interstate dyads, the 
fatality levels between trading partners are reduced (though 
Insignificantly). What this may Indicate Is that trading 
partners are Inclined to escalate conflicts between one 
another, but rarely carry such escalation to a point of 
Interstate war, where fatality levels would be higher.
Recall also that previous reseaurch has produced mixed 
results with respect to trade and conflict. Irrespective,
It seems reasonable based on the b-vales and significance 
levels to assert that trade has a very minimal effect on 
conflict escalation between Interstate dyads.
Summary
In total, these results suggest some positive effects 
for the presence of nuclear weapons In conflict dyads, but 
only when nuclecur weapons appear on both sides. Nuclear 
symmetry must exist for any pacifying effects to occur, in 
such symmetrical nuclear dyads conflict levels are 
significantly reduced, though fatalities are not. Notably, 
however, asymmetrical dyads appear to be less stcKble.
Indeed the regression results show that conflict and 
fatalities are Increased In asymmetrical nuclear dyads, 
though these results are not significant.
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So nuclear weapons can be a successful deterrent to 
conflict escalation when they occur in symmetrical 
interstate relationships. Thus, nuclear weapons appear to 
have played a significant role in placating relations 
between the great powers during the Cold War. Clecurly, the 
presence of nuclear weapons on both sides of a dyad do not 
prevent conflict, but they do appear to limit it. Thus the 
spread of nuclear weapons throughout the international 
system may indeed produce some of the pacifying effects 
theorized. What is in^ >ortant is where these weapons spread. 
Introduction of nuclear weapons to only one side of an 
unstable regional rivalry (thereby creating a nuclear 
asymmetry) could produce disastrous results. Yet it appears 
that should both sides of a dyadic rivalry possess nuclear 
weapons, the level of conflict between the two will be 
reduced.
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CHAPTER POUR: THE HUCLEAR EVOLUTIOH OP THE IHDO-
PAKISTAHI REXJITZOHSHIP ZH JAMMU AMD KA8HMZR
The Indo-Paklstani dyad is most often described as one 
either now imperiled by the presence of nuclear weapons on 
both sides, or placated by them. Few regions in the world, 
if any, present a more consistent and concentrated period of 
conflict between neighbors than in this section of southern 
Asia. Indeed international life itself was breathed into 
Pakistan as a result of conflict with India. Additional 
wars followed over the next twenty-five years and several 
conflicts have escalated to the brink of interstate war 
since their last major conflagration in 1971. The years of 
conflict between these two rivals has bred contempt for one 
another which is only exacerbated by cultural differences. 
The cultural fault lines along which Samuel Huntington 
(1993) has suggested will erupt the battlefields of the post 
Cold War era être clearly present between Hindus in India and 
Muslims in Pakistan. Conflict has become quotidian to the 
two neighbors and central to the rivalry between the two is 
their dispute over control of the Himalayan region of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Indian Hindus and Pakistani Muslims each claim 
ownership over this alpine boundary region and it is where 
the fiercest tensions between the two antagonists have 
manifested themselves.
There have been four major conflict situations between 
India and Pakistan in their dyadic history over the disputed
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region of Jammu and Kashmir. The first two of these 
conflicts evolved Into Interstate warfare, while the latter 
two fell short of It. The goal of this chapter Is to 
ascertain If the presence of nuclear weapons played a role 
In the pacification of the latter two conflict Instances In 
the Indo-Paklstanl relationship. This will occur by means 
of a case study excunlnatlon of India and Pakistan ' s most 
contentious territorial dispute —  control over the Jammu 
and Kashmir region.
Following a background presentation which discusses how 
nuclear proliferation became a reality In this region of the 
world, the methodology for this case study Is presented.
Then analysis of the four major conflict situations between 
India and Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir area occurs 
and conclusions presented.
Background: Indo-Pakistani Security Policy
India's defense and security policy Initially rested 
almost entirely In the hands of the first prime minister, 
Jawaharlal Nehru (Khalld 1988). He defined International 
security In terms of economic development and saw 
International Insecurity as a product of the Cold War. 
Leadership of and pairtlclpatlon In the Nonallgned Movement 
(NAM) seemed to Nehru to be an appropriate policy response 
on both counts. To his surprise, however, his own good 
Intentions were not good enough. War broke out with China 
In 1962 after a rancorous buildup, ending the era of Hlndl-
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Chlnl bhal bhal (Hindus and Chinese are brothers), which had 
followed the 1955 Bandung conference. Nehru's vision of 
International harmony led by the two largest civilizations 
on Earth, India and China, was shattered. China's nuclear 
test a mere two year's later exacerbated India's sense of 
vulnerability (Chellaney 1998-99). By that time, Nehru had 
died, and his vision of peace between India and China 
effectively died with him.
In addition to China, India faced another serious 
threat from Pakistan, \dilch launched attacks In 1947 cuid 
1965 In hopes of seizing Kashmir, but the cessation of 
hostilities never resolved the problem. Six years following 
the 1965 attack, India was able to reduce the security 
threat from Pakistan. When, through Its own mismanagement 
of Internal problems, Pakistan faced a civil war, India was 
able to Intercede on East Pakistan's side, assist In the 
creation of Bangladesh, and thereby eliminate what had been 
a two-front threat from Pakistan. In order to counter the 
possibility that China would help Pakistan once war broke 
out In 1971, India also reached a strategic agreement with 
the former Soviet Union, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation. By the end of the 1971 war, Pakistan was 
reduced to half Its former size, and China faced the 
possibility of having to deal with the Soviet Union as well 
In any future conflict with India (Khalld 1988). Through
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adroit diplomacy and a judicious use of force, India had 
achieved an enviably secure strategic position.
Pakistan was not so fortunate. Throughout its history, 
Pakistan's foreign policy has been dominated by the 
determination to incorporate Kashmir into the republic; its 
security policy, in turn, has been formed by the perceived 
threat from India (Ghumman 1990). A number of 
miscalculations by both Indian and Pakistani leaders led to 
the conflict over Kashmir, which occurred immediately 
following partition. Subsequently, statements by Nehru, as 
well as resolutions at the United Nations, supported holding 
a plebiscite within Kashmir to allow the Kashmiri people to 
choose between joining India or joining Pakistan.
Pakistan's leaders convinced themselves that the Muslims of 
Kashmir would choose to join Pakistan, if given the chance. 
Frustrated through the 1950s by a lack of diplomatic 
progress at the United Nations and with New Dehli, Pakistan 
launched an attack against the Indian section of Kashmir in 
1965. India already had made it clear that it would respond 
to such an attack as if it were against the Indian nation. 
Once Pakistan launched the well-advertised Operation 
Gibraltar, India singly made good on its warning and 
counterattacked across the international border. After a 
decisive Indian victory at Chawinda, a cease-fire was 
negotiated which left the states of Kashmir effectively the 
same as before the conflict.
64
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
According to Pakistani analyst Neil Joeck (1997, 265), 
"as neither China nor the United States assisted Pakistan in 
its aims in 1965 or prevented India from breaking up 
Pakistan in 1971, nuclear weapons came to be seen as the 
best available means to ensure that such an Indian policy 
would never become real." When India detonated a nuclear 
device in 1974, Pakistan's determination to arm itself with 
nuclear weapons was powerfully reinforced. Joeck (1997,
265) continues, "Just as China's detonation of a nuclear 
device 2 years following the 1962 wêu: sharpened India's 
interest in nucleair weapons, so too did India's detonation 
of a nuclear device in 1974 accelerate Pakistan's program."
Pakistan's security environment continues to be 
characterized by the Kashmir issue and the fear that India 
will try to divide Pakistan further. Fearing that outside 
assistance, whether from the United Nations, the United 
States, or China, will be inadequate, Pakistan's nuclear 
program has become now the focus of its security policy, 
standing as a powerful symbol of Pakistani independence. 
Joeck (1997, 265) concludes, "From Pakistan's view, nuclear 
weapons are the only guarantee that India will not attack 
again and 'finish the job' begun in 1971, either through 
overt means or by exploiting Pakistcui's chronic domestic 
disputes."
The 1998 overt nuclear testing by India and Paücistan 
did not make them nuclear newcomers. As was mentioned
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earlier, in 1974 New Dehli detonated a nuclear-fission 
device with a yield in excess of ten kilotons (kt) —  not 
much less than that of the Hiroshima bomb (Singh 1998).
This was the result of a massive nuclear research effort 
undertaken by India following China's 1964 nuclear test.
A.B. Vajpayee, a future Prime Minister of India, said as a 
parlicunentarian in 1964 that (Sharma 1998, 30), "the emswer 
to an atom bomb is an atom bomb, nothing else.” As for 
Pakistan its efforts to develop a nuclear arsenal began in 
earnest following its defeat in the war with India in 1970- 
71, and were accelerated following India's 1974 test. Yet 
the seeds of the efforts of such a nuclear program were 
being sown in the minds of Pakistani policymakers by the 
1960s (Anwari 1988). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's future 
Prime Minister, argued (Weismer and Krosney 1981, 48), "If 
Pakistan restricts (its) nuclecur programme it would...enable 
India to blackmail Pakistan with (its) nuclear technology. 
Our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon 
in time before the crisis begins."
17. It is notable that China, who later became a major 
supplier of nuclear technology to Pakistan, was largely 
absent from providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan as its 
program began. In fact, France was singled out as 
Pakistan's most iji^ ortant nuclear partner until American 
pressure led Paris to cancel the sale of a plutonium- 
reprocessing plant in 1978 (Weismer éuid Krosney 1981). This 
has led to suggestions that China's inability to extend 
nuclear support to Pakistan in the 1965 and 1970-71 wars may 
have been one of the factors prompting the Pakistani program 
(Weismer and Krosney 1981). By the mid-1980s, however,
China had become a major contributor to Pakistan's nuclear 
and ballistic armament programs (Gelb 1984a, 1984b).
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Thus the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan came 
long after both states initiated their military-nuclear 
efforts. These tests occurred after the production of 
substantial quantities of fissile material and well after 
the deployment of a first-generation of nuclear-capable 
delivery vehicles. This is not the sequence followed by the 
"official" nuclear-weapon states, where nuclear testing took 
place at the earliest feasible moment. Both the Indian and 
Pakistani authorities went out of their way to underline 
that their tests were the capstone to long-established 
weaponization and delivery-vehicle programs. On 17 May 
1998, Dr. A.P. J. Abdul Kalam, the scientific advisor to the 
Indian Minister of Defense, stated that "weaponization is 
now complete," adding that India's Prithvi ("Earth") emd 
Agni ("Fire") ballistic missiles were capable of carrying 
"any type of warhead" (Albright 1998). Similarly, Dr. A.Q. 
Khan, who has been key to Pakistcui ' s nuclear and ballistic- 
missile ambitions, indicated on 31 May 1998 that mass- 
production of the Ghauri intermediate-range ballistic 
missile (IRBM) had started, and that Pakistan could deploy 
nuclear warheads on the Ghauri within days (Albright 1998).
Both Pakistan and India have tested, with varying 
degrees of success, two categories of fission bombs: atom
bombs with power sufficient to wipe out a medium-size city 
(a 12 kt weapon by India and 15 kt weapon by Pakistan); and 
sub- (or very low) kiloton devices presumably serving as
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battlefield nuclear weapons (Hotz 1998). India has also 
indicated that it has tested a 43 kt hydrogen bomb. Such a 
low yield for a fully fledged thermonuclear weapon would 
indicate that India has a good mastery of "down-scaling " 
techniques, which make it possible to derive, from a 
comparatively small test, a set of data corresponding to 
that of a much more powerful explosion (Hotz 1998). 
Conversely, if the device had "fizzled", further testing 
could be necessary.
The number of weapons available can only be estimated 
from what is known of the relevant Indian and Pakistani 
sources of fissile material. India may have produced some 
400 kilograms of plutonium reprocessed from fuel irradiated 
in the Cirus and Dhruva reactors, from which 70-80 nuclear 
devices could have been manufactured (Heisbourg 1998-99). 
Given the age, breadth and depth of the Indian nuclear 
program, this should be considered a minimum, rather than a 
maximum figure (Heisbourg 1998-99). Other sources suggest 
that India may dispose up to 1.95 tons of plutonium derived 
from its six unsafegucurded CANDU-type nuclear reactors —  in 
other words, enough to produce more than 400 warheads (Steer 
1998). In comparison, in late 1998 the UK possessed fewer 
than 200 operational nuclear warheads (The Military Balance 
1998-99). India also has a tritium-production capability 
for hydrogen bombs. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are 
currently produced from centrifuge-generated highly enriched
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uranium at the Kahuta facility. Kahuta, which has been in 
operation since 1981, is based on a design absconded by Khan 
from the Anglo-German-Dutch URENCO facility at Almelo in the 
Netherlands (Leonard and Scheinman 1993). Fissile material 
may amount to between 400kg and 600kg, allowing for the 
manufacture of some 20-30 weapons (Albright 1998; Steer 
1998).
Over the years, India and Pakistan have acquired a 
broad array of aircraft which could readily be (and may, in 
a number of instances, already have been) configured for 
nuclear missions (The Mllltetry Balance 1997-98). With 88 
Jaguar and 147 MiG-27 fighter-bombers and an abundance of 
fighters which could play an escort role (among them 64 MiG- 
298, 35 Mirage 2000s and 238 MiG-2Is), India can afford to 
dedicate a substantial number of aircraft to nuclear 
missions (Bailey and Morimoto 1998). Pakistan is not quite 
so well-endowed, but it certainly has enough aircraft to 
conduct a nuclear mission successfully: 34 F-16A/B and 15
Mirage I IIEP aircraft could form the nucleus of cui atomic 
strike force, with a dozen squadrons of Chinese and French- 
made aircraft providing fighter cover (Bailey and Morimoto 
1998). A large proportion of these Pakistani and Indian 
aircraft are based close to the border between the two 
countries, in the vicinity of Lahore (Sargodha) and New 
Dehli (Hindan and Ambala) (Norris and Arkin 1998). Each 
nation's capitcü. is within easy reach of the other's
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aircraft. The largest economic centers of the two 
countries, Karachi (eight million inhabitants) and Mumbai 
(12 million) are also within operational range (Bailey and 
Morimoto 1998). Indeed, one of the most troubling 
characteristics of the Indo-Pakistani theater is the short 
distance between each potential contender's prime political, 
military and economic targets. New Dehli and Islamabad are 
some 600 kilometers apart, Mumbai and Karachi around 1,000km 
(Delpech 1998-99).
At the tactical level, India has created the family of 
Prithvi missiles from the SA-2. India has 75 Prithvi 1, 
which has a range of 150km and a 1,000kg payload (Heisbourg 
1998-99). Several are stationed at Jullundur, less than 
100km from the Pakistani border. Much of the Pakistani 
Punjab, including Lahore, is within the range of these 
forward-based missiles. Longer-range versions (250 km and 
350 km respectively) are also being produced, though with 
the trade-off of smaller payloads of 500kg (Heisbourg 1998- 
99). Notably, this lighter payload remains sufficient for 
nuclear-weapon delivery.
India is also working on a sea-borne missile called the 
Sagarika ("Oceanic"), Wiich may be ballistic or air- 
breathing (Hill 1998). Heisbourg (1998-99) has suggested 
that India may have gained submarine-missile experience 
while leasing a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine 
(SSGN) from the Soviet Union between 1988-91 {The Military
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Balance 1991-92). Despite this, Francois Heisbourg (1998- 
99, 81), an Indian military expert, argues that "unless it 
bought one off the shelf, it is difficult to imagine how 
such a capability could become available before 2005 at 
best, assuming that it would be indigenously developed.”
Pakistan ' s missile program is in many respects quite 
similar to India's. Pakistan tested the road-mobile Ghauri 
missile (also known as the Hatf 5), on 6 April 1998 (Fulghum 
1998). This test followed soon after the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s success in Indian elections 
in March 1998. The missile has a range of over 1100 
kilometers (Sidhu 1998). In terms of tactical ranges, 
Pakistan has produced the Hatf 1 (lOOkm) and Hatf 2 (300km), 
both with a 500kg payload (Norris and Arkin 1998).
In sum, India and Pakistan are both rapidly moving 
towards a diversified nuclear dyad composed of aircraft and 
ballistic missiles, although India will possess, for 
geographical reasons, a more extensive coverage of Pakistan 
than Pakistan will have of India. Such diversified forces 
on both sides enhance the deterrent capability of both 
sides.
Methods
It is believed that by surveying how tensions have 
evolved over the decades between India and Pakistan with 
respect to the Kashmir issue that the intact nuclear weapons 
have or have not had on conflict between the two neighbors
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can be assessed. Clearly in the first two conflict 
instances over Jammu and Kashmir, tensions escalated to the 
level of interstate warfare, while in the latter two they 
did not. But what role did nuclear deterrence play in the 
two most recent conflict situations, if any, in preventing 
escalation? This question will be addressed by two methods. 
First, the independent variables used in the quantitative 
section of this dissertation will be examined more closely. 
Alliance participation, geographic proximity, level of 
trade, military capabilities, presence of nuclear weapons, 
regime stability, and regime type all are considered in four 
cases of conflict between India and Psücistan: 1947, 1965,
1990, and 1999. All four instances are focused around the 
issue of the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
level of escalation and number of deaths again will be used 
as dependent variables in order to ascertain if the presence 
of nuclear weapons affected the level of conflict between 
India and Pakistan.
Two of the independent variables have remained static 
throughout the whole lndo-P5ücistani relationship and 
therefore only will be addressed once and not for each of 
the four cases in question: alliance membership and
geographic proximity.
Second, comments by decision-makers of consequence 
(both political and military leaders) on both sides of the 
Indo-Pakistani disputes will be included to appreciate how
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the presence of nuclear weapons affected their choices.
Such commentary by those in power provides a window to view 
what the major actors in the dispute were thinking at the 
time, as well as how the presence of nuclear weapons may 
have inqpacted the course of the conflict.
Alliance Membership
At no time in their history have India and Pakistan 
been members of the same formal alliance. This is notable 
because as this dissertation displayed in the previous 
chapter and as have other researchers have found in their 
studies, like alliance membership lessens the chance for 
conflict between states (Mihalka 1976; Bueno de Mesquita 
1981; Weede 1989; Kim 1991; Bremer 1992).
Because India and Pakistan have been rivals throughout 
their history it seems very unlikely that any alliance 
pcirtnership would be forthcoming between the two. Pcücistan, 
in an effort to displace some of India's militêury advantages 
in manpower cuid technology over the years, has sought and 
achieved technology exchcuiges with India's other main 
regional rival, China. This has served to exacerbate 
tension with India cuid further precludes the likelihood of 
any Indo-Pakistani partnership.
Thus, the lack of like alliance membership between 
India and Pakistan does not permit a diminution in the 
likelihood of conflict such a partnership could produce. 
Instead, the two remain unbound by such institutional ties
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and thereby forfeit the positive effects on conflict this 
variable has displayed in past interstate relationships. 
Geographic Proximity
All wars to date have been fought in geographical 
terrain and produce spatial outcomes (though this will 
likely change in the next millennium as computer viruses and 
other technological warfare pose new threats to state 
security). The three wars between India and Pakistan all 
left spatial legacies which continue to dictate relations 
among the two countries. From the occupation of a large 
territory to the control of a portion of some obscure 
glacier, geographical claims have and continue to drive 
tensions in South Asia.
These tensions are augmented in the case of the Indo- 
Pakistani dyad because the two rivals share a border with 
one another. As was noted in the previous chapter, 
geographic proximity has been shown in this and other 
studies to have a significant impact on conflict escalation 
(Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Russett 1993; Vasguez 1993; Senese 
1996, 1997). Geographically proximal dyads are more likely 
to escalate conflict than geographically distal ones. The 
salience of a territorial disagreement (in the case of India 
and Pakistan their dispute over Jammu and Kashmir has served 
as a spur) tends to stimulate militarized disputes between
18. This idea will be expanded in the concluding 
chapter.
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neighbors (Diehl 1992; Vasquez 1995). Thus, conflict 
situations between India and Pakistan are more likely to 
escalate because they border one another.
1947-48 Dispute Over Jammu and Kashmir
Between August and September 1947 the situation in 
Kashmir deteriorated rapidly when the Muslim subjects of the 
Maharajah rose in open revolt and were soon joined by fellow 
tribesmen from the Northwestern Frontier Provinces (Burke 
1973). The Maharajah fled from Srinagar and in desperation, 
agreed to accede to India on October 26, 1947. As soon as 
India received the instrument of accession, it dispatched 
airborne troops to Srinagar (Morris-Jones 1982).
The rebellion was quelled and the Pakistani tribesmen 
were pushed out of Srinagar. By the end of 1947 there was a 
stalemate in the conflict. India was in control of over 
two-thirds of Jammu and Kashmir, while the rest remained in 
Pakistan's hands. The government of India was convinced of 
the legality of its position, arguing that India could not 
have tolerated the Pakistani attempt to influence forcibly 
the internal and external policies of any friendly 
neighboring state (Lamb 1966). In the case of Kashmir, the 
treaty of accession had given India the responsibility for 
the defense of Kashmir (Gupta 1966). In those 
circumstances, on January 1, 1948, India lodged a complaint 
under Article 35 of the UN Charter to persuade Pakistan to 
stop the aggression by withdrawing its regular troops and
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denying the "invaders" the access to, and use of, its 
territory for operation against Kashmir (Gupta 1966).
The Security Council passed two resolutions after 
hearing from both India and Psücistan. The first resolution 
of January 17, 1948 asked the parties involved "not to 
aggravate the situation but to do everything to improve it" 
(Burke 1973, 22) The second resolution of Januetry 20, 1948, 
established a mediatory commission that eventually came to 
be known as the United Nations Commission on India and 
Péücistan (UNCIP). During the next month, a draft resolution 
based on the consensus of opinions of the majority of the 
members of the Security Council, was worked out jointly by 
Canada and Belgium, calling for "the immediate cessation of 
all violence and fighting, the withdrawal of all forces and 
armed individuals who had entered the state, the return of 
all citizens who had left the state, the establishment of an 
administration commanding the confidence and respect of the 
people, and the holding of a plebiscite accepted under UN 
supervision at the earliest possible date" (Khan 1983). The 
UN mediation process finally brought the war to a close on 
January 1, 1949. The best estimate of casualties is a 
combined total of 1500 dead (Singer and Small 1972). The 
war also led to a substantial loss of territory for India, 
nearly 5,000 square miles (Lamb 1966).
This initial war between India and Pakistan should not 
have been shocking to international observers at the time.
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Of four independent factors believed to increase the 
likelihood of conflict and war between states, all four 
forecast an intensification of hostilities in the Indo- 
Pakistani dyad in 1947. As noted earlier, the two's lack of 
like alliance membership and geographic proximity both 
pointed to conflict augmentation. Additionally, Pakistan's 
non-Democratic regime status, as well as the lack of regime 
maturity in both Islamabad and New Dehli suggested that 
tensions would escalate.
Table Four: 1947-48 Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Factor Value Escalation Imnact
Ally No INCREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic No INCREASE
Mature No INCREASE
Capability NA NA
Trade NA NA
Nuclear No NA
Outcome: WAR
TéÈble Four provides a listing of all the independent 
variables believed to intact escalation, as well as the 
outcome of the conflict: interstate war. This eventual
outcome was to be expected based on the variables listed in 
Table Four. There were no independent restraints on the
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Indo-Pakistani dyad and as a result it escalated into a 
large war.
1965 Dispute Over Jasumu and Kashmir
In the period 1964-65, there was considerable anxiety 
in Pakistan that its militeury advantage which had been built 
up through alliance with the West could be eroded in the 
wake of India's massive military rearmcunent by both the West 
and the Soviet Union. Indeed, by September 1965, when 
military aid was halted to both countries, US economic aid 
to India had exceeded aid to Pakistan by six billion dollars 
(Thomas 1992) (India's population, however, was four times 
that of Pakistan so that on a per capita basis, it received 
only half as much as Pakistan). It was argued, 
conspicuously by Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that 
Pakistan must act before the military balance tilted in 
India's favor and the window of opportunity closed forever 
(Lamb 1966). The advocates of war were supported by General 
Mohammed Musa, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who 
pointed out that despite an overall disparity because of 
India's militeury build-up, Pakistan still had "theater 
superiority" (Korbel 1966). In other words, a localized war 
fought specifically in Kashmir could still be won (Thomas 
1992). Thus it appears that fears over conventional 
inferiority fueled Pakistan ' s second war with India over 
Jammu and Kashmir.
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The curtain raiser before the actual warfare In Kashmir 
was played out In the dispute over the Rann of Kutch In the 
spring of 1965. Indian troops were decidedly dis advantaged. 
All the local advantages were with the Pakistanis. The Rann 
was well connected with roads from Pakistan and the border 
was close to Pakistan's forward positions, making It easy to 
move troops cuid supplies to the battle-front (Brines 1968). 
Thus, when fighting broke out on April 9, 1965, the 
Pakistanis launched a massive tank attack and had no 
difficulty In routing the Indian outposts. The Indians, 
recognizing the overwhelming tactical dlsadvemtages, chose 
to retreat rather than lose lives and equipment. In 
Pakistan the military "victory" confirmed Its perception of 
India's lack of nerves (Hasan 1978).
The euphoric leaders of Pakistan completely misread 
India's mood (Brines 1968). They had tested India's nerve 
and having found It wanting, now launched their plans for 
"Operation Gibraltar" to recover Kashmir. A secret 
committee headed by Bhutto decided on a Rann of Kutch type 
local campaign confined to Kashmir. According to the plans, 
Pakistan would send out 'Mujahlddln' and commandos across 
the border with Kashmir. Given the enormous popular 
discontent In Kashmir, their very presence would encourage 
the Kashmiris to rise In revolt. Palclstan's army would then 
appear to be seen as coming to the aid of the Kashmiris 
fighting Indian brutalities. The Kashmir dispute would be
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back on the table and India would be forced into accepting 
arbitration as it had done in the Rann dispute (HascUi 1978).
The whole plan backfired because the two assumptions on 
which "Operation Gibraltar" was based proved wrong. Far 
from the Kashmiri Muslims rising in rebellion, they actually 
apprehended the "Mujahiddin" when they crossed into Kashmir 
in August 1965, and promptly handed them over to the Indian 
authorities. The Indians refused to confine the fighting to 
Kashmir and showed little hesitation in violating the 
international frontier (Lamb 1966). The desperate but 
daring move by India to cross the international frontiers 
saved Kashmir. The war which began on September 5th and 
produced over 1,000 battle-deaths, ground to a halt 12 days 
later as the US placed an embargo on arms to the 
subcontinent. Both sides accepted a Security Council
resolution for a cease-fire soon thereafter (Thomas 1992).^ °
19. India also sought an active end to the conflict as 
a result of Chinese threats of "grave consequences" unless 
India dismantled certain fortifications China claimed it had 
erected between Sikkim êuid Tibet (the Chinese also demanded 
the immediate return of 800 sheep and 60 yaks which they 
claimed had been removed from Chinese territory). This 
ultimatum ultimately led to wêurnings from the superpowers 
and the US cunns embargo (Ganguly 1986).
20. This was largely brokered by the Soviet Union as 
the United States had alienated the two combatants with its 
arms embargo. The Soviets arranged negotiations between 
India and Pakistan in Tashkent beginning and concluding in 
January 1966. The Tashkent Declaration produced important 
territorial concessions by both sides. Thus the major 
reason the war ended was because of superpower influence 
(Ganguly 1986).
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Ganguly (1986, 92) concludes:
The 1965 war demonstrated the continuing inertance 
of the irredentist/anti-irredentist factor in Indo- 
Pakistani relations. Pakistan had resorted to war 
primarily because it believed that if it did not act 
in a decisive manner, the state of Kashmir would be 
integrated into India éuid international interest for 
Pakistan's concerns would dwindle. Here we see the 
continuing importance.. .of ideology. The Pakistanis 
had maintained that without their Kashmir their nation 
would be incomplete and simultaneously demonstrate the 
success of Indian secularism.
As was the case with the 1947 tensions, the 1965 Indo- 
Pakistani conflict over Kashmir was replete with indicators 
that it would escalate towards interstate warfare.
Table Five: 1965 Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Factor Value Escalation Imoact
Ally NO INCREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic No INCREASE
Mature NO INCREASE
Capability .6921 INCREASE
Trade 47.522 MINIMAL
Nuclear NO NA
Outcome : WAR
21. This is a relative capability measure for military 
forces between India and Pakistan. In the instance of 
1965, Pakistan had 69% the capability of India.
22. In millions of US dollars (Barbieri 1996b).
81
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Following the escalation formula put forward in the previous 
conflict instance, all the main independent factors 
indicated an escalation of hostilities ( see Table Five ). In 
the case of the 1965 conflict all six of the 
variables applicable to this conflict promoted conflict 
intensification between India and Pakistan. In addition to 
the two pervasive variables of "ally" and "proximity" the 
dyad was again not a grouping of two democracies; it was not 
a coupling of two mature regimes ; the two's relative 
military capabilities were fairly high; and there was a 
significant amount of trade between the two.z3 with all six 
of these factors pointing away from a de-escalation of the 
crisis, it is not surprising that tensions between the two 
rivals ultimately resulted in interstate war.
Ultimately a wider and more protracted conflict was 
prevented by superpower intervention. US arms embargoes on 
both India and Pakistan and Soviet efforts to promote 
negotiations between the two produced a rather rapid end to 
this war. A number of observers have concluded that the war 
effort could have been sustained by both sides for several 
more weeks (Lamb 1966; Ganguly 1986; Thomas 1992). Yet 
outside pressure brought the conflict to a halt.
23. With respect to trade this dissertation's findings 
were ambiguous (as past studies have been) about trade's 
effect on conflict. Again, there was a slightly significant 
increase in the level of conflict between trading partners, 
but no significant impact on the level of fatalities between 
trading partners engaged in conflict with one another.
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Six yeéirs after the 1965 conflagration and seven
following China's ascendancy to nuclear capability, India
tested successfully a nuclear device of its own. Former
Pakistani President Zia suggested in 1988 that after 1974
India's unclear nuclear status helped to foster deterrence
between the two South Asian rivals (Spector 1990, 100):
with respect to their [nuclear capabilities], if 
they create ambiguity, that ambiguity is the 
essence of deterrence. The present programs of 
India and Pêücistan have a lot of ambiguities, and 
therefore in the eyes of each other, they have 
reached a particulcu: level, and that level is good 
enough to create an impression of deterrence.
This suggests that contréLry to the queuititative evidence,
the asymmetrical nuclear relationship in the Indo-Pakistani
relationship did appear to play a positive role in deterring
conflict between the two states. The twelve years of
nuclear asymmetry were relatively uneventful in Kashmir and
though tensions between India and Pcücistan remained
consistently strained, conflict levels never reached beyond
18 out of 22 on the MID index. India and Pakistan remained
an asymmetrical dyad until roughly 1986, when it becéune
clean: to New Dehli that Islamaibad was a clandestine nuclear
power. Pcücistaui enjoyed a status of "opaque" nuclear power
for a couple years after this time in the eyes of the United
States before Reagain administration officials finally
admitted that Pakistan was a de facto member of the nuclear
club (Spector 1990). Thus, in future conflicts, both states
would enjoy nuclear capability.
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Major conflict over the Jammu and Kashmir region abated 
for a time after 1965. It might be asserted that Pakistan 
learned through its interstate warfare failings with India 
that such efforts were futile. Also, India's demonstration 
of its so-called "peaceful" nuclear capability in 1974 may 
have further atrophied Pakistani efforts at recapturing 
Kashmir. But in addition to the nuclear presence, the 
bipolar structure of the Cold War period probably played a 
role as well. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet 
Union were interested in an unstable South Asia. Thus, as 
was made evident in 1965, they would take the steps 
necessary to curtail conflict between India and Pakistan.
But cultural competitions aire not so easily excised, 
especially from neighbors, and so twenty-five years later, 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent end of the bipolar international structure, Indo- 
Pakistani tensions were renewed over Kashmir. Yet by then 
Pakistan had developed nuclear devices of its own and the 
world feared that the first war between nuclear powers was 
inevitable. However, the symmetrical presence of nuclear 
weapons appears to have prevented an escalation of the 
conflict in 1990. Deterrence was forced upon the two 
rivals, not by their superpower supporters as was the case 
during the Cold War, but by the overwhelming destructive 
cap«d)ility of their nuclear weapons.
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1990 Dispute Over Jammu and Kashmir
The Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir erupted for the 
third time less than a decade ago. Richard J. Kerr, deputy 
director of the Central Intelligence Agency said of the 1990 
dispute in South Asia: "It was the most dangerous nuclear
situation we have ever faced since I've been in the U.S. 
government. It was far more frightening than the Cuban 
Missile Crisis" (Hersh 1993).
However, some have suggested that the presence of 
nuclear weapons actually atrophied the 1990 conflict, 
arguing that the crisis adds additional support "to the 
already inuressive evidence that the chief intact of nuclear 
weapons is to deter war between their possessors" (Hagerty 
1995/96). It has also been suggested that the 1990 dispute 
lends credence to proliferation optimists and not its 
critics (Karl 1996/97; Burns 1998).
Again, New Dehli clearly understood Pakistan was now a 
nuclear capable state having acknowledged Pakistan's nuclear 
progress before 1990. General K. Sundarji, Indian army 
chief during the conflict said four years previously in 
1986: "There are enough indicators to suggest that Pakistan
has achieved or is close to achieving a nuclear weapons 
capability.So while Pakistan maintained a somewhat
24. The general's quote, appearing in India Today, 15 
February 1986, p. 78, was the general consensus of most 
strategic observers at the time. A US Special National 
Intelligence Estimate found that, by 1986, Pakistan was a de
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opaque nuclear status to the International community at- 
large, India assumed that It had the capacity to produce a 
few nuclear devices.
The 1990 crisis saw Its development In February of that 
year when Muslim Insurgents (typically supported by 
Pakistan) sparked violence against what they perceived to be 
the corrupt and repressive indleui rulers hip In Kashmir 
(Perkovlch 1996). A war of words followed and escalated 
rapidly. By 13 March 1990 Prime Minister Bhutto had 
traveled to Kashmir where she promised a "thousand year war" 
In support of the Kashmiri mllltêuits. VP Singh quickly 
retorted that India would react decisively to any Pakistani 
Intervention telling the Indian parliament (Manorahan 1990), 
"There should be no confusion. Such a misadventure would 
not be without cost."" By 10 April 1990 Singh"s rhetoric had 
become more harsh. Addressing the leadership In Islamabad 
from New Dehli Singh said (Housego and Meraj 1990, 5): '"Our
message to Pakistan Is that "you cannot get away with taking 
Kashmir without a waur...those who talk edaout one-thousand 
years of war should examine whether they will last one- 
thousand hours of war." By this time, India had mobilized 
troops Into the Indian controlled area of Kashmir. Indian 
diplomats claimed that forces on both sides were on a higher 
state of alert, though they were "several levels lower than 
would Indicate imminent hostilities" (Hussain 1992).
facto nuclear power with enough fissile material to produce 
several nuclear weapons (Spector 1988).
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In fact India cmd Pakistan were far from escalating the 
conflict past some minor border clashes Into the realm of 
Interstate warfare. The Stlmson Center In Washington DC 
brought together some key US participants In the crisis 
( notably the US ambassadors In New Dehli and Isleunabad, Bill 
Clark and Robert Oakley), as well as Indian and Pakistani 
diplomats, experts, and senior military officials In 
February 1994 to review and analyze the 1990 crisis, uday 
Bhaskar (1997), an Indian defense analyst summarizes some of 
the findings from the 1990 crisis as follows :
1. The threat of a nuclear confrontation was not 
great, nor were India and Pakistan eager to have 
another conventional war because of fears of 
escalation.
2. During the crisis the Indian military leadership 
deliberately refrained from moving armor associated 
with Its strike forces out of peacetime canton­
ments, and welcomed US defense attaches to confirm 
this.
3. During the crisis the Pakistani military leadership 
deliberately refrained from moving Its two strike 
corps to the front and refrained from using forward 
operating bases for Its air force —  critical 
Indications of an Impending attack.
In general, the Stlmson Center Report found, according to
Bhaskar (1997, 319), that the "sense of alarm over the
crisis was far greater In Washington than in Islamabad, and
It was greater In Isleunabad than In Dehli."
Yet why was neither side Interested In escalating the 
conflict further? Mushahld Hussain (1992, 195), adviser to 
then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, provides a powerful 
summary to the 1990 conflict saying, "the only reason such
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(an) eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation between the Pakisteuii 
and Indian armies did not convert into military conflict was 
because of the nuclear factor.”
Again the factors believed to contribute to conflict in 
the case of the 1990 Indo-Pakistani tensions are presented 
in Table Six. India and Pakistan displayed disparate levels 
of democratic institutions during 1990. The Polity III data 
set rates states' level of democratization from 0 to 10, 
with 10 being the most democratic. India scored an 8 on 
this scale in 1990, while Pakistan managed only a 3. This 
disparity in democratization would suggest that the 
likelihood of conflict escalating to interstate warfare was 
higher in the 1990 Indo-Pakistani conflict than it would 
have been if it had been a democratic dyad at the time.
The Indo-Pakistani dyad also did not contain two mature 
regimes. The Islamabad government was edging slowly toward 
democracy at the time but still had not stabilized itself, 
jumping from military control to republican government again 
and again. As was demonstrated in the quantitative section, 
this lack of stability suggests Pakistan might be more 
likely to escalate conflicts.
Indeed all the factors, except for the presence of 
nuclear weapons, point to an increased likelihood of 
escalation in the conflict (see Table Six). Yet the 
conflict fizzled out with few casualties and a general sense
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that a larger conflagration had been avoided. These 
indicators, coupled with the long history of turmoil between
Table Six: 1990 Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Factor Value Escalation Imoact
Ally No INCREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic NO INCREASE
Mature No INCREASE
Capability .64 INCREASE
Trade 185.4 MINIMAL
Nuclear Yes DECREASE
Outcome: Clash
these two neighbors over Jammu and Kashmir, suggests that 
the presence of nuclear weapons (the one factor new to the 
dyad) may have promoted conflict de-escalation in 1990 
between India and Pakistan.
Following the cessation of tensions between India and 
Pakistan in 1990 a number of strategic analysts proclaimed 
the success of nuclear deterrence on the Indian 
subcontinent. For instance, an «urticle whose authors 
include two of India's prominent nuclear strategists (Morgan 
et al. 1995, 164) states that, "India has been content to 
demonstrate capability, put basic infrastructure in place, 
and leave deterrence implicit and somewhat ambiguous... It
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appears that atomic capabilities on both sides in the Indo-
Pakistani conflict have so far led to a moderation in
actions between the two states." Indian nuclear strategist,
K. Subrahmanyam (1993, 184) also concludes:
The awareness on both sides of a nuclear capability 
that can enable either country to assemble nuclear 
weapons at short notice induces mutual caution. This 
caution is already evident on the part of India. In 
1965 when Pakistan carried out its "Operation 
Gibraltar" and sent in infiltrators, India sent its 
army across the cease-fire line to destroy the assembly 
points of the infiltrators. That escalated into full- 
scale war. In 1990 when Pakistan once again carried 
out a massive infiltration of terrorists trained in 
Pakistan, India tried to deal with the problem on 
Indian territo^ and did not send its army into 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
Elsewhere (Hagerty 1995/96, 109) fellow Indian nuclear
analyst K. Sundarji agrees with Subrahmanyeun, saying of
India's leaders: "The reason why they've hesitated to take
recourse to their stated, avowed strategy of reacting in the
plains conventionally is because of the nuclear
option... I ' ve got no doubt in my mind at all. " Pakistani
analysts concur with these views. For instance, Abdul
Sattar (1994-95, 3) writes of the "indispensable
contribution" Pakistan's "nascent nucleeu: capability has
made to deterrence of aggression and maintenance of peace."
Pakistani generals Ishaq and Beg agree with this anêü.ysis,
with Beg saying, "Far from talk of nuclear war, there is no
danger of even a conventional war between India and
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Pakistan.. .As compared to previous years, there is no 
possibility of an India-Pakistan war n o w .  "^ 5 
1999 Dispute Over Jmsmu and Kashmir
The 1999 Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir put the 
statements supporting nuclear deterrence in South Asia to 
yet another test. India bleuned the renewed conflict over 
Kashmir on Pakistan, claiming Islamabad sent hundreds of 
soldiers over the so-called Line of Control (LOG) dividing 
Jammu and Kashmir between the two powers. Pakistan 
maintained throughout the conflict that none of its soldiers 
were involved. Instead, Pakistan said that Muslim militants 
from various countries chose Kashmir in their campaign to 
bring the world's Muslim regions under religious rule 
(Bearak 1999a). Pakistan suggested that this campaign is in 
part a legacy of the proxy war that the United States waged 
against Soviet forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s.zs 
During those years the United States trained and armed 
thousands of Muslim guerrillas who opposed the Soviet troops 
because they viewed them as anti-Islamic infidels. Indeed,
25. From "General Beg Claims Country Conducted 'Cold' 
Nuclear Test." FBIS. August 3, 1993: 56. For comments
from Ishaq see "Ex-President discusses Nuclear Program, 
Politics." FBIS. July 26, 1993; 69-71.
26. Afghanistan is a popular whipping boy for 
Pakistan. In the words of an anonymous high-ranking 
Pakistcuii official, "Afghanistan is the source of 97% of our 
problems" (Perkovich 1996, 419). Drugs, terrorism, 
fundamentalism, and refugees are all Pakistani problems it 
is content to associate with Afghanistan.
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many of the guerrillas were using not only tactics that 
Americans had taught them, but also the weapons the United 
States gave them (Dugger 1999a). For instance, in June 1999 
an Indian helicopter was shot down using an American-made 
Stinger missile.Now, having succeeded in driving the 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan and establishing a form of 
religious rule there, Islamabad suggested that the warriors 
were turning their attention to Kashmir (Bearak 1999a).
Tensions remained high between India and Péücistan over 
the Kashmir issue for the next two months as the Indians 
shelled the militants ' Kashmiri mountain-top holdings. Yet 
again, tensions waned as Pakistan announced it intended to 
cease support for the isleunic militants emd agreed to a 
pullback. 28 India reacted favorably to this and the conflict 
was de-escalated.
Clearly the threat of nuclear weapons was on the mind 
of the Pakistani leadership during this crisis and probably 
played an major role in the Pakistani withdrawal. Pakistani 
Prime Minister Sharif, following the announcement of the de- 
escalation of the crisis and the pull-back of forces by both 
sides, admitted in a televised address to his country that
27. US intelligence officers reportedly have admitted 
that approximately one dozen Stinger missiles are 
unaccounted for in this region (Bearak 1999a).
28. Of course what it was Pakistan was pulling back 
remained unclear as Islamabad had stressed throughout the 
conflict that none of its forces were involved. Even after 
tensions had de-escalated Pakistan refused to accept the 
bodies of slain soldiers India claimed were Pakistani 
(Bearak 1999d).
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the nuclear aspect to the crisis had been an in^rtant 
concern (Bearak 1999d, 6): "People are not aware of the
anxiety we passed through during the past one and a half 
months. This is no secret that the threat of a big war with 
India was looming by the way things had deteriorated between 
India and Pakistan. Missiles with nuclear weapons were 
directed toward us and our air force was put on alert. "
The goal of the Pcücistani leadership seems to have been 
to put the issue of Kashmir back on the front page. In fact 
opposition groups in Islamabad complained that as soon as 
Kashmir was again the focus of the world. Prime Minister 
Sharif appeared to wilt (Bearak 1999c). There appears to be 
some merit to these accusations. There did appear to be a 
shift in world focus (with the exception of Indo-Pakistani 
publications) to the problems in Kashmir following the 
relcLxation in tensions between NATO and Serbia in mid to 
late June 1999 (Graham and Absse 1999). Sharif attempted to 
capitalize on this renewed South Asian focus by 
participating in a hastily arranged meeting with President 
Clinton in Washington to discuss the Kashmir crisis on July 
4th. Following the meeting, Sharif said that the President 
assured him that he would take a personal interest in 
settling the Kashmir situation. In fact, in a written 
statement. President Clinton did say that once the 
"sanctity" of the cease-fire line is restored he "would taike 
a personal interest in encouraging an expeditious resumption
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and intensification" of the high-level talks begun between 
India and Pakistan in Lahore during February 1999 (Graham 
and Abse 1999, 15).z* Prime Minister Sharif responded by 
saying that (Bearéüc 1999, 6), "an assurance by the leader of 
a power like America is not insignificant."
The leading opposition party in Islamabad, the Pakistan 
People's Peurty (PPP), called for the resignation of Prime 
Minister Sharif following his decision to order a 
withdrawal. However, the PPP is itself in disarray and 
unlikely to mount a successful challenge to Sharif's 
authority.30 Pakistani military leaders, on the other hand, 
appear to support Sharif's decision to reduce tensions.
This is important in Pakistan, where military support lends 
stability and credence to a government fortunate enough to 
garner it.
The 1999 crisis between India cuid Pakistan basically 
had all the same elements of the previous crises, with the 
continued presence of nuclear weapons and the addition of 
democratic institutions on both sides (Table Seven). While
29. The statement also said that President Clinton 
intended to "pay an early visit to South Asia. ” This after 
the President had canceled plans to visit India and Pakistan 
in 1998 following both side's testing of nuclear devices 
(Graham and Absse 1999, 15).
30. The Pakistan People's Party leader is the former 
Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, who lives abroad and faces 
arrest if she returns because she has been convicted of 
corruption.
94
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nuclear weapons likely played a large role in conflict de- 
escalation in the case of the 1999 conflict, the impact of 
democratic institutions cannot and should not be ignored. 
Yet, ironically, democracy did not seem to support a
Table Seven: 1999 Indo-Pakistani Conflict
Factor Value Escalation Imoact
Ally NO INCREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic Yes DECREASE
Mature No INCREASE
Capability .64 INCREASE
Trade NA NA
Nuclear Yes DECREASE
Outcome: Clash
cessation of the conflict in this instance. Publics in both 
India and Pakistan were fervently in favor of a continuing 
engagement and even of escalating the crisis if necessary 
(Dugger 1999b). A 5 July 1999 poll by one of India's major 
newspapers found 87.5% favored a continuation of the 
conflict, 5.1% supported peace talks with Pakistan, 3.4% 
desired a unilateral cease-fire, and 2.2% wanted to allow US 
mediation f India Todav 1999, 1). This suggests that 
democratic institutions, though present on both sides, might 
not have led to a conflict de-escalation.
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Moreover, in the case of India, there was intense 
pressure on the government to take whatever means necessary 
to dislodge the insurgents. India's ruling political party 
at the time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), received 
severe criticism for not discovering the extent of the 
guerrilla's incursion into Kashmir until May. By that time, 
the guerrillas had captured the high ground and dislodging 
them was too much for ground forces alone (Bearak 1999a). 
This pressure was notable especially because the BJP are 
considered to be defense hawks and it is the BJP who have 
chan^ioned India's nuclear testing and capabilities. With 
elections set for the Fall, the BJP was chastised as 
bumblers by their political opponents. Analysts suggested 
that the BJP might seek to recapture its reputation through 
escalating the conflict into a war. George Perkovich, a 
South Asian specialist, was quoted as saying (Bearak 1999a, 
3), "There has been a fundamental assault on their [the BJP] 
credibility. The BJP can't afford to lose in this 
confrontation. They're under intense pressure to use their 
military."
Yet again, given the first real opportunity to de- 
escalate the crisis, the BJP took it and agreed to a mutual 
withdrawal of forces (Dugger 1999a). The conflict easily 
could have persisted on both sides based not only on 
political and public pressure, but also in military terms. 
Colonel SVE David India's army deputy commander at Dras said
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of Pakistani forces, "If you come 8,9 kilometers inside your 
enemy's territory, why do you bloody run away like a dog 
with its tail down? They should have fought it out longer. 
They had the supply lines " (Bearak I999d, 3). Yet tensions 
de-escalated in spite of this.
These factors, coupled with the clear awareness of 
political and military leaders in both India and Pakistan of 
the nuclear factor seems to indicate that these weapons 
prevented their 1999 conflict over Jammu and Kashmir from 
escalating further. Without the deterrent aspect of nuclear 
weapons both governments might have handled the increased 
political and public pressure differently and mired 
themselves in a protracted conflict costly to both sides. 
Alternate Explanations for De-escalations
At least three alternate explanations have been posited 
regarding why the 1990 and 1999 conflicts did not escalate 
beyond some minor clashes between Indian military forces and 
Pakistani-backed guerrilla forces in Kashmir, one cirgument 
suggests that both India and Péücistan "learned " that 
conflict escalation leading to weir does not produce 
beneficial outcomes to either side. While this may be 
accurate in the case of Pakistan, \dio lost both previous 
Kashmiri wars against India, it seems less plausible when 
applied to India. Indeed in some cases, India may have 
learned that war with Pakistan does pay. India won its 1965 
war over Jammu and Kashmir with Péücistan with an aggressive,
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offensive maneuver. Hagerty (1995/96, 111) suggests in this 
regard: "Their [India] lesson may have been that there are
certain intolerable circumstances under which the forceful 
application of offensive military doctrines can ease the 
security threat from a smaller but determined neighbor.
Thus... nuclear deterrence provides the most persuasive 
explanation of vdiy New Dehli did not go on the offensive in 
1990." Moreover, if Pakistan had "learned" that conflict 
did not pay, then why was it the initiator in the two most 
recent conflicts? The evidence suggests that this first 
alternate explanation lacks predictive power.
A second hypothesis posited for the de-escalation of 
Indo-Pakistani tensions in 1990 and 1999 was that 
conventional, instead of nuclear capabilities deterred the 
two rivals from a larger conflagration. Yet both sides' 
conventional capabilities, while in^roved from the two 
previous instances of war, did not produce relatively more 
conventional capability for either side than in the past.
In other words, their relative military capabilities were 
similar to past levels. Again Hagerty (1995/95, 111) 
argues: "Elements of both conventional and nuclear
deterrence operated in 1990, but the sine qua non of 
conflict resolution was the nuclear factor. " The same could 
be said for the 1999 conflict as well.
Fineü.ly, a factor exclusive to the 1999 conflict was 
the presence of democratic institutions. This would seem to
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be the strongest argument for conflict abatement outside of 
the presence of nuclear weapons in the dyad. But as was 
noted previously y public support was evident on both sides 
of the border for a continuation of the conflict (Dugger 
1999b). There was no strong public call for a cessation of 
tensions. Internally, the opposition party of consequence 
in Pakistan called for the government to stay the course 
with respect to the crisis and not to withdraw. Though the 
Prime Minister did appear to receive support from the 
military leaders for his decision to withdraw, it seems 
likely that their support of such a decision was because of 
the nuclear threat posed by India.
So why did Islamabad begin the conflict at all? What 
Pakistan seems to be engaged in with respect to Kashmir is a 
sort of miniaturized proxy conflict with India. Pakistem 
supplies weapons and advisors to radical Islamic forces in 
Kashmir to fight with India, but makes no overt effort to 
engage Indian forces directly. Such surrogate activity and 
not direct confrontation could be construed as evidence of 
the powerful nuclear stailemate atomic weapons have 
engendered in South Asia.
Results
The results of this case study indicate support for the 
theory that nuclear weapons have had a pacifying effect on 
Indo-Pakistani relations. On the two occasions of conflict 
where neither side had nucleeir weapons the turmoil escalated
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to a level of interstate warféire (22), while during the 
occasions when India was open nuclear power and Pakistan was 
an opaque one, as well as during the most recent discord 
where both were out of the nuclear closet the level of 
conflict did not rise above 18 (clash), with respect to the 
level of fatalities, the same pattern holds true (see Table 
Eight). Much higher casualty levels were witnessed when
Table Eight : Indo-Pakistani Conflict Over Jaasiu and
Kashmir
1947-48 1965 1990 1999
Ally Mb NO No NO
Proximal Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dem Dyad NO NO NO Yes
Mature NO NO No NO
Capability NA .69 .66 .64
Trade NA 47.5 185.4 NA
Nuclear NO No Yes Yes
Conflict
Level 22 22 18 18
Combined
Fatalities > 1,500 > 1,000 < 50 < 500
neither side had nuclear weapons in comparison to when one 
or both openly admitted to having such weapons.
Lending additional credence to the nuclear peace notion 
in the case of the Indo-Pakistani dyad is the fact that so 
many of the other independent factors surveyed pointed to an
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increased likelihood of escalation on all four occasions.
The lack of alliamce structures, close geographic proximity, 
the presence of one of more immature regimes, and relatively 
similar military capabilities all serve to augment the 
chances of conflict escalation towards war. The absence of 
a democratic dyad in every instance but that of 1999 also 
increased the likelihood of conflict escalation in the case 
of the first three conflict situations.
Further, as has been discussed in previous sections, 
both India and Pakistan have taken extreme steps to ensure 
that the other side would not view their own moves as 
antagonistic. In the two most recent crises when nuclear 
weapons were present in the dyad, both India and Pakistan 
deliberately refrained from operating from forward bases (in 
the case of India) or from moving military strike corps to 
the front ( in the case of Pakistan ). Such action was not 
taken in the two earlier conflict instances, when the 
conflict escalated to the level of interstate war.
All of this suggests that nuclear weapons have had a 
pacifying impact on the Indo-Pakistani dyad. This is 
fortunate, as the prospects for placing the South Asian 
nuclear jinn back into its silo for good seem slim.
Prospects for Nuclear Reversal
The contrasts between states that have reversed their 
nuclear programs and India and Pakistan are clear. The most 
important change for South Africa, Brazil, Argentina,
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Belarus, Ukrad.ne, and Kazakhstan was in security policy.
According to Neil Joeck (1997, 271), in the case of those
six states, "change became possible when national leaders
were convinced that the security threats to the nation did
not require a nuclear deterrent. Coupled with that drcunatic
change in security perceptions was the incentive of economic
development and growth. All six states anticipated
substantial rewards if they gave up nuclear weapons, and few
economic rewards in keeping them." Nuclear weapons, or
nuclear weapons programs, were very important for security
under certain circumstances, but the penalty in keeping them
once the security issue had changed became equally
important. Joeck (1997, 271) concedes, however, that
perception of threat was the overriding factor:
It would not be correct to conclude that national 
security in these states singly had a price tag, 
which the West finally paid. Even when the economic 
hardships were severe, if the perception of threat 
was high, the burden was accepted. But, it clearly 
was the case that, once state security ceased to be 
connected with nuclear weapons, the economic incentives 
in reversing the nuclear programs became con%>elling.
For India and Pakistan, the security threat has not
changed, and the economic inducements to remove nuclear
weapons have not been persuasive.The psychological
investments that both sides have made in their nuclear
progrêuns also continue to be powerful incentives not to
31. Admittedly, in India's case its nucleaur arsenal is 
used for security not only against Pakistan, but also 
against China.
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reverse course. For India, the symbol of nuclear power, in 
addition to the raw need for new reservoirs of energy, 
provides a strong disincentive to cede to Western demands. 
India, of course, could have as much nuclear energy as It 
could afford If It were to sign the MPT, but that symbolic 
retreat would probably be too great a polltlcaü. price to pay 
for the Indian governments of the near future. For 
Pakistan, nuclear weapons are clearly more Important than 
the rather unsubstantial energy addition provided by nuclear 
power. The nuclear program serves to bind Pakistanis 
together In a way few other state symbols can. Even Islam 
divides the nation between Sunni and Shla.
Also, unlike other cases of reversal. In South Asia the 
Issue of transition from authoritarianism to democratic 
governance Is not a factor. As one of the world's oldest 
democracies, India's nuclear policy Is popularly supported 
and has survived numerous political transitions. Although 
relatively new, Pakistan's struggling democracy also has 
supported the nuclear program and promises to continue to do 
so. This Is distinct from Argentina and Brazil, where 
public debate had been suppressed under the military and 
ultimately promoted the decision to reverse. In contrast, 
India's and Pakistan's programs enjoy strong public support 
suggesting that a reversal of nuclear policy Is unlikely to 
occur (Dugger 1999b).
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While most analysts seem to agree with the findings of 
this dissertation that the presence of nuclear weapons In 
the Indo-Paklstanl dyad has led to conflict pacification the 
prospect of nuclear permanency on the Indian subcontinent 
has left others nervous, indeed, scmte analysts still pose 
questions concerning the stability the Indo-Paklstanl dyad 
will enjoy now that both states have become overt members of 
the nuclear club (Erlanger 1998). Three potential 
differences between the stable US-Sovlet nuclear dyad and 
the newly formed Indo-Paklstanl nuclear dyad have been 
posited.
First, unlike the US-Sovlet situation, India and 
Pakistan share a common border. The suggestion here Is that 
a common geographic boundary breeds animosity between states 
and Increases the likelihood of conflict. In fact, as was 
addressed earlier In the quantitative section of the 
dissertation, the Impact of geographical proximity has been 
shown In previous studies to be significant on the 
escalation of hostilities between states (Bremer 1992; Diehl 
1985; Russett 1993; Senese 1997). Yet, since the 
Introduction of nuclear weapons to the dyad, the strains of 
geographic proximity In the Indo-Paklstéuil relationship have 
yet to be felt In a magnitude greater than those of the 
relatively geographically distal US-Sovlet relationship, it 
seems reasonable to suggest that nuclear weapons have dulled 
conflict between India and Pakistan, as none of their crises
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since India first detonated a nuclear device in 1974 has 
escalated to a level higher than 18 on the MID index. In 
the years before the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
the Indian subcontinent the Indians and Pakistanis fought 
three wars against one another. Thus, nuclear weapons seem 
to have lessened, if not negated, the escalation effects of 
geographic proximity in the case of India and Pakistan.
Second, the relative dearth of nuclear weapons 
possessed by either India or Pakistan has led some to 
suggest that the lack of survivable nuclear forces on both 
sides might promote a first-strike (Erlanger 1998). The 
United States and Soviet Union overcame such a threat to 
deterrence by deepening their arsenals to achieve relative 
symmetry, but more in^ >ortcUitly by developing strategic 
triads to diversify the locale of their weapons. Both the 
United States and the Soviet Union created a multiform force 
structure by developing a range of delivery systems to 
ensure the survivability of their nuclear forces. The two 
sides developed nuclear delivery systems which were land- 
based (ICBMs), air-based (bombers), and sea-based 
( submarines ). India «md Pakistan have no comparable 
strategic triad. Such a diverse strategic insurance policy 
may be developed in time, but at this point neither side 
appears to have enough nuclear weapons to threaten an 
initial attack. This is very different from the US-Soviet 
dyad where both sides had nuclear arsenals large enough to
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wipe the other side conqsletely off the face of the Earth. 
India and Pakistan merely have sought to achieve a "minimum 
deterrent" force (Burns 1998). Such a limited force seeks 
only to deter a nuclear attack and does not provide the 
fir e-power needed to enable either side to initiate a 
nuclear exchange without fear of reprisal. Therefore, a 
nuclear symmetry exists between the two. If the Indian and 
Pakistani nuclear arsenals vastly deepen over time, then it 
may be appropriate for a strategic triad similar to that of 
the superpowers to be developed in these two countries. But 
for now, the absence of such a triad is reasonable and does 
not lessen the intact of nuclear deterrence for either side.
Also the logic of preemption recently has been called 
into question with empirical evidence. Surveying all wars 
since 1816, Dan Reiter (1995) found that only 3 of 67 
(approximately 4%) were preemptive in origin. The nuclear 
era has seen at least one instance of preventative conflict 
—  that of the 1981 Israeli bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear 
facility, though it was taken without fear of nuclear 
reprisal.32 Hagerty (1995/96, 114) notes: "In situations
where nuclear retaliation has been a possibility, no leader 
of a nuclear weapon state has chosen to launch a preemptive 
first strike."
32. The Allied coalition's 1991 air war against Iraq 
during the Gulf War might be a second instance, but here as 
well there was no fear of nuclear reprisal by Iraq.
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Third, some fear that the fifteen years It took the 
United States and the Soviet Union to develop a reliable 
command and control center are not affordable In the Indo- 
Paklstanl dyad.^  ^ Yet In the case of both India and Pakistan 
the primary delivery systems for their nuclear weapons are 
bombers (Albright 1993, 1998) Such airborne delivery 
systems remove the chances of an accidental missile launch 
that the superpowers had to face during the Cold War and 
still face today. For Instance, In 1995 Russian warning 
systems Interpreted the launch of a Norwegian scientific 
rocket as a possible nuclear attack promoting President 
Yeltsin to extract the nucleeu: launch codes from the Russian 
equivalent of the "nuclear football." A disaster was 
averted when It was realized In Moscow that the Norwegians 
had months earlier notified the Kremlin that such a launch 
was going to take place at the time specified. India and 
Pakistan have sought to avoid such an accident by not 
en^loylng computerized delivery systems. Also, strict 
command and control procedures prevent a Strangelovlan 
scenario (Delpech 1998-99).
So while all three of these concerns may have some 
merit, mostly their Inertance Is over-emphasized In the 
context of the Indo-Paklstanl dyad. The fact Is that
33. The former director of Pakistan ' s Inter-Servlces 
Intelligence Agency, has dismissed the survivability Issue 
as a US preoccupation (Giles and Doyle 1996).
34. Both India and Pakistan are developing ballistic 
missile capability however. (Singh 1998).
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nuclear weapons have existed in the Indian subcontinent 
since 1974 and the instances of conflict between the two 
have lessened since that time with twenty-seven conflict 
instances occurring before 1974 and only nine since then 
( Jones, Bremer and Singer 1997 ). The closest the two 
countries came to war since 1974 was in 1990 and it is 
generally agreed that in this instance, nuclear weapons 
served to dull the escalation of the crisis (Perkovich 1993; 
Arif 1995; Hagerty 1995/96; Karl 1996/97).
Conclusion
Conflict in general between India and Pakistan seems 
unlikely to abate in the near future, indeed, theirs has 
been a relationship of conflict. But with the introduction 
of nuclear weapons to South Asia, this conflict has 
diminished in magnitude. Border incursions and clashes have 
persisted and most likely will continue, but there is no 
reason that the apparent nuclear peace which has kept both 
sides from escalating in the past won't continue to maintain 
at least a limited peace in the future. Indeed, the Western 
powers should accept the nuclearization of the Indian 
subcontinent and work to promote a stable deterrence 
structure, instead of attenqsting to stuff the nuclear genie 
back into its bottle.
From the perspective of Indieui and Pakistani officials, 
efforts to discourage the two South Asian states from
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adopting nuclear capabilities is attributcd>le to racism.
India's former external affairs secretary, K. Shaker Bajpai
(1993, 24) summarizes the feeling of the subcontinent:
East-west deterrence is said to have preserved world 
peace for 40 years but the rationale is not always 
considered safe for other confrontations : others
cannot be trusted to act as sanely, soberly, 
Caucasianally. Even if the world's controlling powers 
will not accept that deterrence would apply 
universally, Péücistan and India provide one case where 
it would.
Indeed, feaurs over the inability of regional powers to
control their nuclear weapons seem exaggerated. As Martin
vaui Creveld (1993, 122) writes, "...there seems to be no
factual basis for the claims that regional leaders do not
understeuid the nature and implications of nuclear weapons. "
Later, van Creveld (1993, 123) asserts:
An even more critical reason %diy regional leaders 
tend to be at least as careful in handling nucleau: 
weapons as those of the superpowers is the fact 
that many of the countries in question are quite 
small, adjacent to one each other, and not separated 
by any clear natural borders; often they share the 
same local weather systems and draw their water from 
the Scune river basin. Sence the question of how 
escalation, radiation, and contamination may be 
avoided appears even more baffling in their case than 
in that of the US and the former USSR, which used to 
be located on different hemispheres and which for 
decades prepared to fight each other on terrain 
belonging to third parties. As agreements concluded 
between India and Pakistan demonstrate, there can be 
no doubt that regional leaders are aware of these 
disincentives to the use of nuclear weapons.
In fact vem Creveld believes that the treaties amd regimes
to which the threat of nuclear proliferation has given rise
hide as their real objective the perpetuation of the "old"
nuclear powers. Van Creveld (1993, 124) writes, "Regional
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powers and their leaders have been described as unstable, 
culturally biased, irresponsible, and whatnot. To this end, 
weapons and technologies that used to be presented as 
stabilizing when they were in the hands of the great powers 
were suddenly described as destabilizing \dien they spread to 
other countries."
Yet as the Indo-Pakistani dyad indicates, the leaders 
of regional powers tend to be extremely cautious with their 
nuclear capabilities. Still, concerns over the stad)ility of 
the Indo-Pakistani nuclear peace persist. Geographical 
constraints between the subcontinent's nuclear contenders 
are by far the most demanding that have been encountered by 
any nuclear antagonists on a permanent basis since the 
advent of nuclear weapons. For the first time, both 
capitals être within four or five minutes of a missile 
strike. Washington and Moscow were within more than a half 
hour of each other, while Paris and London were within a 
dozen minutes of a Soviet strike. Thus, the more 
established nuclear powers should offer technology and 
assistance to promote communications and peace-of-mind to 
India and Pakistan.
There will always be the threat of an Indo-Pakistani 
conflagration erupting into a nuclear exchange. But at the 
same time, this nuclear threat seems to be one major 
component, if not the major con^nent, behind twenty-five 
years of peace between these bitter rivals. As Shai Feldman
110
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(1995, 179), a senior research associate at the Jaffe Center 
for Strategic Studies, suggests, "It is difficult to see how 
escalation of the conflict over Kashmir could have been 
avoided were it not for the two countries ' fear of nuclear 
escalation." Nuclear deterrence seems to have worked in 
South Asia. Thus, while the likelihood of conflict 
escalating out of control between India and Pakistan remains 
a possibility, it seems unlikely at best.
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CHAPTER FIVE: US EUCLEAR POLICY AMD
NAEAGED PROLIFERATICE
The nuclear club, whose membership began with the 
United States over fifty years ago, today alarms policy­
makers and the public alike with the prospect of its 
continuing expemsion (Thayer 1994, 1995). As this 
dissertation has displayed, there are at least nine existing 
or former nuclear weapons ' states in the world today ( see 
Appendix A). The dissertation has examined the intact of 
nuclecur weapons on conflict situations both qualitatively 
and quantitatively and now the knowledge extracted from 
those earlier chapters will be applied to advising what 
policies the United States should adopt with respect to 
nuclear weapons as the twenty-first century arrives. Should 
the United States continue its vigorous efforts to prevent 
nuclear proliferation, or are changes in this policy 
warranted? For instance, several scholars have advocated 
openly the spread of nucleê&r weapons to Germany and Ukraine 
(Hearsheimer 1990, 1993; Van Evera 1990/91; and Posen 1993). 
They argue that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by these 
two states would deter Russian aggression in the region.
Yet is a limited spread of nuclear weapons the correct
35. Such continued efforts to prevent Russian 
influence in Europe hearkens back to the Cold War saying 
that for Europe to be stable NATO needed to keep the Germans 
down, the Americans in and the Russians out. Expansion of 
the nuclear club to Germany might only succeed in the third 
element.
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course for the United States? This chapter will address 
this question by exploring the potential intact of managed 
nuclear proliferation to regional troublespots.
Specifically, the prospects for allowing or promoting 
nuclecir proliferation to two dyads of great historical 
tension will be analyzed in this chapter. The two 
prospective cases are the Korean dyad and that of Greece and 
Turkey. But before considering the potential merits and 
shortcomings of the spread of nuclear weapons to these 
dyads, US policy towards nuclear weapons is assessed.
US Policy Towards Nuclear Weapons
As the United States prepares for the twenty-first 
century it must consider what strategic course it will take 
with respect to nucleeu: weapons. Presently the United 
states is embarked on a path focused on nuclear reduction at 
home, and the strict prevention of the spread of such 
weaponry abroad. 6^ while it is clear that the US nuclear 
arsenal is overbuilt from its Cold War competition with the 
Soviet Union, US efforts to keep the spread of nuclear 
weapons in aüseyance may not only be futile, but not even in 
its best interest.
36. In the 1950s the United States laid the 
foundations of the current nonproliferation regime, with 
President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. The 
focal idea was that the promotion of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes could be used to gain nonproliferation 
commitments from nations. This gave rise to the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Association) in 1957, and 
eventually to the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 
1968.
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From the standpoint of nuclear proliferation, the 
United States has nothing immediately to fear.^  ^ In the near 
term, the use of nuclear weapons by an Nth country is 
unlikely to endanger US territory, as no such country 
possesses both long-remge nuclear capable delivery vehicles 
and intentions or reason to harm the United States 
(Schelling 1982; Leventhal and Alexander 1986; Karp 1996; 
Vogele 1997).
The United States has fought vigorously to prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear technology. But 
revelations of the breadth and depth of Irag's clandestine 
nuclear program after the Gulf War served to strengthen 
criticisms of the nuclear control regime and promoted 
efforts aimed at improving it. Since these discoveries of 
the covert Iraqi nuclear activities the United States has
37. The real risk is if prospective proliférants are 
sold weapons or nuclear weapons technology because nuclear 
weapons are difficult to manufacture. The problems with 
nuclear weapons lie not in their design, but in the 
procurement of the plutonium, uranium and sometimes tritium, 
which, depending on the particular type of nuclear reaction 
one is seeking, are needed for the successful constitution 
of a nuclear weapon. This aspect in the creation of a 
nuclear device poses problems because none of these 
substances exist in nature. Plutonium is created as a 
byproduct of a nuclear reactor fueled with uranium (Spector 
1990). Uranium-235 is present as only .7% of naturally 
occurring uranium, which is predominantly con^sed of the 
isotope uranium-238. The proportion of uranium—235 can be 
increased (normally up to 90% or more for nuclear weapons) 
through a process of "enrichment” which separates isotopes 
on the basis of their mass (Spector 1990). The United 
States no longer produces tritium, though we still need It 
for our nuclear weapons for boosting purposes. The U.S. 
still has a tritium stockpile from the Savannah Hiver 
Reactor (which stopped producing tritium in 1986).
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redoubled its efforts to promote anti-proliferation 
initiatives. 1995 saw the renewal without limit of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty; the Missile Technology Control 
Regime expanded to over twenty-five members with US 
prodding; êuid the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was 
completed in 1996. Additionally^ the United States has 
refocused some of its bilateral engagements directly around 
the area of nonproliferation. For instance, agreements with 
China and North Korea have attempted to strengthen 
nonproliferation rules and norms. Also, the United States 
has threatened to adopt a more active anti-proliferation 
enterprise known as "counterproliferation." Such an effort 
would seek to position the United States "as global judge, 
jury and executioner against weapons of mass destruction" 
(Muller and Reiss 1995).3* The notion of such a proactive, 
aggressive stance emerged in the Bush administration 
following the Gulf War and has been espoused by the Clinton 
administration as well as a means of coping with rogue 
states such as North Korea (Pilat and Kirchner 1995). 
However, US military action with the specific intent of 
blunting the progress of a potential proliférant has yet to 
occur. 39
38. Such a focus on pre-en^tive action is reminiscent 
of the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear facility in 
Osirak (Spector 1990).
39. The post-Gulf War destruction of some of Iraq ' s 
nuclear production capabilities might qualify, but this
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So what Is the correct course for the US to take with
respect to nuclear weapons at home and abroad? Presently,
three potential US policy options with respect to nucleéur
proliferation could be considered. First, the United States
could seek the complete abolition of nuclear weapons from
the plamet. Yet the pacifying aspects of nuclear weapons
which this dissertation has presented suggests that such a
"nuclear free" option would be as foolish (Bailey and Barish
1999) as it would be infeasible to achieve. Nevertheless,
such an idea does have its supporters (Gilpin 1962; Schell
1982, 1984; Ellsberg 1992) and a RAND study conducted in
1993 notes as the potential benefits of such a retro
international structure (Millet et al. 1993, 10):
Establishing a "no-nuclear" norm would legitimate 
the highly intrusive challenge inspections necessary 
to assure con^liance with nonproliferation and provide 
wairning of potential breakouts from the regime. The 
warning gained by intrusive inspections would give 
the international community time to respond with a 
graduated series of economic and political sanctions.
It would also provide an opportunity to build 
international consensus for military operations by 
the former major nuclear powers through the use of 
advanced conventional weaponry against nascent nuclear 
arsenals should that step become necessary.w
effort was mandated by the cease-fire agreement signed by 
Iraq and enforced by the UN. Thus, this is hardly a 
unilateral US military effort designed to hit an 
unsuspecting proliférant ' s nuclear production facilities 
envisioned in the concept of counterproliferation.
40. The notion of conventional war to preserve an 
anti-proliferation agreement seems to defeat the purpose of 
the deal. Lawrence Sigal (1998, 3) quotes Korean analyst 
Donald Gregg as saying in this vein, "If you fight a war to 
preserve the NPT, that's like burning a village in Vietnam 
to save it."
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All of this sounds remarkably unrealistic. Now that the
nuclear genie has escaped its confines to venture out into
the world it is difficult to imagine a scenario allowing for
its re-corking. In fact the goal of a nuclear free world
should not be to legitimize international inspections, but
to eibolish the need for them. This would require a level of
international trust not seen before in the history of the
world. In short, it seems like fantasy.
Second, the United States could persevere with its
current policy with respect to nuclear proliferation and
maintain a restrictive two-tiered international system of
"haves" and "have-nots." This approach seeks to convince
the present "have-nots" that there is little reason for them
to join the exclusive nuclear club. This is achieved
through extended deterrence security guarantees, and when
necessary, sanctions against potential proliférant states,
or potentially couterproliferation efforts. It also
requires that the other nuclear powers assist in maintaining
the exclusivity of the club by not sharing nuclear
technology with the "have-not" states.
For some amalysts, however, international treaties the
United States and others have supported in an attempt to
curtail proliferation are not an effective route. Fareed
Zakaria (1998, 28) argues:
International treaties usually reflect reality rather 
than shape it. For the past fifty years the real 
engine behind nonproliferation was the Cold war.
During their global struggle the United States and
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the Soviet Union had at least one goal in common: 
maintaining their nuclear preponderance. To reduce 
instability brought about by new nuclear chêLllengers, 
they promised protection to some countries and 
threatened punishment to others. It worked; despite 
access to high technology, many countries chose not 
to go nuclear.
Zakaria (1998, 28) goes on to suggest that the United States 
must tailor its nuclear policy to individual countries, 
noting, "Under international law, «Ü.1 states are alike. In 
the real world they are not." For Zakaria, rogue states 
such as Iraq and North Korea should be dealt with strictly, 
while "stable, legitimate regimes" such as in Israel, India 
and Pakistan (the latter two of which have achieved nuclear 
prowess despite US efforts) should be allowed to achieve 
nuclear capability.
Following through with this idea, as a third policy 
direction the United States could opt for some form of 
relaxation of its proliferation policy and permit either a 
limited spread of nuclear weaponry to states deemed 
acceptable, or it could step away entirely from 
proliferation controls and allow the free spread of nuclear 
weapons across the globe. The latter end of this spectrum 
of choice seems too radical. Irrespective of the pacifying 
intact of nuclear weapons the United States should not allow 
a proliferation free-for-all because it will limit us 
foreign policy options. This is what nuclear deterrence
41. Also, a rapid spread of nuclear weapons could lead 
to an increased opportunity for nuclear terrorism (Pilat 
1998-99; Stem 1998-99).
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succeeds In doing after all, preventing escalation by 
limiting the rational options states might choose in dealing 
with an adversary. Consider the Gulf war, for instance.
Had Iraq had nuclear weapons in 1991 it seems unlikely that 
the United States would have chosen to attempt to expel 
Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Instead, the US probably would 
have acted as a shield for Saudi Arabia, preventing any 
further Iraqi incursions over the Arabian peninsula. Thus, 
while a US-Iraqi nuclear dyad would have prevented an 
escalation, it would have limited US policy options by 
creating a nuclear stalemate.
Therefore, the more reasonable policy course would be 
for the United States to permit a "managed " spread of 
nuclear weapons to select states. Such a spread might be 
limited to regionêü. trouble-spots and/or areas in which the 
United States is not interested in operating. While it 
could be argued that such a permissive stance by Washington 
might lead to new nuclear states whose regimes eventually 
could be hostile to the United States, this would seem to be 
a risk worth taking if it will lead to regional 
pacification.
Two regional dyads of some tension where a policy of 
"managed" proliferation might provide such dividends are the 
Korean and Greco-Turk dyads. These two regional rivalries 
will now be examined to ascertain if they and the United 
States might benefit from their nuclearization.
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Nuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula
The nuclearization of the Korean peninsula has been an 
active fear of us policymakers for almost half a century.
US efforts to curb South Korean efforts to produce a nuclear 
weapon led to a ten^rary Introduction of American nuclear 
power to the region, though this was later removed In a 
separate effort to hold North Korea's nuclear program In 
abeyance. Yet might the threat of nuclear Armageddon have 
positive effects on relations between the two Koreas? This 
section explores their relationship and assesses the Impact 
the threat of nuclear weapons has had and continues to have 
on It. The prospect of a nuclear race on the peninsula will 
be examined not only within the context of North-South 
relations, but also the proliferation effects It might have 
on neighboring states (such as Japan and Taiwan) who greatly 
fear North Korean nuclear capability. Following a 
historical review of the relationship between the two 
Koreas, both North and South Korean efforts at manufacturing 
nuclear weaponry will be examined.
Nuclear Nexus
In 1956 the recently formed North Korean state entered 
Into an agreement with the Soviet Union on nuclear research 
as part of which North Korean scientists were reportedly 
shuttled to the Dubna Nuclear Research Institute for 
training. Five years later, following China's first 
successful test of a nuclear device. North Korea established
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its first nuclear research center at Yongbyon with Soviet 
assistcuice. South Korea believes that China has shared 
nuclear-weapons technology with Pyongyang as well (Spector
1990).
The 1960s witnessed sustained tension between the North 
and South as the North's leader, Kim II Sung, sought 
reunification with the South through subversion and 
violence. The most extreme action occurred in January 1968 
when the North sent a 31 person commando team to Seoul in an 
effort to assassinate South Korean president Park Chung Hee. 
The team was captured only 500 yeirds from President Park's 
residence (Spector 1990). A second assassination attempt in 
1974 missed the South Korean president again, but killed his 
wife.
These rising tensions spurred efforts by the South to 
develop its own nuclear weapons program in the mid-70s. US 
pressure on Seoul to abandon such efforts led to its signing 
of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1975, though 
evidence suggests that South Korean nuclear production 
activities may have continued up until 1979 (Shorrock and 
Gadacz 1985). Eventually, guarantees of a US nuclear 
umbrella swayed the South Koreans from continuing a vigorous 
program to develop nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, in the North, Kim II Sung initiated efforts 
to build the infrastructure needed for a nuclear weapons 
program after 1980. The major result of these efforts was
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the construction of an indigenous 30-megawatt reactor 
(considerably larger than the Soviet-supplied reactor which 
was in the 1 to 5 megawatt range) near Yongbyon by 1987 
(Spector 1990). Some time in late 1988 or early 1989 US 
satellite intelligence photographs revealed that the North 
had begun construction of a plutonium extraction plant near 
the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Because plutonium could not 
have been used for North Korea's "peaceful" nuclear program, 
it was assumed that the site was being used to produce the 
material necessary for nuclear weapons (Chanda and Islam 
1989). US analysts were divided over how quickly North 
Korea could have produced a bomb. The Department of 
Defense, using worst-case scenario projections, believed 
that the North might have nuclear weapons capability by the 
mid-1990s. However, others in the intelligence community 
felt that such an estimate greatly exaggerated the North's 
scientific and technical con^tence, suggesting that 
Pyongyang would not have the bomb before the end of the 
1990s (Spector 1990).
Whatever the case, these efforts by North Korea 
elicited attempts by the South in 1989 to promote exchange 
and talks, and later that same year three-hundred visitors 
from each side of the DMZ were allowed to cross the dividing 
line for a brief visit for the first time since the end of 
the Korean War (Chang 1993).
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The United States also was spurred to seek confidence 
building measures with the North Koreans. President George 
Bush announced "good faith" policies in 1990 aimed at 
attempting to sway North Korea into full adherence with the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (North Korea was a signer 
in 1985) .42 Such adherence would have allowed for 
inspections by members of the International Atomic Energy 
Association (IAEA)These "good faith" policies promoted 
by Bush were twofold: first the United States pledged to
drop its force levels in South Korea from 44,000 in 1990 to 
37,000 by 1992; second, the United States pledged to remove 
its ground and sea-launched nuclear weapons from the area of 
the Korean peninsula (Sigal 1998).
These actions by the Bush administration led to a 
December 1991 North-South agreement on non-aggress ion, 
exchanges, and cooperation, and even more inuressively, the 
first policy-level talks since the end of the Korean War in
42. North Korea's signing of the NPT in 1985 was 
considered by many at the time to be a significant 
breakthrough in preventing it from nucleariz ing. By 
signing. North Korea agreed to accede to inspections within 
18 months, but by the deadline's passing in 1987 no 
inspections had taken place and, as was previously 
mentioned, US intelligence satellites discovered an 
undeclared nuclear reactors at the Yongbyon Nucleeir Research 
Center (Lehman 1993, 263).
43. The IAEA, founded in 1957, is a Vienna-based UN- 
affiliated organization with over 110 members. By the 1960s 
it had begun a series of on-site inspections, audits , and 
controls known as "safeguards." The goal of IAEA safeguards 
is to deter the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful 
uses to military purposes through the hazard of timely 
detection (Spector 1990).
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January of 1992. Despite the fact that events since then 
have called into question North Korea's willingness to fully 
comply with IAEA inspections, the west has witnessed more 
openness by North Korea than ever.
Under an agreement (Agreed Framework) reached with 
North Korea in March of 1994, the United States was allowed 
visits to the remote mountainous site at Kumchangri, about 
twenty-five miles northwest of Yongbyon, a nuclear research 
center that has been under inspection by the IAEA for five 
years. In exchange for the supposed shutting down of their 
nuclear weapons program and for cooperating with inspectors 
the North Koreans were promised billions of dollars in 
energy assistance, including two new nuclear reactors (Sigal 
1998). Such an agreement reflected not only the desperation 
of the US in preventing a North Korean nuclear weapons 
capcibility, but also apparent evidence that the Pyongyauig 
government was hurting economically now that assistance from 
the Soviets and China was drying up in the post Cold War 
atmosphere (Sigal 1998). North Korea, probably the most 
jingoistic state in the world, was having to abandon its 
philosophy of juche (self-reliance).
IAEA inspectors were allowed in and then kicked out of 
North Korea over the next five years as Pyongyang postured 
for economic assistance even as it threatened to become a 
nuclear power. In May of 1999 American nuclear inspectors 
in North Korea discovered that an underground site that the
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United States suspected was being used for nuclear weapons 
production was revealed to be only a "huge, empty tunnel" 
(Shenon 1999). There was no evidence that the "hole" was 
being prepared for construction of a nuclear reactor. This 
suggested that the North Koreauis were not as capable of 
developing nuclear weapons as analysts had feared.
Moreover, it seemed more evident that Pyongyang was using 
the threat of nuclearization in an attempt to garner 
economic assistance.
The North Koreans had initially demanded a payment of 
$300 million (Shenon 1999) from the United States for the 
right to conduct a one-time inspection of the tunnel. But 
they dropped the demand after the United States offered new 
promises of food aid, which the State Department insists is 
for relief purposes unrelated to the nuclear agreement.
Such an outpouring of effort to promote openness and 
peace on the Korean peninsula likely would not have occurred 
minus the threat of North Korea achieving a nuclear arsenal. 
Indeed it seems that fecirs over the possible nuclearization 
of North Korea spurred such efforts. However, unlike the 
Indo-Pakistani dyad, the nuclear threat posed by both sides 
on the Korean peninsula remains opaque. That is to say, 
neither side clearly has nuclear capability. In fact, it 
appears that both sides presently do not have a nuclear 
stockpile. Nevertheless, the threat that a nuclear 
capability by one or both sides may be achievable has
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promoted more efforts aimed at cooperation between the two 
sides.
what is suggested by all of this is that nuclear
proliferation (or at least the threat of it) on the Korean
Peninsula may be an acceptable outcome for the united States
in the future. This may seem a radical statement at first,
but relations between the North and South have never been as
docile as they have been in the 1990s when the threat of
nuclear proliferation to the area loomed largest. Other
factors commonly associated with more peaceful dyadic
relations between states are also absent in this region.
For example. North Korea and South Korea are not alliance
partners; North Korea and South Korea have a history of
conflict; North Korea and South Korea are not both
democracies; and finally. North Korea and South Korea share
a common border. In terms of militéury capabilities the
North has enjoyed a clear advantage in man-power since the
mid-1980s. Currently the North has over one million man
army, while the South has about 650,000 in its army. Yet
such a difference in size may be misleading. David Kang
(1994-95, 343) suggests that the South has numerous military
advantages over the North:
Empirically, the South Korean military is larger, 
better-equipped, better-trained, and more versatile 
than the North Korean military. Numbers of troops 
and tcuiks are crude metrics and do not reveal the 
superior training, C^ i, and logistical support that 
the South enjoys over the North. Just as tellingly, 
the North has virtually no amphibious capability.
Given the Inchon landing of 1950 and the inherent
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difficulty in moving straight down the peninsula, 
it is quite likely that the North understands the 
value of amphibious assaults, and presumably any 
version of a northern invasion would presumably 
include an amphibious assault, if only to draw off 
forces from the MlZ. Yet this is not the case.
Paul Bracken suggests much the same in his analysis of
the two Korea's military capabilities. But for Bracken (in
Mack 1993, 94), it is the logistical factors ^ich threaten
to curtail the apparent numerical strength of the North
Korean amny:
Another feature of the system in the North is the 
undersized military support staff —  logisticiams, 
transportation experts, food suppliers, and arms- 
maücers... North Korea lacks the critical institutional 
ingredients to pull these forces together to support 
the middle line in its dec is ion-making. There has 
never been any attempt to logistical capabilities to 
see if they would function in a crisis. North Korea's 
road network north of the DMZ does not have the 
capacity to carry the logistical forces necessary to 
support the large operating corps of a million-man 
army.
So a true military comparison between the two Koreas is 
difficult to portray.*4 North Korea has a clear numerical 
advantage, but the South seems to have an advcuitage in terms 
of capabilities. What this suggests is that the two Koreas 
may be more militarily equal than is sometimes suggested and
44. This dissertation, using COW data (see Chapter 
Three military parity variable) ultimately assessed there to 
be roughly a 2 to 1 advantage in favor of the North, though 
this has lessened in the 1990s, with the North enjoying a 
roughly 1.7 to 1 advantage over the South. Other analyses 
support this diminution in the military balance between the 
two Koreas. Masaki (1994-95) for instance, uses Armored 
Division Equivalent (ADE) methodology, and finds a change in 
the military balance between the two Koreas from 1.68 to 1 
in 1980 to 1.36 to 1 by the mid-1990s.
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as has been noted previously, military parity tends to 
increase conflict levels between states.
Thus, might the addition of nuclear weapons serve to 
promote more peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula? 
Review of Table Nine suggests that most of the independent 
variables which tend to heighten conflict escalation are 
present in the Korean dyad. The lack of alliance 
partnership, geographic proximity, the absence of a 
democratic dyad, and the lack of a mature dyad (South Korea 
has experienced a number of regime transitions) all increase 
the likelihood of escalation should conflict arise between 
the two neighbors.
Table Nine: Escalation Factors on
the Korean Peninsula Post 1990
Factor Value Escalation Imnact
Ally No INCREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic No INCREASE
Mature No INCREASE
Capability .62 AVERAGE
Trade NA NA
Nuclecir Opaque UNCLEAR
Outcome: ?
But nuclearization of the Korean dyad probably still is 
not the appropriate course to take at this time. It is
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undeniable that in spite of all of these factors a certain 
level of peace has been kept between the two Koreas because 
of the US military presence there. Certainly us forces 
stationed on the border with the North have had some 
deterrent impact on Pyongyang (Sigal 1998). So while the 
threat of Northern nuclearization undoubtedly has helped to 
maintain the peace there as well, the US military tripwire 
is a factor with which North Korea is unlikely to risk 
tampering.
Nevertheless, both the US and South Korea have been 
responsive to North Korea's nuclear opacity (Sigal 1998). 
What is important to keep in mind with respect to the Korean 
situation is that, again, neither side has ever been proven 
to be able to produce nuclear weapons, nor has either side 
been shown to possess nuclear weapons. Yet, still, the 
pacifying intact of the threat of building such weapons 
seems to have helped maintain civility between the North and 
South. Korean expert Bruce Cummings (1997, 5), when 
speéücing of the relationship between the two Koreas, sums up 
the deterrent power of nuclear weapons even in a case where 
neither side has been identified as having them: "In the
realm of ambiguity, it is less important to actually possess 
nuclear weapons them to foster the belief that you may 
possess them, or may eventually possess them. " This is what 
makes the Korean dyad a particularly unique case. The 
South, as well as their US partners, have responded not to
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the appearance of nuclear weapons in the North, but to the 
mere threat of their appearance. This suggests that the 
deterrent capabilities of nuclear weapons are more far- 
reaching than most expected. Opacity may work in the sense 
that while other states may not believe that a potential 
proliférant has nuclear capability, they do not wcuit to 
undertake conflictuel behavior which might lead said state 
to accelerate its efforts toward nuclearization. Thus the 
opaque state is appeased by status quo powers in cui attempt 
to prevent it from acquiring nuclear capability.
The implications of all of this for the Korean 
Peninsula is that the nuclearization of North Korea need not 
be encouraged because of the apparent positive effects of 
its nuclear opacity and because of the US military presence. 
Indeed, the effects North Korean nuclearization would have 
on other neighbors would likely lead to the spread of 
nuclear weapons not only to South Korea, but also to Japan 
and Taiwan (Lehman 1993; Hughes 1996; Dibb 1997-98). If 
this were to occur US influence in the region likely would 
be diminished as US security guarantees would be less needed 
in Seoul and Tokyo. This ultimately may be the direction 
events in Asia take as the hegemonic status of the United 
States is diminished slowly. US internationalist efforts 
will be refocused then exclusively to Europe as long as NATO 
remains intact.
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Thus the best scenario for the Korean Peninsula, at 
least for US Internationalists, would be for North Korea to 
maintain an opaque nuclear status, thereby never officially 
engendering a need for Its neighbors to develop nuclear 
weapons of their own, while simultaneously benefiting from 
the deterrent aspects of nuclear weapons. Such a structure 
would be tenuous, however, as It Is unclear how long North 
Korea would maintain (as well as how long others would 
tolerate It maintaining) a strictly opaque status.
Ultimately the US may turn Inward again and decide to 
remove Its forces from the Korean Peninsula. If such a 
period of Isolationist fervor does recapture US foreign 
policymakers, then nuclearization of the two Koreas might be 
the proper course to follow. Without the deterrent presence 
of US forces, the escalatory factors present within the 
Korean dyad would bode Inausplclously for future conflicts 
between the two. Thus, at that time a symmetrical nuclear 
dyad on the Korean Peninsula would be appropriate.
Turkey and Greece
A rivalry even more bitter and centuries older than 
that of the Chicago Cubs and St. Louis Ccirdlnals, the 
Greece-Turkey relationship has yet to be stabilized. 
Historical antagonisms have persisted between the two 
countries In spite of their status as NATO allies. Neither 
side has actively sought to procure nuclear weapons, but 
what Intact would such weapons have on relations between the
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two? This section Intends to explore this Issue, suggesting 
that the Greece-Turkey dyad Is similar In some notable 
respects to that of both the indo-Paklstanl and Korean 
dyads, in all three cases there Is a history of animosity 
and military action against one another as well as the 
presence of a common border.
What sets the Greece-Turkey relationship apart Is the 
duo's participation In a common alll«mce. Yet NATO 
membership failed to prevent Turkey's Invasion of Greek- 
controlled Cyprus In 1974. Might the presence of nuclear 
weapons have produced a different outcome and might such 
weapons prevent future escalations? This section Intends to 
explore that possibility by exeunlnlng the Greece-Turkey dyad 
more closely. It will focus on the most contentious Issue 
between the two, that of control over the Island nation of 
Cyprus. The Cyprus Issue led to Greece's teo^rary 
departure from NATO In the mid-1970s and threatens today to 
push these strained allies Into mllltciry action against one 
another. Might nuclear weapons be of help, or are other 
alternatives available?
Background
The relation between Greece and Turkey throughout 
history has been an unamlable one to say the least. The 
United States, following World War II, took over from Great 
Britain the formidable task of maintaining western Influence 
In this part of the world, while keeping Greece and Turkey
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from trying to slaughter one cuiother. The U.S. used the 
admission of the two Into NATO as a means to this end. The 
bipolar world of the Cold War also helped to maintain U.S. 
Influence over the two, thanks to the threat of the looming 
Soviet Union just next door.
President Truman on March 12, 1947, proclaimed American 
readiness to come to the rescue of the two countries by 
pledging financial aid for economic or mllltciry purposes.
The official policy statement, later known as the Truman 
Doctrine, clearly recognized the threat : "the very
existence of the Greek state Is today threatened by the 
terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by 
Communists, \dio defy the government's authority at a number 
of points, particularly along the northern boundaries." As 
for Turkey, Its "Integrity Is essential to the preservation 
of order In the Middle East" (Lenczowskl 1980, 795).
As members of NATO, Turkey and Greece would be 
Important to SACEUR (Supreme Allied Command In Europe) —  
both as a deterrent to a Soviet attack and as a threat to 
the Soviets ' southern flank. If the region ' s military 
potential were Integrated Into a security framework, the 
Soviet Union would have to commit significant forces to 
protect Its southern flank. A security commitment to Turkey 
therefore, would constitute a far more effective deterrent 
than previous arrangements for resisting Soviet attack, not 
only along the Middle East's entire northern tier —  which
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provided a buffer for European and U.S. oil interests in the 
Persian Gulf —  but in Europe as well.
But the Turks also felt that they needed to join. As 
President Bayar told Assistant Secretary of State George 
McGhee, Turkey "wants to give a guaremtee, and it would like 
to receive a guarantee” (Lenczowski 1980, 38). The deal was 
done and both Turkey and Greece joined NATO in the 1950s to 
everyone in the NATO's approval.
Greece and Turkey were in quite different circumstances 
in the spring of 1947. The Greeks were in the middle of a 
civil war and thus, for the Athens government, the waning 
support from Great Britain meant turning to a new western 
source, the United States, a must. The Turks, on the other 
hand, while consciously seeking an American presence on 
Turkish territory as a counter-weight to its ever-lurking 
Soviet neighbor, were tougher negotiators.
The U.S. military and economic aid soon rocketed 
upward. Congress originally authorized $400 million in aid 
for both countries in 1947. This grew to well over $6 
billion by the end of the 1960s (Couloumbis 1983). American
45. Turkish internal stability was quite good at the 
time. Political cohesiveness and economic conditions were 
"tolerable to good." The Turks thus, had less dependence on 
the United States when compared to Greece at the time. At 
the Scune time however, U.S. interest was first in supporting 
Greece financially. The Truman Doctrine was prompt^ by 
U.S. official perceptions that the "Communist rebellion" in 
Greece would prove successful without massive American 
intervention. Such a loss would then lead to the possible 
isolation, encirclement, and loss of Turkey for the West. 
See, latrides (1981, 256-258).
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military presence in the two countries followed the 
acceptance of the two nations into NATO in September 1951 in 
Ottawa. Bilateral base agreements were signed in February 
1953 and June 1954 that bound the United States with Greece 
and Turkey, respectively (Harris 1972).*®
Turkey and Greece were of utmost importance for the 
U.S. during the Cold War period. Their stability however, 
was not only put into jeopardy by expansionist Russia, but 
by their own disputes. These disputes have persisted into 
the post-Cold War period. Foremost among them is the 
quarrel over the future of Cyprus, where a unilateral 
attempt by Greek's of the island's majority population in 
1974 to declare union with Greece prompted Turkey to invade. 
The island is now partitioned between the two.
So incensed was Greece by NATO's failure to mediate 
judiciously, as it judged it, between the two disputing 
parties, that the Greek government withdrew from the 
military structure of NATO between 1974 and 1978. Turkey 
was also upset because of a U.S. arms embargo of Turkey 
between 1974 and 1977 as a mark of disapproval of the 
Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Those years, when Greece had 
withdrawn from the military structure of NATO, mark the
46. These agreements provided for America's right to 
establish bases; to overfly Greek and Turkish territories; 
and to provide for the legal status and local accountability 
of U.S. forces in the host countries.
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period of NATO's greatest anxiety for the Integrity of Its 
southern flank.
In August 1984, UN Secretary Javier Perez de Cuellar 
arranged Indirect talks between the two Cypriot parties to 
discuss the constitutional framework for a Federal Republic 
of Cyprus. The talks broke down, however, over the 
questions of International guarantors and the timetable for 
the phased-wlthdrawal of foreign troops, and the positions 
of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots hardened. Since 1994, 
Turkey has maintained 30,000 troops on Cyprus (Jacovldes 
1994).
Settlement of the Cyprus Issue Is unlikely. Former 
Turkish Prime Minister and current president, Suleyman 
Demlrel says "Turkey will never give up Cyprus. "4? The 
Turkish controlled section of Cyprus has voted for 
Independence and Is now called the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus. Currently, Turkey Is the only state to 
recognize Northern Cyprus as a separate entity. However, 
should one of Turkey's new sister states of the former 
Soviet Union choose to do so (as Ankara hopes), then 
Turkey's claim to Cyprus will only harden.
Current relations between Turkey and Greece have 
basically been shaped by the 1974 Invasion of Cyprus by 
Turkey. On July 20th of that year, Turkish troops burst
47. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. (West 
Europe), (FBIS-WEU), #93-187, (29 September 1993): 58.
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onto the Mediterrcuiean island, justifying the action by 
espousing its goal as being to "re-establish the status quo" 
(Stavrou 1986, 83). The "status quo” according to the 
Ankara government had been disturbed by a military coup 
organized by the military junta controlling Greece at the 
time. Neither junta lasted and the Turks estctblished a 
military presence on Cyprus.
The strategic value of both countries to the U.S. and 
NATO is considerê&ble even today, but was especially so 
during the Cold War period. Both states bordered countries 
unfriendly to the West (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria in 
the case of Greece; Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, in the 
case of Turkey). Turkey, by controlling the straits, held 
back the Soviet naval presence in the Black Sea from the 
Soviet fleet (the Fifth Escadra) operating in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Greece held the next level of defenses 
separating the Soviet navy in the region by controlling the 
Aegean and Dodecanese islands.
The end of the Cold War however, has not diminished the 
strategic importance of the two nations to United States and 
the West. Turkey has already proven its worth in the 1991 
Gulf War with Iraq. The Turkish contribution to the anti- 
Iraqi coalition included: moving 100,000 troops along its 
border with Iraq, thereby posing the threat of a second 
front to the Iraqis; effective closure of the Iraqi pipeline 
to the Mediterranean (through which Iraq exported 54 percent
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of Its oil); extension until December 1991 of the Defense 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement, which gives the United 
States access to military bases in Turkey; and use of NATO 
airbases within reuige of military targets in Iraq (Kuniholm
1991).*8
Greece does not have the record of cooperation with the 
United States that Turkey possesses,but the U.S. and NATO 
are continuing to militarily supply Greece, most likely as a 
counterweight to Turkey. Both Greece and Turkey have been 
armed by NATO in the early 1990s, possibly in an attempt to
48. In return for Ankara's assistance, the U.S., as 
part of the Southern Region Amendment assistance program 
(which has allowed for transport of slightly outmoded 
American weapons), along with Germany, have supplied the 
Turks with military equipment as a quid pro quo. This arms 
package included : 600 M-60 tanks, 400 Leopard tanks, 700 
armored personnel carriers, 40 Phantom fighters, as well as 
a compliment of Cobra helicopters, missile destroyers and 
Roland surface-to-air missiles (Kuniholm 1991, 36-7).
49. In fact, Greece under Papandreou seemed to be a 
U.S. enemy if one merely reviews the rhetoric. Papandreou 
criticized the U.S. as being "the metropolis of imperialism" 
and praised the Soviet Union and some of its political 
stratagems. Greece refused to participate in sanctions 
introduced following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the 1981 Solidarity in Poland. And Greek officials, 
including the Prime Minister, sided with the Soviet 
explanation of why in September 1983, it shot down Koreéui 
Air Lines Flight 007. Yet under Papandreou's leadership 
Greece signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(DECA) with the United States. This agreement gave the U.S. 
access to specified military facilities in Greece for a 
period renewable every five years. Most recently, Greece 
has not been supportive of the NATO effort in Kosovo. So 
Greece seems to be saying one thing and then doing another. 
Greece seems to be seeking to keep its Russian neighbor 
happy while allowing the U.S. in to help protect it from 
said neighbor (Haass, 1986).
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prevent the ethnic fighting occurring on both nations ' 
borders (In former Yugoslavia and Armenla-Azerbaljan) from 
spreading southward. According to a 1994 published United 
Nations register for conventional weapons, Greece and Turkey 
accounted for 73% of the global army In^rts In tanks, 48% 
of the armored personnel carriers, 42 % of the warships and 
22 percent of the combat aircraft (Kokklnldes 1994) .so
Most recently the NATO conflict In Kosovo Illustrated 
that Greece and Turkey tend to view the world from their own 
unique cultural perspective. Samuel Huntington (1997) has 
written extensively concerning the cultural fault lines 
emerging throughout the world as being the markers for 
conflict In the post Cold War era. In the case of Greece 
and Turkey this takes the form of a clash between the 
Christian and Muslim cultures, which according to Huntington 
(1997), Is the fault line along which conflict Is most 
likely to erupt In the twenty-first century. As Huntington 
would predict, Greece and Turkey had sharply different 
Interests In the Kosovo tensions, dictated In part by their 
unique cultures. Turkey supported action to assist the 
Kosovar Muslims, while Greece Identified more with the Serb 
Christians. NATO served to constrain the two rivals'
50. A major reshuffling of NATO forces has also led to 
military hardware being shipped to Greece and Turkey. NATO 
agreed In 1992 to give poorer allies In the Mediterranean 
thousands of tanks, big guns and armored vehicles no longer 
needed, according to NATO officials. In central Europe. 
Around 4,000 pieces of equipment were given to Greece, 
Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Norway (Doughty 1992).
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tensions in this case by keeping both states out of the
conflict, but whether it can continue to do so is uncertain.
Indeed future institutional constraint is of particular
concern now that there are serious questions concerning the
continued viability of the Atlantic alliance because the
threat it originally was created to defend against, the
Soviet Union, has collapsed. Even if NATO does continue,
the bonds of alliance it created as a cooperative defense
structure against the Soviet Union no doubt will weaken over
time as long as an identifiable threat for it to rally
against fails to appear. This, coupled with Greek efforts
to prevent Turkey’s entry into the European Union (EU) might
serve to diminish the pacifying intact of alliance on the
Greece-Turkey dyad.
In fact at least one analyst has argued that the
inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the NATO alliance proved
to be somewhat destabilizing to their relations. Ronald
Krebs (1999, 369), speaking of the two's NATO membership,
suggests the following problems with it:
First, it externalized these small powers' security, 
encouraging a shift in foreign policy focus from 
the Soviet threat to regional interests, and 
prompting the emergence of the conflict at the zenith 
of the Cold War. Second, as Greece and Turkey engaged 
in contest over Cyprus, alliance arms transfers helped 
transform this limited conflict into a broader and 
deeper enmity. Third, in the context of this 
deteriorating relationship, those features of alliance 
theoretically conducive to cooperation failed to 
achieve that end.
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As NATO moves through a period of uncertainty, the idea
that Turkish involvement in the EU and full membership in
the WEU could serve to anchor and stabilize Turkis h-Greek
relations could gain momentum. This is an idea that has
been espoused for some time to no avail. For instance, lan
Lesser of Rand suggested in 1992 (iv):
Should Turkey remain isolated from the process 
of European integration, the outlook for 
peaceful relations in the Aegean (and in the 
Balkans as a whole) will worsen. The prospects 
for recapturing the spirit of the 1988 Davos 
meetings and reinvigorating Turkish-Greek 
détente will turn on the development of 
confident political leadership in both 
countries.
But the prospects for full Turkish participation in 
emerging economic and security arrangements in Europe still 
seem to be poor. As Europe moves toward a common foreign 
and security policy, it will be less willing to accept the 
burden of a direct exposure in the Middle East, which full 
Turkish membership in the EU or WEU would bring.si Thus, 
Turkey will continue to share with the United States a 
pronounced stake in the viability of NATO as a link to the 
European security order.
51. Turkey became and associate member of the European 
Economic Community in 1963 with the understanding that full 
membership would be granted after a certain transitional 
period (Halefoglu 1986, 3). Feeling that its service as a 
strong NATO ally had earned it the right to elevate its 
status, Ankara applied for full membership in the EC in 
1987. However, citing shortcomings in the level of 
democratization and respect for human rights in Turkey, the 
European Commission agreed in 1989 to defer consideration of 
the application until at least 1993. Since that time it 
Turkish membership into the EU has been denied continually.
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Ankara hoped to sway western support for Its entry Into 
the EU by assisting coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War. 
Turkey hoped that its efforts in the 1991 Gulf War would 
strengthen its position for entry into the European Union, 
which Greece has adamantly opposed. There were reports that 
former Turkish President Turgut Ozal, following the Gulf 
War, asked President Bush to plead Turkey's case with the 
EU. The Turks wanted him to stress their value to the West 
in dealing with the Arab world. Ozal did so, though without 
success.
Despite continuing efforts by Ankeira, Turkish admission 
into the EU seems unlikely for at least a couple of reasons. 
The EU's stated reason for postponement of Turkish entry was 
the need to "deepen" the Community in its current form as 
envisaged by the Maastricht Treaty. However, issues of 
human rights in Turkey have played a part as well. Claims 
of Turkish mistreatment of its Kurdish minority have been 
trumpeted by Western Europe as reason enough to deny Turkish 
membership (Krebs 1999).
Indeed, though Turkish trade with Europe dwarfs that 
with other areas, many Turks feel the Europeans view them 
with prejudice. Europe still shows little interest in 
Turkey's membership in the EU and many Turks believe that 
this is because they are Muslims. Then Prime Minister Tansu 
Ciller herself suggested in the Winter 1994 issue of 
Strategic Review that "organizations like the European
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Community should open themselves up to an applicant like 
Turkey, rather than preserve the EC (In the words of one 
European official) as a Christian club. ' Here again the 
tensions of cultural disparity were registered, likely 
building additional resentment among the Turks for Christian 
Europe (Huntington 1997).
Clearly, though, Turkey would be an economic burden to 
the rest of the European Union. Horton Abromowltz (1993, 
167), the U.S. ambassador to Turkey from 1989 to 1991, 
pointed out In 1993 that as one of the poorest states of 
Europe, Turkey would need a decade of rapid growth before 
Its EU membership would be considered seriously. Such 
growth still has yet to occur for Turkey as It remains one 
of the poorest Europeaui states (Krebs 1999).
Turkey Is facing Internal challenges as well. The PKK 
(Kurdish Workers Party) continues Its fourteen year long 
guerrilla war against Ankara, in Its beginnings, the PKK 
totaled a meager 200 fighters and was not supported by the 
Kurdish minority within Turkey. Some early 1990s totals of
52. See Ciller 1994, p. 9. Former Turkish Prime 
Minister Tansu Ciller adopted the Idea of the EC being a 
"Christian Club" as a theme, to pressure Turkey's 
acceptance. Speaking on Ankara TV In 1993 she said, "If the 
EC overcomes Its fear of being transformed from a Christian 
club and accepts Turkey as Its full member. It will be 
uniting dissimilar civilizations and therefore guarantee 
that new walls will not be erected." Her efforts proved 
fruitless however. From, Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service. (West Europe), (FBIS-WEU), #93-203, (22 October 
1993): 70.
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the PKK numbered it as having some 15,000 guerrilla forces, 
all well-armed as a result of Syrian and Iranian support.
More of concern to secularist Ankara than anything else 
though, has been the success of the pro-Islamist Welfare 
Party (WP) in national elections. The WP first made 
electoral headway in the 27 March 1994 nationwide municipal 
elections. The WP emerged as the biggest winner taking 
mayorships in 30 of Turkey's 76 provinces.This was 
followed by the WP winning more votes and seats in the 
Turkish parliament in December 1995 elections. Six months 
later the WP created a coalition government with a 
secularist party and assumed a short-lived control of the 
country (Huntington 1997). in 1998 the secularists took 
control of Turkey again auid have maintained it, though the 
threat of the WP remains real (Krebbs 1999).
Greece and Turkey are forced by geography into 
remaining neighbors. They will both probably never get 
along. Their historical differences bring too much baggage
53. More current fibres are not available. The 
aspirations of the Kurds in Turkey are somewhat unclear. 
Most observers seem to agree that those who are seeking 
outright independence would settle for "normal democratic 
rights in the West" —  the right to bilingual schooling in 
their native tongue as well as Turkish, to broadcast and 
publish in Kurdish, to organize their own cultural 
activities, etc. (Rouleau 1993, 122).
54. The WP won 18.4 % of the total vote, doubling its 
votes since the last general election. However, former 
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's True Path Party still won the 
most total votes with 22.5%. The vote did not affect the 
composition of the parliament, where the WP held only 40 of 
the 450 seats (Kohen 1994, 2).
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on behalf of both nations for one to ever believe that the 
two will become cooperative friends. The Turkey-Greece 
relationship then is all about toleration. NATO helped to 
maintain this level of mutual toleration for fifty years. 
Could nuclear weapons help to maintain it in the next 
century?
Table Ten: Escalation Factors for Greco-Turk Dyad
Factor value Escalation imoact
Ally Yes DECREASE
Proximal Yes INCREASE
Democratic Yes DECREASE
Mature Yes DECREASE
Capability .91 HIGH
Trade 106.6 INCREASE
Nuclear No NA
Outcome: ?
Table Ten indicates that most of the independent 
factors in the Greco-Turk dyad do not favor esceilation of 
disputes. Both cire alliance members, both are democratic, 
and both are mature. However, both are also neighbors, have 
a high level of military parity and are solid trading 
partners, all factors encouraging escalation. Thus the 
evidence is mixed. In such an instance, where there is not 
a strong inçetus for conflict control, nuclear weapons are
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not called for. What could change this situation in the 
future would be the demise of NATO and the failure to 
integrate Turkey into any other European institutional 
structure. Then a dyadic nuclear situation between Greece 
and Turkey might prove beneficial. Otherwise, the 
introduction of nuclecu: weaponry to the Balkans seems 
unnecessary and unwise.
US Policy Recommendation#
Having now surveyed both the Korean and Greco-Turk 
dyads it is useful to summarize US policy recommendations 
with respect to nuclear weapons for these two cases. While 
both dyads present a history of disdain and aggression, only 
the Korean dyad reveals itself to be potentially benefited 
by the introduction of nuclear weapons, though a continuance 
of North Korea's opaque status and a US military presence is 
what is recommended for the near term. North Korean 
nuclearization could possibly lead to South Korean, Japanese 
and Taiwanese production of nuclear weapons, and though this 
might further solidify cautious, pacific relations among the 
major powers in the region, US influence would be diminished 
greatly. While this may be the ultimate direction of things 
for Asia, most US internationalists are not eager to pull­
back from the continent. The continued nuclear opaqueness 
of North Korea would allow the United States to preserve its 
influence in the region into the twenty-first century, while 
simultaneously promoting pacific relations in the Korean
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dyad. While this seems to be the best course to follow, it 
is likely only a matter of time before nuclear weapons 
spread in Asia, at %diich time the United States should 
accept its lesser role after working to ensure that nuclear 
symmetry is achieved in the region.
In the case of the Greece-Turkey dyad, further 
integration of Turkey into western institutional structures 
likely will ensure the stability of the Turkish economy, and 
therefore, the continued success of Turkish secularism.
This probably will keep the two neighbors from escalating 
future conflicts with one another. Turkey's refusal to 
develop nuclear capabilities may also assist in retarding 
Iranian and other Middle Eastern states ' efforts at joining 
the nuclear club by potentially forestalling a nuclear 
domino effect in the Middle East.
Thus, in neither coupling should nuclear weapons be 
actively promoted, but in the Korean dyad the addition of 
nuclear weapons could be acceptable. In the case of the 
Korean dyad what remains to be seen is if North Korea is 
truly serious about developing a nuclear capability, or if 
it is merely posturing in order to gain international 
assistance for its floundering economy, with respect to 
Greece and Turkey, neither state seems interested in 
acquiring a nuclear capability anyway.
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CHAPTER SIX: THE FUTURE OF HUCLEAR HEAPOHS
"There will one day spring from the brain 
of science a machine or force so fearful 
in its potentialities, so absolutely 
terrifying that even man, the fighter, who 
will dare torture and death in order to 
inflict torture and death, will be appalled, 
and so abandon war forever. What man's mind 
can create, man's character can control."
— Thomas Alva Edison
This concluding chapter restates the findings of the 
dissertation and examines the future of nuclear weapons. It 
explores some of the new military technologies that will be 
emerging in the twenty-first century to determine if nuclear 
weapons' importance will persist.
What this dissertation argues is that nuclear weapons 
can have a significant intact on conflict by often serving 
to de-escalate tensions between interstate dyads. This 
appears to present itself exclusively, though, in cases of 
symmetrical nuclear dyads. In other words, for the 
beneficial deterrent aspects of these weapons to occur both 
sides of the interstate dyad must possess the weapons. In 
asymmetrical conflict instances, the presence of nuclear 
weapons displays no significant intact on interstate dyads.
On an individual dyad level the beneficial aspects of 
nuclear weapons were evident in the case of the Indo- 
Pakistani pairing where escalatory factors such as a history 
of conflict, geography, institutions, trade, and
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conventional military capabilities appear to have been 
overcome by the addition of nuclear weaponry to the region. 
Indeed since the introduction of atomic weapons to South 
Asia, both sides appear to have exercised additional 
restraint in their conflicts with one another.
Ironically, however, the weapons so feared in the 
second half of the twentieth century may be playing a lesser 
role by the second-half of the next century. The lessons of 
nuclear knowledge cannot be expunged from human learning, 
but the future promises not only new weapons, but new ways 
of conducting warfare which may leave nuclear weapons 
antediluvian in comparison. Thus, as the twenty-first 
century arrives so too may a revolution in military affairs 
(RMA) alter strategic thinking in the United States and 
around the world.
RMA
Coined by Andrew Marshall, long-time Director of the 
Office of Net Assessment in the Department of Defense, the 
phrase "Revolution in Military Affairs " connotes a drastic 
change in military affairs resulting from a combination of
55. It should be noted that while this dissertation 
argues that the RMA ultimately may make nuclear weapons 
obsolete by rendering them moot by technological advance, 
some strategic thinkers feeur that the RMA will promote 
proliferation as weaker states strive to combat technology 
with terror (Betts 1998; Carter, Deutch and Zelikow 1998). 
Whatever the direction, though, it still seems likely that 
conflict will lessen, either because technology makes 
weapons so effective that warfare becomes a futile exercise, 
or because the spread of weapons of mass destruction 
accomplishes the same by deterring adversaries.
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technological changes and operational and organizational 
innovation (Jablonsky 1994). Marshall's hypothesis that a 
new revolution in military affairs may be in progress or 
just over the horizon is based on the proposition that a 
number of critical technologies are maturing now that, if 
applied properly, might change the way wars are fought, and 
whoever is quickest to identify and exploit such a 
revolutionary potential could radically alter the military 
equation in world politics. If the US fails to exploit the 
RMA, others might, thereby improving their military 
positions considerably, perhaps at the expense of US 
interests (Kipp 1996).
RMAs have come in various flavors over the centuries. 
The major elements of this one are technological (Bartlett 
et al., 1996). The central theme that connects them is 
their reliance on information (Toff 1er and Toff 1er 1993).
The details of the postulated elements of the RMA have 
evolved somewhat over the years, partly because the ideas 
have become more refined and peurtly as a result of petty 
bickering among the military services over turf and budgets. 
Four areas have emerged in the modern RMA: precision strike
and delivery; information warfare; robotics and 
nanotechnology ; and space technology.
Precision Strike and Delivery
Precision strike is the ability to bring the right kind 
of firepower to bear at the right time and place to destroy
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virtually êuiy kind of critical teurget. The concept is a 
logical extension of the precision part of the Gulf War air 
campaign and traces its antecedents at least as far back as 
the use of laser-guided bombs in Vietnam (Davis 1996; Orme 
1997-98). With more types of precis ion-guided weapons in 
current inventories and in the works, more advanced guidance 
and navigation schemes available, and critical supporting 
technologies maturing rapidly, large inventories of very 
accurate weapons should be within the reach of major 
industrial powers and auiy other countries with the 
wherewithal to purchase them in the relatively near future. 
Equally critical are the intelligence collection, 
communications, data processing, and command and control 
systems necessary for large-scale, timely use of precision- 
guided weapons. Improvement in sensor technology, computer 
hardware and software, and large-scale communications 
technology might make possible precision strike on a scale 
that would quantitatively and qualitatively change the 
nature of warfare (Jablonsky 1994). Adding "precision 
delivery" acknowledges the importance of delivering things 
other than weapons (e.g., humanitarian relief supplies) 
accurately.
Conventional munitions have made remarkable advances in 
lethality by combining real-time information with precision- 
guided technology. Bombing has become so precise "that 
weapons systems can routinely attack not just the building
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or the rooms, but the corner of the room that will bring 
everything down —  even the vent shaft that will put the 
bomb inside the shelter" (Davis 1996, 46).
The effectiveness of NATO's air can^aign against Serbia 
in 1999 evidenced the dominance of the superior technology 
produced by the current RMA. NATO conducted over 34,000 
sorties and deposited approximately 22,000 bombs on Serbia 
(many guided by lasers) and yet NATO did not suffer a single 
casualty in the seventy-eight days of the air campaign 
(Gelman 1999).
Information Warfare
New technologies make it possible to gather, process, 
and move vast amounts of information very quickly. In 
future military operations, they may make it possible for 
military commanders to know virtually everything about their 
enemies as well as their own forces and be able to 
continuously replan and direct forces in near-real time.
How much of this "situational awareness " and real-time 
command and control is really valuable remains to be seen, 
but the idea of being able to do better in this arena is 
central to the RMA (Davis 1996).
Dependence on information technologies could create 
vulnerabilities, however, that an adversary might be able to 
exploit. Protecting one's own information-related 
operations while attacking an enemy's is likely to be even 
more fundamental to military success than in the past. This
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geographic expansion of the battlefield will con^l military 
commanders to think more globally (Davis 1996).
The other major con^nent of Information warfare Is the 
potential vulnerability of high-tech civilian societies 
(banking and financial systems, telecommunications networks, 
and con^uter reliant technologies) to electronic attack.
This could ultimately lead to an expanded conception of 
national security (Davis 1996).
Robotics and Hanotechnology
Robotic devices are no longer simply used for mass 
producing automobiles. Robotic weapons were used as 
recently as the Gulf War. Pioneer RPVs (small, unarmed 
pilot less planes controlled by computer operators miles 
away) flew some 330 sorties once Desert Storm commenced. 
Pioneers tracked Iraqi mobile missile launchers as they were 
returned to their bases, checked on bomb damage, searched 
for mines In the Gulf, and surveyed Iraqi troop movements 
(Toff1er and Toff1er 1993).
Yet the robotics of the near future will discover Its 
most beneficial potential as It Is miniaturized to 
microscopic levels. The notion of molecular machines was 
first put forward by the renowned Nobel physicist Richard 
Feynman In the late 1950s (Feynman et al., 1965).®® The
56. By 1957 Dr. Feynman had concluded: "Principles of
physics, as far as I can see, do not speak against the 
possibility of maneuvering things atom by atom. It Is not 
an atten^t to violate any laws; It Is something. In 
principle, that can be done" (Swain 1999).
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first scanning tunneling microscope, which can detect 
individual atoms, was built in 1981 by Gerd Binnig and 
Heinrich Rohrer^  ^at the IBM Zurich Research Laboratory 
(Roland 1991a). Following this breakthrough, K. Eric 
Drexler (1986, 1991) created the term "nanotechnology" to 
refer to the technology of controlling matter at the scale 
of nanometers —  billionths of a meter.
Techniques of miniaturization have exploded in the past 
decade with patents for micro-machines and nanobots 
accelerating the potential benefits of robotics by shrinking 
devices to incredible levels. Researchers announced in July 
of 1999 that they had discovered a method for creating 
computer tremsistors at the molecular level (Markoff 1999). 
Such an advance would increase the processing capability of 
computers 100 billion times over their present 1999 
capabilities. SB This research could lead to the production 
of machines at the molecular, or even atomic level, which 
could in turn create like devices. Toff 1er and Toff 1er 
(1993, 120) suggest of such machines: "If micro-machines are
57. The two scientists received a Nobel Prize for this 
work in 1986. Later, in j^ril 1990, IBM researchers spelled 
out the company name by moving individual atoms of xenon. 
This proved the technological potential of nanotechnology to 
custom-build molecules atom by atom (Roland 1991b).
58. Researchers at UCLA and Hewlitt Packard created 
the so-called Rotaxane Molecule. The researchers suggest 
that "this could lead to a world in which supercomputing 
power is so pervasive and inexpensive that it literally 
becomes an integral part of every mem-made object (Markoff 
1999, lA).
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small enough to manipulate individual cells, nano-machines 
can manipulate the molecules of vAiich cells are built. " 
According to a survey of twenty-five scientists working on 
nano-tech, within the next ten to twenty-five years we will 
not merely be able to create devices at the molecular scale, 
but we will be able to make them self-replicating —  meaning 
we can breed them. Thus, modern technology may soon produce 
self-producing war machines. Toff 1er and Toff 1er (1993,
121) note: "a generation from now, says a physicist at RAND
Corporation, 'we start looking at sensors [the size of a 
pinpoint] that...can burrow into communications systems, or 
sensors that can lie there for twenty years, just ticking 
away, ready to be remotely activated. "
What the ultimate product of nanotechnology may be is 
difficult to say. Most researchers are very auspicious 
about the technological benefits nanotechnology could 
produce for society. 5» Some have even suggested that it may 
lead to the "'end of economics, ' ushering in an age of 
almost unlimited abundance of marvelous new things" (Roland 
1991b). It might also lead to a further devolution in
59. The potential benefits of nanotechnology are awe­
inspiring, though caution with any future technologies seems 
always a wise course. Nevertheless, a vast range of 
salutiferous achievements could be realized through 
nanotechnology if forecasters familiar with it are accurate, 
including: the end of disease, inexpensive space travel,
and in the minds of the most sanguine seers, immortality 
(Drexler 1986; Du Charme 1995; Kurzweil 1999).
60. Sounds good to me.
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conflict, not only because of the economic boom such devices 
could produce for states, but also because their destructive 
potential would be greater than that of nuclear weapons and, 
thus, so would their deterrent capability.
Space Technology
Currently the most vital and yet least appreciated 
facet of the new RMA Is the growing military dependence on 
space technology. While space systems have long been 
Important to US national security, trying to Integrate them 
Into routine military operations has been a source of 
perennial frustration (Gray 1996).
Space offers both unique opportunities and requires 
special skills and capabilities to exploit fully. By their 
very nature, space capabilities offer even modest nations 
global capability to communicate and collect Information. 
Moreover, with the burgeoning commercial markets for 
satellite communications, navigation, and remote sensing, 
the buy-ln price for even small countries (or, for that 
matter, non-nation states) to take advantage of some of the 
opportunities that space can offer Is likely to be greatly 
reduced (Jablonsky 1994).
In addition to antl-satelllte technologies the most 
evident effort at militarizing space has been US efforts to 
acquire a ballistic missile defense (HMD) system. The 
original space-based concept of BHD arrived during the 
Reagan administration In the form of the heavily lambasted
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strategic Defense Initiative. The lack of feasibility (both 
monetarily cuid scientifically) of this project, coupled with 
the demise of the Soviet threat gave way to a lesser BMD 
system during the Bush administration known as Global 
Protection Against Limited Strikes ( GPALS). GPALS purpose 
was in its name: to provide global protection from limited
strikes, whatever their source. It was unique from the 
original SDI Phase One conception in that it was designed to 
repel only limited strikes and not an all out nucleeir attack 
from the Soviet Union. It was more directed to the 1990s 
world in which the threat of horizontal proliferation and 
the possibility of limited attacks, (not a large-scale 
nuclear strike by the Soviet Union), was the perceived 
threat of U.S. policy-makers.
Such a space-based system was never developed and 
deployed however. Future space-based interceptor systems 
will face much the Scune fate unless the cost can be made 
less prohibitive and a credible threat arises to push the US 
Congress into some action in this regard. The Clinton 
administration's current course with respect to missile 
defense is to develop ground-based intereceptors for theater
61. GPALS is not deterrence, but protection of the 
United States, U.S. forces deployed overseas, U.S. power- 
projection forces —  as well as U.S. friends and allies —  
against accidental, unauthorized and/or limited strikes, 
whatever their source (McDowell 1991) . Previously, the SDI 
had sought defenses that could strengthen deterrence of a 
massive Soviet ballistic missile strike. Thus, GPALS was a 
major change in the role that strategic defenses were to 
perform.
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and national defense.Such devices, while terrestrially 
based, would employ space-based satellites to assist in 
target acquisition (Jablonsky 1994).
The Icurger question of whether a BMD system would 
damage the deterrent value of nuclear weapons is a serious 
one. It seems in principle that such a system would be 
detrimental to nuclear deterrence as the side with such 
defensive capabilities would hold a clear strategic 
advantage over its adversary. That thinking holds in 
theory, but in reality there really is not much disincentive 
for the United States not to procure a limited ballistic 
missile defense capability. A limited defense such as GPALS 
would pose no threat to a large nuclear power such as the 
Soviet Union because it has a powerful second-strike 
capability which would keep nuclear deterrence strong 
between itself and the United States. A BMD system would 
make a difference in US dealings with smaller nuclear 
powers, but it would only remove the deterrent threat from 
the weaker party, allowing more strategic options for US 
policymakers. S3 Where ballistic missile defense would be
62. Such systems will be devised using kinetic energy 
weapons (KEWs) such as Exo-Endoatmospheric Interceptors 
(E21s)êuid Ground-Based Interceptors (GBis) equipped with 
non-nuclear wairheads that destroy targets by the force of 
their impact with the target (Cooper 1991, 5).
63. Indeed in 1993 former Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin declared (as part of the Clinton administration's 1993 
Bottom-Up Review) that the primary threat to US security in 
the twenty-first century stemmed from nuclear pariah states. 
He concluded that "the new possessors of nuclear weapons may 
not be deterrad)le" (Kcirl 1996). If this is the case, there
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detrimental is in regional situations where strategic 
superiority could destabilize the dyad, such as in South 
Asia, or in the event that the Korean Peninsula was 
nuclearized.
Development of ballistic missile defense systems 
outside of the United States is quite limited however.
Israel is the notable exception having been a strong partner 
to the Untied States in developing Arrow interceptors.
Arrow interceptors are designed to intercept ballistic 
missiles in flight and are somewhat similar to the Patriot, 
but use a more advanced technology (Payne 1991). Israel has 
no nuclear-capable regional competitor, so their development 
of defensive missile capabilities does not harm deterrence 
in this case.
Time'8 Arrow
The impact of these technological improvements on state 
behavior could be profound. What this dissertation has 
indicated already is that the unique accomplishment of 
splitting the atom assisted in promoting more cautious, and, 
thus, more pacific behavior between states with that 
technological capability. It seems reasonable to envision 
that as technology advances over the coming decades, so too 
might constraints on escalation. Of course it depends upon 
the form this technology takes. As has been noted, advances 
in defensive systems could potentially threaten regional
is all the more reason for the United States to develop a 
limited nuclear defense.
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stability. But the trend in technology suggests that this 
will not be the case. In fact, the process of evolving 
technology tends to improve capabilities in an exponential 
fashion, which tends to promote more order within the 
system. MIT professor Raymond Kurzweil (1999, 32) observes, 
"Innovators seek to improve things by multiples. Innovation 
is multiplicative, not additive..." Kurweil (1999) thus 
concludes the following with regard to the evolution of life 
forms, and of technology:
— An evolutionary process is not a closed system; 
therefore, evolution draws upon the chaos in the 
larger system in which it takes place for its 
options for diversity; and
— Evolution builds on its own increasing order.
— Therefore, in an evolutionary process, order 
increases exponentially.
Figure Two: The Law of Accelerating Returns as
Applied to an Evolutionary Process
Thus, technology, like cuiy evolutionary process, builds on 
itself, and by doing so, increases order within the system 
in which it operates. Indeed, from a conflict perspective, 
it seems reasonable to assert that as technology has been 
inqproved, warfare has lessened in frequency within the 
international system. This notion is based on Correlates of 
War (COW) data tracking the frequency and chciracter of war 
in the international system since 1816. By breaking time- 
periods into roughly thirty year blocks until the end of the 
Cold War the number of initiated wars declines precipitously
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over time in relation to the number of states in the system. 
In fact, since 1918 the frequency of war outbreak "actually 
declines from four per state per decade prior to World Weir 
II to two per state per decade since [and even less since 
the Berlin WcLll was dismantled in 1989 ]. And if we control 
not for the number of states but the number of pairs, the 
decline appears even more dramatic" (Singer 1991, 57). As 
Table Eleven clearly indicates, the frequency of warfare in
Table Eleven: War in the International System,
1816-1994
Ava. Wars
Years Period # 
Concert of
of Wars # of States oer state
1816-1848 Europe 
Wars of 
European
33 28 1.18
1849-1881 unification
Resurgent
43 39 1.10
1882-1914 Imperialism 
The Great
38 40 .95
1915-1944 Depression 24 59 .41
1945-1988 The Cold War 
Post Cold
43 117 .37
1989-1994 Weu: 2464 174 .12
the international system per state per yecir declines in 
every approximate thirty year time-period occurring since 
the Concert of E u r o p e .
64. Post Cold War figure adjusted for a thirty year 
time period.
65. Such optimism has been challenged by some scholars 
who suggest that the proper measure should not be the number 
of wars that start, but the number of wars presently under 
way (Small and Singer 1982; Wallensteen and Sollenberg
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Part of this may be attributable to the destructive 
potential of nuclear weapons (at least after 1945), as well 
as the growing accuracy and effectiveness of modem 
weaponry. As the Intensity, accuracy and effectiveness of 
weaponry Is advanced and augmented by technology, so too may 
be the likelihood of order In the International system.
While Interstate warfare and conflict unlikely will ever 
abate con^letely, they probably will be lessened In 
frequency and Intensity by the march of technological 
progress.
Conclusion
In an evolving system, as Is the case with the current 
state-centric International system, the passage of time 
generally reflects the growth of order within the system. 
Successful behaviors cure learned or mimicked as the system 
members adapt to what has proven to be beneficial behavior 
In the past. Thus successful Institutions are generally 
adopted, as has been the case for democracy following the 
victory of the democratic Institutional structures of the 
West during the Cold War.
Indeed there Is a proliferation of democratic 
Institutions throughout the world, which many have suggested 
will lessen the chances for conflict between states. This
1995). Still, as Kegley and Wittkopf (1997, 365) note, "The 
so-called outbreak of peace In the post-Cold War [era] Is 
not mythical, however, as only four large-scale wars were 
under way between states In the 1989-1994 period 
(Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1995, 345)."
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so-called End of History thesis, eloquently proposed by 
Francis Fukuyama (1993), cirques that lesser states tend to 
emulate more successful ones and because the West scored a 
Pyrrhic victory in the Cold War, Fukuyama suggests that the 
democratic institutions of the winners will be copied 
throughout the world. In fact, there is some evidence of 
this institutional mimicry with democracy seeming to spring 
up in every corner of the world.
Yet this appears not to be the solitary facet of 
successful countries that states are seeking to copy. Like 
Fukuyama, Kenneth Waltz, as has been noted, argues for the 
impressionability of states suggesting that states who are 
successful are those that are best able to adapt. This 
Darwinian notion of state evolution suggests that democratic 
institutions will not be the only aspect copied by others.
In fact a secondary proliferation has become one not of 
institutions, but rather, weapons (specifically, nuclear 
weapons). Waltz (1995) notes, "Self-help is the principle 
of action in an anarchic order, and the most important way 
in which states must help themselves is by providing for 
their own security." Therefore the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is inevitable, as states strive to ensure 
their own survivability. Thus with the international system 
dictating a proliferation of nuclear weapons to more and 
more states. Waltz (1995) argues that war will become less
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likely because the weaponry (nuclear warheads) will be less 
suited for waging it.
The evidence this dissertation has presented suggests 
that there is merit to this argument. But as was the case 
with democratic states, such pacificity occurs only within 
dyadic relations between like states. That is, pairs of 
nuclear states produce lower levels of conflict than other 
types of interstate couplings. Thus it is regional nuclear 
asymmetries that should be of concern to US policymakers. 
Should North Korea ever evolve from nuclear opacity to overt 
nuclear capability the response to provide South Korea with 
like capability should be swift. And of more concern to US 
policymakers than a dyad of two nuclear states such as India 
and Pakistan should be interstate rivalries in which there 
is only one nuclear capable state (such as the case of China 
and Taiwan) or none at all (as might be evidenced by Iraq 
and Kuwait in 1991).
Certainly, the proliferation of nuclear weapons should 
not be taken lightly. But doom and gloom forecasts about 
the terrors these weapons will unleash on the world are 
overstated. As nuclear weapons spread in the next decades 
many fear that the likelihood of a nuclear mishap or 
exchange will increase (Schelling 1982; Martin 1997; Beres 
1998; Falkenrath 1998-99). Yet, thus far, countries of 
varying regime type, GNP, sizey and geographic locale have 
possessed and continue to possess these weapons with none of
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the nuclear horror stories so often trun^ted having 
occurred. Gremted, the spread of nuclear weapons should not 
be something to be wantonly encouraged, as the presence of 
nuclear weapons in typically conflictual dyads may not be 
warranted in every case (the current Greece-Turkey dyad for 
instance ). But it is also not something that need be overly 
feared. Nuclear weapons have helped to maintain peace 
within the international system since 1945, and they most 
likely will continue to do so into the twenty-first century 
until the next wave of innovation crashes over us and sweeps 
them into the vast ocean of obsolescence in which swim so 
many of the technological terrors of the past. Until that 
time, however, beati sunt possédantes.
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APPBHOZZ A 
THE HUCLBAR CLUB
United States 1945 —  present
Russia (USSR) 1950 —  present
United Kingdom 1953 —  present
France 1960 —  present
China 1964 —  present
Israel 1970 —  present
India 1974 —  present
Republic of South Africa 1980 —  1990
Pakistan 1986 —  present
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APPBVOIZ B
56 SYMMETRICAL NUCLEAR DYAD CONFLICT INSTANCES
1. US-USSR 1958
2. ÜS-USSR 1958
3. US-USSR 1961
4. US-USSR 1963
5. US-USSR 1964
6. China-USSR 1964
7. Ch±na-UKG 1964
8. US-USSR 1964
9. US-USSR 1964
10. US-USSR 1965
11. USSR-UKG 1965
12. Chlna-USSR 1965
13. China-US 1965
14. US-China 1965
15. China-USSR 1966
16. US-USSR 1966
17. US-USSR 1967
18. USSR-UKG 1967
19. USSR-US 1967
20. China-USSR 1967
21. China-USSR 1967
22. China-USSR 1968
23. UKG—China 1968
24. US-USSR 1968
25. China-USSR 1969
26. US-China 1969
27. US-USSR 1970
28. US-China 1971
29. US-China 1971
30. ISR-USSR 1971
31. US-USSR 1972
32. China-USSR 1973
33. China-USSR 1974
34. USSR-ISR 1974
35. India-China 1975
36. US-Israel 1975
37. China-USSR 1977
38. US-USSR 1977
39. US-USSR 1978
40. China-USSR 1978
41. China-USSR 1979
42. India-China 1979
43. China-USSR 1980
44. US-USSR 1980
45. US-USSR 1980
46. US-USSR 1980
47. US-USSR 1981
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48. US-USSR 1982
49. US-USSR 1984
50. China-India 1985
51. India-Pakistcm 1986
52. US-USSR 1986
53. China-USSR 1986
54. US-USSR 1986
55. Pak-India 1990
56. Pêüc-India 1991
190
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
APPBMDXZ C
291 ASYMMETRICAL NUCLEAR DYAD COEFLICT IESTAHCE8
1. Taiwan-us 1950
2. UKG-USSR 1950
3. US-Bulgaria 1951
4. USSR-Iran 1951
5. Sweden-USSR 1952
6. Ecuador-US 1952
7. Japan-USSR 1953
8. Talwan-USSR 1953
9. UKG—China 1953
10. us-China 1953
11. UKG—China 1954
12. China-US 1954
13. Finland-USSR 1954
14. Switzer land-U5 1954
15. US-Ecuador 1954
16. China—US 1955
17. Japan-USSR 1955
18. Sweden-USSR 1955
19. Taiwan-UKG 1955
20. UKG-Saudi Arabia 1955
21. US-Ecuador 1955
22. US-Peru 1955
23. Hungary-USSR 1956
24. Mexico-US 1956
25. Norway-USSR 1956
26. Saudi AraUaia-UKG 1956
27. US-China 1956
28. US-Egypt 1956
29. USSR-Norway 1956
30. USSR-Poland 1956
31. Chile-US 1957
32. Czechoslovakia-US 1957
33. USSR-Norway 1957
34. Albania-UKG 1958
35. Albania-US 1958
36. GDR-US 1958
37. Japan-USSR 1958
38. UKG-China 1958
39. UKG—Iceland 1958
40. UKG—Yar 1958
41. Brazil-USSR 1959
42. Dominican Republic-US 1959
43. Ireui-USSR 1959
44. Japan-USSR 1959
45. Philippines-USSR 1959
46. us-Switzerland 1959
47. USSR-Denmark 1959
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48. USSR-Japan 1959
49. USSR-South Korea 1959
50. China-US 1960
51. France-Tunisla 1960
52. Morocco-France 1960
53. UKG-Iceland 1960
54. US-Austria 1960
55. USSR-Belgium 1960
56. France-Tunisia 1961
57. UKG-Denmark(1) 1961
58. UKG-Denmark( 2 ) 1961
59. US-Dominican Republic 1961
60. USSR-Japan(1) 1961
61. USSR-Japan ( 2 ) 1961
62. China-USSR 1962
63. Japan-USSR 1962
64. Peru-US 1962
65. Turkey-USSR 1962
66. Braz il-France 1963
67. Ecuador-US 1963
68. Iran-USSR 1963
69. Japan-USSR 1963
70. USSR-Finland 1963
71. Yar-UKG 1963
72. France-Gabon 1964
73. GFR-USSR 1964
74. US-Egypt 1964
75. USSR-Japan 1964
76. Sweden-USSR 1964
77. China-lndia(1) 1965
78. China-India(2) 1965
79. Japan-USSR 1965
80. PRK-US 1965
81. UKG—Yar 1965
82. us-China 1965
83. China-India 1966
84. China-Netherlands 1966
85. China-South Korea 1966
86. China-Taiwan 1966
87. Taiwan-China 1966
88. UKG- Indones ia 1966
89. US-Guinea 1966
90. Yar-UKG 1966
91. China-India(1) 1967
92. China-India(2) 1967
93. Taiwan-China 1967
94. US-Ecuador 1967
95. Argentina-USSR 1968
96. Brazil-USSR 1968
97. Egypt-US 1968
98. North Korea-US 1968
99. UKG-China 1968
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100. US SR—Gh&n& 1968
101. USSR-Japan 1968
102. Venezuela-USSR 1968
103. China-Myanmar 1969
104. Indla-Chlna 1969
105. Peru-US 1969
106. Spaln-UKG 1969
107. USSR-Japan 1969
108. Is rael-Jordaui 1970
119. Jordan-Israel 1970
110. China-India 1971
111. Egypt-Israel 1971
112. US-Cuba(l) 1971
113. US-Cuba(2) 1971
114. US-Ecuador 1971
115. Guatemala-UKG 1972
116. Peru-US 1972
117. UKG-Iceland 1972
118. US-Ecuador 1972
119. China-India 1973
121. Israel-Egypt 1973
121. Israel-Syria 1973
122. Libya-Israel 1973
123. US-Libya 1973
124. Canada-US 1974
125. Cuba-US 1974
126. Syria-Israel 1974
127. UKG-Uganda 1974
128. Viebnéun-China 1974
129. Cambodia-US 1975
130. Canada-US 1975
131. Guatemala-UKG 1975
132. Israel-Egypt 1975
133. Israel-Syria 1975
134. US-Cuba 1975
135. USSR-Japan 1975
136. Vietnam-China 1975
137. Argentina-UKG 1976
138. Cuba-US 1976
139. France-Somalia 1976
140. India-Bangladesh 1976
141. Israel-Greece 1976
142. Israel-Turkey 1976
143. Is rael-Uganda 1976
144. North Korea-US 1976
145. Saudi Arabia-Israel 1976
146. South Korea-China 1976
147. Syria-UKG 1976
148. US-Panama 1976
149. USSR-Japan 1976
150. Argentina-USSR 1977
151. Cuba-US 1977
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152. Egypt-Israel 1977
153. Guatemala-UKG 1977
154. USSR-Japan 1977
155. Iran-USSR 1978
156. Israel-Syria 1978
157. Japan-China 1978
158. Japan-USSR 1978
159. Norway-USSR 1978
160. South Korea-USSR 1978
161. Egypt-Israel 1979
162. Iran-US 1979
163. Laos-China 1979
164. Peru-US 1979
165. Syria-Israel 1979
166. US-Canada 1979
167. US-Libya 1979
168. Bangladesh-lndia 1980
169. Israel-Syria 1980
170. USSR-Yugoslavia 1980
171. Bangladesh-lndia 1981
172. China-Vietnam 1981
173. Ecuador-US 1981
174. Israel-Iraq 1981
175. North Korea-US 1981
176. Pakistan-India 1981
177. Saudi Arabia-Israel 1981
178. Sweden-USSR 1981
179. US—Cuba 1981
180. Argentina-UKG(1) 1982
181. Argentina-UKG(2) 1982
182. China-Philippines 1982
183. India-Pakistan 1982
184. Israel-Iraq 1982
185. Israel-Syria 1982
186. Italy-USSR 1982
187. Libya-US(l) 1982
188. Libya-US(2) 1982
189. Nicaragua-US 1982
190. RSA-Lesotho 1982
191. Sweden-USSR 1982
192. US-North Korea 1982
193. USSR-Japan 1982
194. Vietnam-China 1982
195. Argentina-UKG 1983
196. Banglades h-India 1983
197. Israel-Egypt 1983
198. Mozambique-USSR 1983
199. Norway-USSR 1983
200. Pakistan-India 1983
201. South Korea-USSR 1983
202. Sweden-USSR 1983
203. Syria-US 1983
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204. US-Cuba 1983
205. US-Iran 1983
206. USSR-Iran 1983
207. Vietnam-China 1983
208. China-Vietnam 1984
209. France-Libya 1984
210. France-Spain 1984
211. India-Iran 1984
212. India-Pcücistan 1984
213. India-Sri Lanka 1984
214. Iran—UKG(1) 1984
215. Iran-UKG(2) 1984
216. Iran-US 1984
217. Iraq-India 1984
218. Japan-USSR 1984
219. RSA-Botswana 1984
220. China-South Korea 1985
221. Egypt-Israel 1985
222. France-Iran 1985
223. France-New Zealand 1985
224. India-Pakistan 1985
225. Iran—UKG 1985
226. Israel-Syria 1985
227. Israel-Tunis ia 1985
228. RSA-Botswana 1985
229. Vietnam-China 1985
230. Banglades h- India 1986
231. China-South Korea 1986
232. Iran—UKG 1986
233. Libya-Israel 1986
234. Libya-US 1986
235. RSA-Zimbabwe 1986
236. Swaz iland-RSA 1986
237. Vietnam-China 1986
238. Z imbabwe-RSA 1986
239. Canada-France 1987
240. China-Taiwan 1987
241. Cyprus-Israel 1987
242. France-Iran 1987
243. India-Banglades h 1987
244. India-Sri Lanka 1987
245. Iran-India 1987
246. Iran-USSR 1987
247. Norway-USSR 1987
248. Pakistéui-lndia 1987
249. RSA-Mozambigue(1) 1987
250. RSA-Mozambique(2) 1987
251. US-Cuba 1987
252. US-Iran 1987
253. US-Iraq 1987
254. us-Pananma 1987
255. USSR-Sweden 1987
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256. Vietnam-China(1) 1987
257. Vietnam-China(2) 1987
258. China-Vietnam 1988
259. France-Canada 1988
260. France-Iran 1988
261. Iraq-UKG 1988
262. Libya-US 1988
263. RSA-Swaziland 1988
264. RSA-Z imbabwe 1988
265. Swaz iland-RSA 1988
266. Taiwan-China 1988
267. us-lraq 1988
268. Canada-US 1989
269. Comoros-France 1989
270. France-Lebanon 1989
271. India-Sri Lanka 1989
272. Israel-Egypt 1989
273. Pakistan-South Korea 1989
274. Panama-US 1989
275. US-Iran 1989
276. Cuba-US 1990
277. North Korea-France 1990
278. Canada-US 1991
279. China-Taiwan 1991
280. Iran-US 1991
281. Iraq-Israel(1) 1991
282. Iraq-Israel(2) 1991
283. Is rael-Jordan 1991
284. Estonia-USSR 1992
285. Georgia-USSR 1992
286. Sri Lanka-India 1992
287. Papua NG-India 1992
288. Sweden-USSR 1992
289. US-Peru 1992
290. USSR-Moldova 1992
291. USSR-Ukraine 1992
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APPBVDIZ D
SIGNATORIES OP THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
Afghcuixs-tan 1970
Antigua and Barbuda 1985
Albêuila 1990
Algeria 1995
Andorra 1996
Angola 1996
Argentina 1995
Armenia 1993
Australia 1973
Austria 1969
Azerbaijan 1992
Bahamas, The 1976
Bahrain 1988
Bangladesh 1979
Barbados 1980
Belarus 1993
Belgium 1975
Belize 1985
Benin 1972
Bhutan 1985
Bolivia 1970
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994
Botswana 1969
Brazil 1998
Brunei 1985
Bulgaria 1969
Burkina Faso 1970
Burundi 1971
Cameroon 1969
Canada 1969
Cape Verde 1979
Central African Republic 1970
Chad 1971
Chile 1995
China 1992
Colombia 1986
Comoros 1995
Congo 1978
Congo, Republic of (Zaire) 1970
Costa Rica 1970
Croatia 1992
Cyprus 1970
Czech Republic 1993
Denmark 1969
Dominica 1968
Dominican Republic 1971
Djibouti 1996
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Ecuador 1969
Egypt 1981
El Salvador 1972
Equatorial Guinea 1984
Eritrea 1995
Estonia 1992
Ethiopia 1970
Fiji 1972
Finland 1969
France 1992
Gabon 1974
Gambiay The 1975
Georgia 1994
Germany 1975
Ghana 1970
Greece 1970
Grenada 1975
Guatemala 1970
Guinea 1985
Guinea-Bissau 1976
Guyana 1993
Haiti 1970
Holy See 1971
Honduras 1973
Hungary 1969
Iceland 1969
Indonesia 1979
Iran 1970
Iraq 1969
Ireland 1968
Italy 1975
Ivory Coast 1973
Jamaica 1970
Japan 1976
Jordan 1970
Kan^uchea 1972
Kenya 1970
Kiribati 1985
Korea (North) 1985
Korea (South) 1975
Kuwait 1989
Laos 1970
Lebanon 1970
Lesotho 1970
Liberia 1970
Libya 1975
Liechtenstein 1978
Luxembourg 1975
Macedonia 1995
Madagascar 1970
Malawi 1986
Malaysia 1970
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Maldives 1970
Mali 1970
Malta 1970
Marshall Islands 1995
Mauritania 1993
Mauritius 1969
Mexico 1969
Micronesia 1995
Moldova 1994
Monaco 1995
Mongolia 1969
Morocco 1970
Mozambique 1990
Myanmar 1992
Ncunibia 1992
Nauru 1982
Nepal 1970
Netherlands 1975
New Zealand 1969
Nicaragua 1973
Nigeria 1968
Norway 1969
Oman 1997
Palau 1995
Panama 1977
Papua New Guinea 1982
Paraguay 1970
Peru 1970
Philippines 1972
Poland 1969
Portugal 1977
Qatar 1989
Romania 1970
Russia (USSR) 1970
Rwanda 1975
San Marino 1970
Sao Tome and Principe 1983
Saudi Arabia 1988
St. Kitts and Nevis 1993
St. Lucia 1979
St. Vincent and The Grenadines 1984
Slovakia 1993
Slovenia 1992
Solomon Islands 1981
Somalia 1970
Spain 1987
Sri Lanka 1979
Sudan 1973
Surinam 1976
Swaziland 1969
Sweden 1970
Switzerland 1977
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Syrian Arab Republic 1969
Taiwan 1970
Tajikistan 1995
Tanzania 1991
Thailand 1972
Togo 1970
Tonga 1971
Trinidad emd Tobago 1986
Tunisia 1970
Turkey 1980
Turkmenistcui 1994
Tuvalu 1979
Uganda 1982
Ukraine 1994
United Arab Emirates 1995
United Kingdom 1968
United States 1970
Uruguay 1970
Uzbekistcui 1992
Vanuatu 1995
Vietnam 1982
Western Samoa 1975
Yemen 1979
Zambia 1991
Zimbabwe 1991
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